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ABSTRACT 
In synchronous educational discourse, teaching is predominantly perceived in terms 
of competences and scientific knowledge. In this thesis, I suggest an alternative 
understanding of teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice. This premise, while it 
is based on the idea of educating learners as persons, instead of simply teaching them 
knowledge and skills, postulates the practice of aretaic pedagogy. In drawing upon an 
Aristotelian view of virtue ethics and MacIntyre’s theory of practice, this study 
investigates the potential contribution of two courses, Drama Education and Theatre 
Education and Theatrical Play, to the promotion of the student primary teachers’ 
conception of teaching as aretaic pedagogy. Both courses are those I teach within the 
context of a teacher education programme at the University of Nicosia, Cyprus. 
Two qualitative methodological traditions contributed to the design of this study: case 
study and phenomenography. The research participants were six student primary 
teachers who attended the courses. Data emanated from both narrative/text-based and 
audio-visual-based methods, over the course of one academic year. In attempting to 
satisfy the research paradigm of both methodologies, the schema of analysis that I 
adopted was constructed on open-coding strategies and categorical aggregation 
consistent with constant comparative analysis. 
Findings indicate that the courses’ ensemble-based artistic work is the poetic space, 
which enables participants to practice both personal and professional virtues. Their 
personal aretaic development can be defined by virtues originated by dialogue, the 
beautiful, the will and consciousness. A nexus of these virtues, such as joy, trust and 
friendship/love are embedded in their pedagogy of drama/theatre education, which 
fortify their communication, playfulness, vigilance and artistry. 
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PROLOGUE  
Retrieving Pedagogical Issues, Initiating Research Questions 





The Theoretical Field  
Teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice is the leading pedagogical idea that 
drives this research study, through which it seeks to establish the theory that this 
notion is fundamental to understanding what good teaching is. In light of this 
perspective, this study wishes to explore what it might mean to think of good teaching 
not as a space of mastery of a complex knowledge base (Shulman, 1987), but rather as 
a space of practising virtues for both teacher and learners. This alternative paradigm 
of good teaching can be determined by the term aretaic pedagogy, which reflects a 
philosophical context that chimes primarily with Aristotelian virtue ethics – a 
tradition that also takes us back to Plato and Socrates. ‘Aretaic’, accordingly, 
originates from ‘the Greek term for excellence, arete’ (Steutel & Carr, 2005, p. 8). 
Although these two models of teaching have a dissimilar theoretical background, 
making them invariably appear unconnected, this study will suggest that the former, 
in praxis, subsists in the latter. This connection is explicit while, for Shulman (1987), 
the effectiveness of teaching depends upon a large bank of pedagogical knowledge 
regarding what and how to teach, a premise that within the scope of aretaic pedagogy 
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is interpreted by the practice of two Aristotelian intellectual virtues: epistêmê and 
technê. Unquestionably, both a teacher’s scientific and technical knowledge are 
integral to good teaching, but beyond this, which we might ponder as a given, good 
teaching cannot be delimited solely by this kind of pedagogical competence.  
Notwithstanding that Shulman’s rationalistic theory of teaching plays a predominant 
role in contemporary educational discourse and policy, we might argue that it arouses 
a serious skepticism about its significance in terms of a humanistic teleology of 
teaching. Its biggest problem is that it disregards the ethical-social parameters of 
teaching within which, as Biesta (2014) contends, ‘the relational dimensions of the 
event of subjectivity’, or else of ‘the event of “coming into presence”’ (p. 143) can be 
emancipated. Teaching, according to Campbell (2008b), is ‘one of the oldest 
expressions of human interaction and relationship’ and, as such ‘an interpersonal 
journey’ which is ‘far more nuanced and layered than what the teacher’s mastery of 
curricula and pedagogical techniques can fully enable’ (p. 357).  
Aretaic pedagogy, contrary to a technical-rationalist approach to teaching, sets at the 
heart of education the development of learners as persons through the practice of both 
intellectual and ethical virtues (Sockett, 2012). Following Aristotelian ethics, the life 
of the virtues is what constitutes eudaimonia, the highest good of the good life. 
Therefore, in terms of a person-centred vision, teaching gives priority, as I suggest in 
this study, to the construction of an epistemological environment that promotes 
learning as: (1) an exploratory and explanatory journey, (2) a dialogical activity and 
(3) a counter to egocentrism. Within this epistemological approach, knowledge and 
virtue can be intrinsically reconciled (ibid.). This is achievable because the process of 
gaining knowledge becomes an empirical and interpersonal one, urging the learners to 
form a personal ecology of good/virtuous dispositions. As Aristotle’s virtue 
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epistemology teaches us, good dispositions can result from a systematic practice of 
virtuous acts that, in turn, are transformed into virtues (NE, 1103a31-1103b1, 1107a-
1107a2).  
In addition, the use of the concept of practice, enclosed in the central idea of this 
study, corroborates the theory that teaching holds an ethical-social character; due to 
this property, the teacher’s ethical presence is a crucial presupposition. Practice, in 
accordance with MacIntyre’s (1981) celebrated definition, is a social activity fastened 
upon cooperation and communal goals, while its excellence depends on the internal 
goods that its participants attain and systematically seek to evolve. Αs inferred by 
Higgins (2011), teaching is such a practice whose excellence emerges from the 
application of virtue ethics. Concerning the virtues that a teacher needs to practise, 
Sockett (2012) indicates three types: those of ‘character, intellect, and care’ (p. 51).  
However, one reasonable question that this discussion must address is what has given 
rise to a neglect of – or even an antipathy to – the idea of teaching as a virtue-driven 
practice, which prevails in the educational discourse? Typically, the mistrust in this 
specific pedagogical idea, as Kristjánsson (2013) expounds, is based on 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations about the concept of virtue, which display it 
as: ‘unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, paternalistic, anti-democratic, 
conservative, individualistic, relative and situations dependent’ (p. 284, italics 
original).  
In the main, as argued by Sandin in his Rehabilitation of Virtue (1992), the negative 
stance towards the notion of virtue emanates from ‘Kohlberg’s dismissal of the 
philosophy of virtue as an example of an underdeveloped moralism [that] is a 
grotesque distortion of the tradition of ethics’ (p. 86). Kohlberg (1970), as a 
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developmentalist working in the late 20th century, is well known for his theories of 
moral development, which assume that the pursuit of virtue, habit and ethos are 
unfeasible in a viable programme of moral education, but also fundamentally 
defective. The ‘essence of morality for Kohlberg’, as Hunter stresses in his The Death 
of Character (2000), is found ‘in the kinds of reasoning brought to bear on situations 
of tension and conflict – the way a person decides what to do when confronted by a 
moral dilemma’ (p. 85). Interestingly, this dominant thesis of Kohlberg’s equation of 
ethics with moral reasoning has been criticised by Carr (1991), giving the following 
explanation:  
To omit any reference to the virtues in our account of morality in favour of 
a theory of moral reasoning or to conceive some topic-neutral process of 
moral reasoning as offering a route to understanding morality alternative to 
one which makes reference to moral dispositions is simply incoherent (p. 
167, italics original).  
 
Under this climate of disbelief in the value of virtue, modern educational theory is 
mostly construed as an empirical science, with little attention paid to the promotion of 
virtues (Sockett, 2012). This observation, practically, can be ascertained within the 
articulation of the aims of education, which govern the constitution of educational 
policies, school curriculum and learners’ performance-based assessment system, for 
example. Added to these channels of educational trends are also the programmes of 
teacher education, which Campbell (2011) indicates should be the starting point for 
the cultivation of student teachers’ ‘[e]thical knowledge’, both as ‘personal and 
professional capacity’ (p. 82). Acknowledging, therefore, this nexus of educational 
limitations on the sustainability of aretaic pedagogy, this study attempts to show how 
this alternative approach to teaching may be made visible as a philosophical notion 
and, also, as an object of empirical inquiry. 
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The Applied Field 
Teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice has been examined in this study within 
the context of two courses Drama Education and Theatre Education and Theatrical 
Play – both of which I teach in a teacher education programme at the University of 
Nicosia, Cyprus. From one perspective, the investigation of this central idea within 
drama/theatre education is surely not a new undertaking, since the field retains a long 
and powerful tradition of the promotion of virtues. Considering its history (Slade, 
1954; Bolton, 1979, 1990; Heathcote, 1982), drama/theatre education is 
diachronically associated with the potentiality of ‘personal growth and social 
transformation’ (Neelands & Nelson, 2013, p. 21). As Edward Bond puts it, ‘drama 
uses the same emotional and intellectual–psycho-physical–means by which, from 
birth onwards, and critically during childhood, each of us creates a “self”’ (cited in 
Nicholson, 2009, p. xi). 
Therefore, although existing studies in drama/theatre education do not generally make 
explicit use of the notion of virtue, they do however demonstrate not only the 
influence of the field on aretaic development, but also the epistemological conditions 
under which virtues can flourish. Beyond the work of Winston (1998) on the virtues 
within the narrative of traditional stories and the empirical studies undertaken by 
Wagner in Building Moral Communities Through Educational Drama (1999), there is 
a growing body of literature that highlights the fostering of a nexus of personal, 
interpersonal, dialogical, social, civic and poetic virtues. Indicatively, sympathy and 
empathy (Neelands & Nelson, 2013; Winston & Strand, 2013), cooperation, trust and 
laughter (Cahill, 2002; Nicholson, 2002; Winston, 2009), democratic virtues 
(Neelands, 2009a, 2009b), as well as creativity and artistry (Saxton & Miller, 2013; 
Winston, 2010, 2013) are some of the key virtues linked with the field. 
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Taking into account the irreducible interest in aretaic development within the space of 
drama/theatre education, the assumption that this study suggests an innovative 
prospect relies, consequently, upon two further factors. First, its primary purpose: how 
the drama/theatre education courses might serve as scaffolds for fostering the student 
primary teachers’ understanding of teaching as aretaic pedagogy, denotes the 
potential contribution of the field to a third domain, apart from personal and social 
development, to that of professional development. Second, as will be evidenced in the 
literature review, there is no other study as yet that has explored this specific notion of 
pedagogy within drama/theatre education in the context of teacher education. Two 
relevant studies, Training Teachers’ Behaviour (2002) by Henriette Coppens and 
Teaching is Performing: An Alternative Model of Teacher Education (1997) by 
Jennifer Whatman, although concentrating on the benefits of drama courses in 
preparing student teachers, nonetheless do so through theoretical lenses that differ 
from those used in this study.  
Hence, given the above major aim, it is apparent that the central research question that 
this project seeks to explore is: how do we educate student primary teachers to lead 
them to a familiarity with aretaic pedagogy. This fundamental question is scrutinised 
through a set of more specific sub-questions, on the basis of the two qualitative 
methodological approaches, case study and phenomenography. In particular, by 
exploiting a rich gamut of narrative/text-based and audio-visual-based methods, this 
study examines the following four research sub-questions: 
• What ecological conditions developed within the drama/theatre education 
courses could be seen to contribute to the promotion of teaching/a teacher’s 
virtues?  
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• What are the kinds of virtues that might be developed in the framework of 
these courses? 
• To what extent did the student primary teachers apply an aretaic pedagogy in 
their teaching practices of drama/theatre education? 
• What kinds of learning experiences do student teachers describe as critical in 
shaping their perception of teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice 
(within the context of their teacher preparation programme)? 
Personal Experience in Research Field 
Teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice is a pedagogical proposal, intimately 
intertwined with both my professional experience as a teacher and as a postgraduate 
student. This suggests that its process of becoming chimes with Freire’s (1998a) 
notion of the future as ‘something constructed by people engaged together in life’ (p. 
72). The different educational settings in which I have taught and have been taught 
and, also, the challenges I had to confront in each case, enabled me to see good 
teaching in terms of two fundamental premises: the student’s self to be amplified 
cognitively, emotionally and ethically and, second, the teacher’s presence to establish 
a state of connectedness both to the mental and emotional context of the learning 
environment.  
When I was first appointed at a rural school as the sole teacher of six classes with, in 
total, twenty-four pupils between the ages of 6-12, I initially believed that in order to 
manage the massive volume of my teaching task I would have to become a “bionic 
teacher”! Reality, however, taught me another way, that of strategic partnership. I 
gradually learnt how a classroom functions as a community where pupils themselves 
can perform the role of a second teacher. Practically speaking, teaching was operating 
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as a space for the exercise of the virtues of collaboration, responsibility and 
autonomy.  
Later on, at an inner city school, I learnt what teaching primarily means as an 
intellectual and technical practice. The conditions, which were conducive to the 
formation of this perception, were predominantly the application of a holistic 
approach to language learning in Class A (6-7 years old), along with the writing of the 
national curriculum of Natural Sciences for Class B (7-8 years old). Good teaching for 
me, at this point, was connected to the effectiveness of child-centred methods, which 
could lead pupils to experiential learning through exploration, play and pleasure. A 
key evaluation criterion of teaching was therefore the transfiguration of pupils’ 
indifference to curiosity, which was apt to activate ‘multiple areas of the brain, 
including memory storage’ (Saxton & Miller, 2013, p. 113).  
Subsequently, my transition from public primary education to private primary 
education was an important landmark in my conception of teaching. Working mainly 
with the pupils of Class F (11-12 years old), my teaching became mainly a dialogical 
practice. The emancipatory capacity of dialogue was robust enough ‘to raise … [the 
pupils’] eyes beyond the immediate’ and to help them ‘learn more about themselves’ 
and ‘build an identity grounded in new self-images’ (Day, 2004, p. 176). Nonetheless, 
the dialogic perspective of teaching was what I came to understand most deeply, both 
ontologically and epistemologically, during my Master studies in Drama and Theatre 
Education at the University of Warwick in 2005-2006.  
In the context of Drama and Theatre Education, teaching is remodeled as a space of 
the self’s consciousness. In workshops, the classroom obtained the sense of a 
laboratory (Neelands, 2009a), but not in the way I had been used to perceiving its 
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operation, namely to be based on teamwork and investigation through materials. 
Instead, it leaned on the dynamics of the poetic expression of ideas and emotions, 
employing the body, metaphorical thought and space itself; these were in fact the 
primary tools towards the exploration of self and otherness. As a consequence, the 
pedagogy of drama and theatre education could be described as illustrative of the 
synergetic operation of four coefficients: of theatre, aesthetics, sociability and virtue 
ethics.  
This is the frame of pedagogy, which I now aim at applying within the two courses I 
teach. It is within this context that this research project has examined the development 
of aretaic pedagogy in regard to the data collected by six student primary teachers. 
Outline of the Study 
The writing of this thesis is arranged in four parts. The first, Examining Spaces of 
Eudaimonia: The Nexus Between Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, Teaching and 
Drama/Theatre Education, is structured into three chapters, offering a literature 
review of the key theoretical issues which support this study. Chapter 1 examines both 
the ontology and epistemology of virtue in accordance with Aristotle and, also, 
studies MacIntyre’s sociological approach to the philosophy of virtue ethics within 
the social practices of our life. Chapter 2 explores the implications of a person-centred 
vision of pedagogy through an epistemological approach to teaching and, 
concurrently, suggests the teacher’s presence as an indispensable epistemological 
factor of aretaic pedagogy. In Chapter 3, I pursue an argument which introduces the 
epistemology of drama/theatre education and its potentials for aretaic development, 
giving priority to the virtues promoted in the framework of dialogue and the ethics of 
the beautiful. 
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The second part, separated into two chapters, illustrates the theoretical and empirical 
process of the design of the study. Chapter 4 focuses on the inquiry paradigm of 
qualitative research and indicates the logic of the combination of two methodologies, 
of case study and phenomenography. It also delineates the specific socio-cultural and 
pedagogical contexts of the study and, further, discusses the criteria I used for the 
selection of the research participants. Chapter 5 is devoted to the explanation of the 
methods used in both processes of data collection and data analysis. In addition, it 
deliberates issues of trustworthiness and ethics, pointing out the techniques employed 
for the internal validity of the study.  
Chapters 6 and 7 compose the third and largest part of this study, which presents the 
research findings and the theories that underpin them. The main body of Chapter 6 
begins with a presentation of the research participants’ profiles, including aspects of 
their ethos and personality, as well as their pedagogical views of good 
teaching/teachers. The remaining four subchapters of this chapter come up with a 
spectrum of research data that provides answers to the four key research questions. 
Therefore, the examination of the ecological conditions of the drama/theatre 
education courses, which contributed to the participants’ aretaic development, is first 
followed by the documentation of the kinds of virtues promoted within the courses 
and, second, by the analysis of the aretaic pedagogy applied by the participants. The 
chapter concludes with a demonstration of the participants’ views regarding the role 
of their education programme in their understanding of teaching as an ethical practice. 
Chapter 7 attempts to articulate a theory of the participants’ aretaic development and 
aretaic pedagogy within the context of drama/theatre education. It initially explores 
the impact of beauty, playfulness and ensemble-based pedagogy on what I argue to be 
the enhancement of the participants’ virtuous dispositions and, by extension, of their 
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aretaic development. Then, it considers the professional virtues that the participants 
developed within the courses which affected their pedagogy, as evidenced in their 
teaching practices of drama/theatre education in primary schools. 
Finally, the fourth part, within Chapter 8, sums up the central findings of this research 
project and demonstrates their significance with respect to virtue epistemology, the 
ontology of good teaching and teacher education. Given the findings, I make 
suggestions for new policy and further research and argue my personal reflections on 
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Chapter 1 
ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS IN POST-MODERNITY 
Much contemporary moral philosophy … has tended to focus on what it is   
right to do rather than on what it is good to be, on defining the content of 




1.1 INTRODUCTION: BEYOND MORALITY 
In this first chapter of the study, a (re)conceptualisation of the notion of good is 
attempted vis-à-vis the Aristotelian ethics of arete. Literature in the field of 
contemporary philosophy has observed the popularity of Aristotelian virtue ethics, a 
popularity that has been regained for more than half a century now (Anscombe, 1958; 
Foot 1958; MacIntyre, 1981; Nussbaum, 1986; Williams, 1972). As noted by 
MacIntyre (2007), the cause of the shift towards this philosophical current can be 
found in the inadequacies that emerged from the Enlightenment Project, which was 
grounded on a culture of an absolute rationality, emotivism and relativism. Nussbaum 
(1987) affirms that in the search for an alternative approach to ethical theory, ‘the 
concept of virtue is playing a prominent role. So, too is the work of Aristotle, the 
greatest defender of an ethical approach based on the concept of virtue’ (p. 1).  
Considering that the term ethics has a central position in the context of this study, its 
interpretation is therefore a substantial prerequisite. Observing its use in literature, we 
can easily ascertain that it is often employed as interchangeable with the term 
morality, and at times they are both conceived as tautological concepts. But a close 
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investigation of both terms might challenge such a perspective. Williams (1985) and 
Papastefanou (2010) offer an illuminating analysis of both terms, highlighting their 
fundamental distinctions. As they both argue, moral duties and obligations, which are 
expressed in deontic notions like, “should”, “ought”, “right” and “wrong”, factually 
constitute morality, but not ethics. In Papastefanou’s view, moral maxims and 
principles regulate what is permitted; thus, moral law plays a protective role for 
individuals’ desires and dangerous intentions (ibid.). According to Williams (1985), 
this kind of morality is a peculiar version of ethics, which does not represent ‘an 
invention of philosophers. It is the outlook, or incoherently, part of the outlook, of 
almost all of us’ (p. 194).  
In addition, based on the French philosopher Badiou (2005), Papastefanou (2010) 
asserts that ethics has a more universal character, considering what would be a 
generalised principle as a virtuous response to ethical questions. For instance, within 
this theoretical frame, if one tells the truth, either because of some abstract principle 
such as “we should not lie”, or to achieve a good consequential result that could 
happen on that occasion, then such an attitude can be identified as moral. Instead, an 
ethical stance would focus on the value of the ethics of truth in personal or social life, 
underlining the significance of being truthful. At this point, the comparison that Slote 
(1992) draws between notions of virtue ethics and deontic notions is useful, not only 
to aid our understanding of the heterogeneity of ethics and morality, but also to 
introduce us to the Aristotelian perception of ethics, as examined subsequently in the 
first subchapter. Specifically, he points out: 
A virtue ethics in the fullest sense must treat aretaic notions (like “good” or 
“excellent”) rather than deontic notions (like “morally wrong”, “ought”, 
and “obligation”) as primary, and it must put greater emphasis on the 
ethical assessment of agents and their (inner) motives and character traits 
than it puts on the evaluation of acts and choices (ibid., p. 89).  
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Having briefly delineated the orientation of morality and ethics, the contextualised 
landscape of this chapter will be Nicomachean Ethics – the founding writing of virtue 
ethics – a space beyond morality. The study of Aristotelian ethics is mapped into two 
basic subchapters. In the first, our attention is turned to the nature of virtue ethics, 
which lies on three themes: the teleological character of virtue ethics, the two 
categories of virtues – the ethical and the intellectual – and the nexus between self and 
virtue ethics framed by the contemporary spirit of life. The second subchapter 
emphasises the construction of Aristotelian ethics as a sociological philosophy by 
MacIntyre (1981), describing the architecture of the theory of practice, its scope and 
the idea of internal goods. Also, it discusses the significance of practice in 
professional ethics. The whole chapter concludes with an overview of virtue ethics 
and its contribution to the design of this study. 
 
1.2 THE NATURE OF ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS 
The ethics of Aristotle is not as unfamiliar to us as one might at first think. In fact, it 
is may be well rooted in our lives. The study of book I of Nicomachean Ethics is the 
proper site for one to begin making conscious sense of this theory, along with the 
classical ending slogan of fairy tales, “… and they lived happily ever after” – a slogan 
that all of us have heard or narrated. Comparing this motto with its equivalent in 
Greek, “και έζησαν αυτοί καλά και εµείς καλύτερα” (and they lived well and we now 
live better) helps highlight the fact that fairy tales present an aspirational idea of life. 
Such tales revel in portraying good people who have happy endings connected with 
goodness as the ideal beauty of life. But this concern what truly conceals is a 
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philosophy of life, that of Aristotle’s lectures to Nicomachus, his son, and to those 
who desired to hear. 
1.2.1 Virtue Ethics: A Teleological Space 
Aristotle’s first logos, ‘every art and every investigation, and likewise and every 
practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good’ (NE, 1094a1-1094a2), 
sets his philosophical position for life, or as Aristotle would prefer his political 
starting-point. For Aristotle, all human action aims towards a goal, which may vary 
from case to case. He argues that there are two basic types of goals: those that 
constitute ends to themselves and those that subordinate to other goals. In many cases, 
both types of goal can happen simultaneously. For instance, learning swimming is an 
end in itself and still a means for someone to be fit.  
The question with reference to good that attracts a great deal of thought is how 
Aristotle identifies the quality of goodness. He gives it the name of εὐ-δαιµονίαν 
(eudaimonia) and defines it – ‘τὸ δ᾽ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν’ – precisely translated: 
‘living well and doing well’ (NE, 1095a20). Essentially, eudaimonia appears to 
enclose two functions, one theoretical and one practical. It has been the subject of 
many studies and a couple of alternative interpretations exist in the literature. It is 
frequently translated as ‘blessedness, happiness, prosperity’ (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 
139), or even, “flourishing”, “good living”, and “well-being” (Marangos & 
Astroulakis, 2010, p. 552). Meanwhile, Ross (1995) and Smith (2001) point out that 
the conventional translation of eudaimonia, as “happiness”, is unsuitable in 
Aristotelian ethics. Ross (1995) explains that “happiness” is ‘a state of feeling, 
differing from ‘pleasure’ only by its suggestion of permanence, depth, and serenity’, 
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whereas Aristotle discusses eudaimonia as ‘a kind of activity; that it is not any kind of 
pleasure, though pleasure naturally accompanies it’ (p. 122). 
From the discussion so far, what might be inferred is that eudaimonia sounds too 
inaccurate to be articulated with a single term. This is evident in MacIntyre’s (1981) 
perception, according to which, eudaimonia ‘is the state of being well and doing well 
in being well’ (p. 139). Though this interpretation reflects Aristotle’s definition of the 
term, it still remains quite abstract. Yu (2001) suggests that an appropriate meaning of 
Aristotle’s eudaimonia needs to be based on the function of the human soul – an issue, 
at the heart of Aristotle’s ethics.   
1.2.2 Virtue Ethics: A Unity of Character and Intellect  
What is necessary in understanding how the human entity operates, as Aristotle 
contends, is the study of the human soul, the place wherein arête belongs. Anscombe 
(1958) has characterised this study as ‘an adequate philosophy of psychology’ (p. 1). 
Aristotle divides the soul into two parts – the rational and the irrational (NE, 1139a5) 
– and this separation becomes the criterion for the classification of virtues into two 
major categories: the ethical and the intellectual. He highlights that both parts of the 
soul are governed by reason but in different ways, a point which becomes clear from 
the statement: ‘though irrational, yet in a manner participates in rational principle’ 
(NE, 1102b15-1102b16).  
Aristotle defines the ethical virtue as ‘a settled disposition of the mind determining 
the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the 
mean relative to us’, as finally ‘the prudent man would determine it’ (NE, 1107a-
1107a2). In a similar way, Rawls (1971) generally identifies virtues as ‘sentiments, 
that is related families of dispositions, and properties regulated by a higher desire’ (p. 
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192) – a desire to act, in accordance with what is good, in particular cases. In the 
process of acting virtuously, Aristotle ascribes the same seriousness both to reason of 
the rational soul and emotions of the irrational soul, which, as pointed out above, 
holds a rational-irrational dialectic. Significantly, when Aristotle refers to ethical 
virtues he typically underlines that ‘feelings and actions are the objects with which 
virtue is concerned’ (NE, 1106b24). The cognitive hermeneutic of emotions will be 
further explained in the following section, concerned with the formation of ethical 
virtues. It is however a theory that has become notably popular, as it is emphatically 
echoed by modern cognitive theories of emotion (Best, 1992; Damasio, 1995; 
Goleman, 1996).  
1.2.2.1 Ethical virtues: Learning by habit 
The irrational part of the soul is the space of the virtues of ἦθος (character) – the 
ethical virtues – that are the product of ἔθος (habit). Both terms – ἦθος and ἔθος – are 
key terms, given that their semantics signify the origin of ethics. According to 
Aristotle, ἠθικὴ (ethics) derives from ἦθος, which is risen from and depends on ἔθος 
(NE, 1103α17-1103a18). Such an etymological analysis sheds even more light on the 
pragmatic interpretation of ethics discussed in the introduction to this chapter. 
Manifestly, Aristotle is actually interested in the development of character and its 
relationship to ethical life. He argues, for instance, that we become brave by 
performing brave actions, because in so doing we gain those dispositions that make us 
ready to act with bravery (NE, 1103b1). In this sense, hexis (habituation) turns into a 
practical method of learning an ethical virtue. As Aristotle affirms: ‘Mark me, my 
friend, ’tis long-continued training, [a]nd training in the end becomes men’s nature’ 
(NE, 1152a33-1152a35).   
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In the process of habituation, emotion has a dynamic role (see Figure 1.1). It can 
empower the shape of those dispositions that emerge from actions. For Aristotle, 
emotion is ‘of itself a type of perception of value, specifically, perception of the value 
of certain particulars’ (Achtenberg, 2002, p. 44). This exegesis seems very compatible 
with Aristotle, as he infers ‘it appears that life in the full sense is sensation or thought’ 
(NE, 1170a19-1170a20). As Norman (1983) identifies the relational interplay of 
emotions and reason, he concludes that for ‘Aristotle, feelings themselves can be the 
embodiment of reason. It is not just a matter of reason controlling and guiding the 
feelings. … Reason can be present in them’ (p. 52). Yet, Nussbaum’s (1986) view, 
that emotions might be ‘the truer and deeper level of ourselves’ (p. 390), confirms 
their influence on giving shape to virtues. 
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle expands on a wide spectrum of ethical virtues. 
Among them, friendship is discussed as one of the most significant virtues, essential 
to the constitution of any form of community. It varies in its expression; self-centred 
or utilitarian friendship is not appreciated as the kind of a virtuous person. Aristotle 
commends those friends, who are seen as integral to each other’s lives (NE, 1171b34-
Figure 1.1: The habituation process of learning an ethical virtue 
 
	  	   20	  
1171b35), and thus, what is good for one is intimately connected with what is good 
for the other. This frame of friendship opens the prospect of a space in which other 
character virtues can be learnt and practised (Healy, 2011) – amiability, sincerity, wit, 
and liberality, for instance. The amiable person cares for a friendly companionship 
with others and avoids any vices, as the lover of truth is expected to avoid being 
dishonest in any case. ‘But life also includes relaxation, and one form of relaxation is 
playful conversation’ (NE, 1127b34-1127b35), giving the chance for the growth of 
witty character by expressing charming and tactful ways of joking with others. In this 
spirit of community, the liberal person prefers to give than take wealth (NE, 1119b24-
1119b25). 
Central to ἦθος is bravery, but rashness is a defect of fear, and cowardice an excess of 
it (NE, 1107b1-1107b4). Patience is recognised as a virtue, which protects one from 
being irascible. Aristotle praises honour – showing admiration and respect towards 
those who merit it – and temperance – desiring physical pleasures conducive to health 
and fitness – seeing them as supportive virtues facilitating the self to maintain a 
proper balance in social and personal circumstances. Justice is, for Aristotle, a huge 
issue divided into the lawful and the fair, two different aspects of universal justice. In 
brief, being fair means to treat equals equally and unequals unequally in relation to 
their relative differences. There are also two virtues elaborated by Aristotle, 
µεγαλοψυχία (magnanimity) and magnificence. Commenting on them, MacIntyre 
(1981) notes that they both address the status of the Athenian gentleman: while 
µεγαλόψυχος (magnanimous) is the person who possesses pride, dignity and self-
esteem, the magnificent individual aims to achieve the finest and most appropriate 
results for public issues.  
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Closing this portrayal of the virtues of character, it is not difficult to ascertain how 
Williams’ (1985) perspective for Aristotelian virtues – as thick concepts – fits with 
the concept of ethics I have previously described. Ethical virtues in their wholeness 
convey a system that invites anew fresh visions for the conditions of the good life, 
possibly more idealistic and, in a sense, not less realistic. In Socrates’ words, ‘what 
we are talking about is how one should live’ (ibid., p. 1). What might follow then, is a 
three-dimensional search for ourselves that combines: reason, feelings and character. 
1.2.2.2 Intellectual virtues: Learning by teaching 
Drawing our attention, this time, to the intellect of the rational part of the soul, we 
will comprehend that it has the adequacy ‘to arrive at both theoretical and practical 
truth’ (MacIntyre, 1990, p. 111). Applying his analytical approach, Aristotle divides 
the rational soul into two parts: the scientific/theoretical and the deliberative/practical 
(NE, 1139a5-1139a11). The scientific part of the rational soul contemplates ‘those 
things whose first principles are invariable’ (NE, 1139a8), in opposition to the 
practical one, which deliberates particular things that are variable (NE, 1139α9).  
Aristotle proceeds and specifies the intellectuality of the rational soul in five key 
virtues: nous (intelligence), epistêmê (scientific knowledge) and sophia (wisdom) – 
which belong to the scientific part – technê (art or craft knowledge) and phronēsis 
(practical wisdom) – properties of the practical part. Moreover, the rational soul’s 
function is facilitated by two additional intellectual capacities: synesis 
(understanding), which helps one to right judgments for things that may be in doubt 
(NE, 1143a7-1143a9) and gnōme (good sense) – the sensitive path ready to forgive 
others and to judge well what is fair or equitable (NE, 1143a19-1143a24). Intellectual 
virtues, in contrast to ethical virtues, are teachable (NE, 1139b25-1139b26), not the 
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end of habitual exercise. As noted by MacIntyre (1981) to become ‘theoretically or 
practically wise’ is ‘a result of systematic instruction’ (p. 145). 
The importance that Aristotle attributes to intellectual virtues is manifest in a series of 
arguments he makes about the diverse roles they have to enact, principally in a 
harmonised cooperation. First, he highlights the power of nous by stating that 
‘intelligence more than anything else is man’ (NE, 1178a9), and yet he describes it 
using Plato’s metaphor, the ‘eye of the soul’ (NE, 1144a30). Nous is that human 
faculty able to apprehend fundamental principles and truths, also laws or definitions, 
and self-evident statements that do not need demonstration. However, demonstration 
is the object of epistêmê, ‘which proceeds either by way of induction, or else by way 
of deduction’ (NE, 1139b27-1139b28). Hence, epistêmê can be any theory ‘produced 
by conventional research’ that fulfils the ‘traditional criteria of reliability and validity, 
and has the potential for broad generalization’ (Lunenberg & Korthagen, 2009, p. 
226). Sophia, then, is the “mother” virtue of nous and epistêmê, which embraces both 
virtues, and in this way is the most perfect (NE, 1141a16-1141a21). Aristotle asserts 
that sophia without phronēsis is potential to exist, but uselessly (NE, 1141b3-1141b8). 
In so doing, he stresses a key notion of phronēsis’ function that I will examine below. 
Technê is the parent word of a large family of terms. To name a few of the most 
frequently used – technique, technical, technician, technology, technologist, 
technocracy – all are concentrated on production and construction. Aristotle stresses 
that technê is a rational virtue that ‘deals with bringing something into existence’, and 
to pursue it means to study ‘how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist 
or not, and the efficient cause of which lies in the maker and not in the thing made’ 
(NE, 1140a12-1140a14). In this view, technê is interwoven with epistêmê – meaning 
theoretically elaborated – and its excellence depends on the hands of the craftsman. In 
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his book The Craftsman (2009), Sennett indicates that technê has been proven through 
the histories of all professions that ‘focuses on the intimate connection between hand 
and head. Every good craftsman conducts a dialogue between concrete practices and 
thinking; this dialogue evolves into sustaining habits’ (p. 9). Accordingly, technê may 
become instrumental in bringing universal certain knowledge and therefore promoting 
the epistemology of a practice. 
The last, but by no means the least virtue of the rational soul is phronēsis. This could 
be characterised as the most responsible of the virtues, disclosing the fullness of the 
‘vita activa’ (Arendt, 1998, p. 7) of Aristotle’s entire system of ethics. It is 
encapsulated in one laconic phrase: ‘κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον’ that means, ‘according to 
the right reason’ (NE, 1144b23). Phronēsis, then, is able to discern how to exercise 
virtuous judgments in particular conditions, sometimes assisted by both synesis and 
gnōme. While it is neither epistêmê nor technê, in practice it seems to lack stability 
but no intelligence, since it is acknowledged as the second rationality (Elliott, 1991). 
Its role permits it to treat reason multidimensionally, which actually denotes that 
‘phronesis represents the quality of the perception of concrete situations’ (Lunenberg 
& Korthagen, 2009, p. 226, italics original). This quality of perception can also filter 
those dispositions obtained in the process of habituation of ethical virtues, as has been 
previously illustrated (see Figure 1.1, p. 19). In the light of such energy, phronēsis and 
ethical virtues are inseparably connected. Aristotle clarifies that phronēsis and ethical 
virtues determine: 
the complete performance of man’s proper function: [Ethical] virtue   
ensures the rightness of the end we aim at … [phronēsis] ensures the 
rightness of the means we adopt to gain the end (NE, 1144a6-1144a9).  
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Given this spherical analysis of the human virtues (see Figure 1.2), Aristotle puts 
forward a twofold harmony of the soul function: first, the reciprocal relation of 
intellectual virtues and, second, the interdependence of character and intellect by 
means of phronēsis. This interweaving of phronēsis and ethical virtue shows both that 
phronēsis ‘is not autonomous and cannot determine its own end’ (Yu, 2001, p. 126) 
and that the formation of ethos is not a mechanical process, but a rationally driven 
one. From such a picture of the soul, what comes to light is the synthesis of Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia. If we recall it as ‘the end at which all actions aim’ (NE, 1097b20-
1097b21), its signifier might therefore be justified as the activation of a unity of both 
kinds of virtues, both ethical and intellectual. Its signified is, at last, a matter of 
choice, like ‘… and they lived happily ever after’ – a choice guided by tradition.  
 
 
1.2.3 Virtue Ethics: “Being Eudaimon for a Lifetime” 
Eudaimonia, as demonstrated, seems to be a provocative activity which demands, in 
essence, two practical applications from the virtuous self. On the one hand, it can 
hardly exist without an ethically and intellectually unified self, and on the other hand, 
Figure 1.2: Aristotle’s anatomy of the human soul 
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it insists on ‘a complete lifetime’ (NE, 1100a4-1100a5). These prerequisites of 
Aristotelian ethics define the self to be virtuous in all aspects of its life, both in private 
and public and even at work or at leisure (MacIntyre, 1981). While, for Kant, ‘one can 
be both good and stupid’, for Aristotle, ‘stupidity of a certain kind precludes 
goodness’ (ibid., p. 145).  
This ethics of self therefore needs to be in praxis for the whole life. Aristotle justifies 
such a politics of self by illustrating that ‘one swallow does not make spring, nor does 
one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of … [eudaimonia] does not 
make a man [eudaimon]’ (NE, 1098a18-1098a20). So, what can be overall inferred 
for eudaimonia is that it stands remote from any suspicion of instrumentality. 
MacIntyre (1981) elucidates this and notes that ‘the exercise of the virtues is not … a 
means to the end’ of the good life, but it ‘is a necessary and central part of such a life’ 
(p. 140).     
Nevertheless, the ethics of “being eudaimon for a lifetime” has been extensively 
discussed as a philosophy that encounters specific obstacles in order to be applied in 
contemporary life (MacIntyre, 1981; Taylor, 1989; Williams, 1985). As argued by 
MacInytre (1981), this incompatibility has two basic dimensions, a social and a 
philosophical one. The social complexity derives from the pointed separation that 
seems to exist between the self and the social roles that it has to employ.  
Following a sociological perspective, in his The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(1990), Goffman interprets the self as “theatrical” playing its social roles by 
representing routines through different manners and conducts in the ‘front region’ 
(stage) of performance, in comparison with the back of the stage. That is to say, in 
MacIntyre’s (1981) words, ‘life comes to appear as nothing but a series of 
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unconnected episodes – a liquidation of the self’ (p. 191) – an image that depicts the 
threat of performativity (Ball, 2003). This is not the case of the virtuous self. On the 
contrary, what is expected from a person who truly possesses a virtue is that they be 
capable of conveying it in different and particular conditions, where its practical 
embodiment arises as a denoted characteristic of a unitary virtuous life. 
Regarding the philosophical obstacle for Aristotelian ethics, Taylor (1989) believes 
that contemporary life gives rise to a new sense of self – the individualistic self. In 
Carlson’s (1996) view, the ‘increasing fluidity and porousness of social and cultural 
structures’ (p. 188) influences the steadiness of traditional norms, which seem 
inadequate to deal with questions of conflict and change in the new social world and, 
as a consequence, reflect at the personal level. The self challenges received ideas and 
dominant traditions of thinking, and in doing so, the self can be what Lifton (1993) 
has called “the protean self”. This new sort of self is basically engaged, as MacAloon 
(1984) has observed, ‘in continuous exploration and personal experiment’ (p. 9). 
Thus, modern individualism has the propensity to urge the self to see complex human 
issues in terms of simple components (MacIntyre, 1981), or else, in Williams’ (1985) 
words, ‘in a single deliberative language thin enough to be applicable in all situations’ 
(p. 174).  
On the basis of this inhospitability of contemporary life to eudaimonistic ethics, 
MacIntyre (1981) has sought a new road that might offer innovative approaches to 
practical and realistic applications of virtue ethics in social life. Referring to such a 
quest, he recognises that ‘looking for a concept of the good … will enable us to 
understand the place of integrity and constancy in life’; what is more, ‘a quest is 
always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-
knowledge’ (ibid., p. 204). This quest, however, is the core of the next subchapter. 
	  	   27	  
1.3 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH  
What we can learn from Aristotle so far is that virtue ethics is visible in eudaimonia; it 
has its own, unique “spectacularity”. It is alive in three different kinds of actions: 
theoria (theory), poetry and praxis (Dunne, 1993). Theoria leads to epistêmê. Poetry, 
the child of the word ποιεῖν (making), accompanies technê. Praxis is the action guided 
by ethical virtues and phronēsis. All these energies can coexist in the life of practice. 
In his After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981), MacIntyre constructs a new 
sociological theory of practice, central to which is posited Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
The key aim of his theory is the potentiality of developing one’s self eudaimon.  
1.3.1 The Architecture of MacIntyre’s Philosophy 
Quoting MacIntyre (1981), ‘… I have given, a sociology, which aspires to lay bare 
the empirical, causal connection between virtues, practices, and institutions’ (p. 196). 
Reflecting upon these words, it becomes clear that MacIntyre’s major concern is to 
provide ‘an explanatory scheme which, can be tested in particular cases’ (ibid.). This 
sociological approach to virtue ethics is formulated on the basis of a new synthesis of 
the concept of practice – ‘a famous and much-quoted’ model of practice – as Dunne 
(2005, p. 368) comments. In the conception of practice, MacIntyre places virtues in a 
close relation to a novel ethical entity – that of goods – a point that shows his 
departure from Aristotle. In particular, MacIntyre (1981) proposes:  
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended (p. 175). 
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MacIntyre’s voice indeed does not sound less intricate than Aristotle’s. His 
proposal essentially appears to exhibit two crucial themes that need a cautious 
analysis: the scope of practice and the identity of internal goods. 
1.3.1.1 The scope of practice 
A practice can be identified as any activity whose basic foundation is the existence of 
community, in the sense of a shared partnership. The spirit of such partnership, as 
Dunne (2005) explicates, ‘is not based on an economy of scarcity, it does not 
encourage rivalry or conflict between partners: one person does not excel at the 
expense of others’ (p. 369). If this preeminence of cooperation prevails, then all the 
good that is achieved through any engagement in a practice will impact upon all 
participants. This is a premise of practice that seems to extend Aristotle’s ideal 
conception of the virtue of friendship. In the opposite instance, the possible danger 
lurking within a practice is that it be transformed into a source of external goods – 
wealth, social status and fame, for example – which are not consistent with its life. In 
Dunne’s notion, such an instrumentality of practice can be evaluated as a ‘violation of 
its internal fabric’ (ibid.).  
According to MacIntyre (1981), the range of practices covers a variety of fields: arts, 
like dance or painting; sciences, such as mathematics or history; and games, such as 
chess or football. More generally, it includes all those practices ‘of making and 
sustaining families and households, schools, clinics, and local forms of political 
community’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. xv). This spectrum of practices may include 
performative or productive, vocational or avocational practices (Higgins, 2011). For 
MacIntyre, what really matters about the different kinds of practice are ‘activities that 
grow out of social life and remain cooperative in execution’, which ‘tend to develop 
	  	   29	  
into distinctive ethical worlds’ (ibid., p. 50). This concern suggests that a person can 
be integrated in a series of practices, living simultaneous and different social roles 
embodied in cooperation – a state that encourages the empirical knowledge of the 
virtues needed and the unique particularities for the good of each practice. 
1.3.1.2 The identity of internal goods         
One could reasonably wonder whether MacIntyre equates virtues and internal goods 
in his definition of practice, since there is no explicit reference to them. Following 
Aristotle, MacIntyre understands the teleological character of practice, according to 
which the good of its life rests upon the life of virtues. However, MacIntyre (2007) 
posits the internal goods in that process of achieving the good as ‘not the ends 
pursued by particular individuals’ but ‘the excellence specific to those particular types 
of practice which individuals achieve or move towards in the course of pursuing 
particular goals on particular occasions’ (p. 274). Here, MacIntyre leads our line of 
thinking to three very specific points. First, internal goods serve those goals that 
subordinate to the final end of a practice; this issue of goals has been discussed in 
section 1.2.1. Second, every practice becomes home to its own idiosyncratic goods. 
Third, internal goods are experiential; they can only be recognised by the person who 
participates in a practice.  
In his book, The Good Life of Teaching: An Ethics of Professional Practice (2011), 
Higgins examines in depth MacIntyre’s theory of internal goods and presents a further 
analysis, one which helps us to comprehend their different types as they exist in a 
practice (see Figure 1.3). Initially, Higgins invites us to imagine a mental picture of a 
horizon, which represents the telos of a practice. Then, ‘internal goods are not the 
distant points on the horizon, but the journeys toward the good’ (ibid., p. 56). The 
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typology that Higgins adopts, as presented in Figure 1.3, illustrates two basic types of 
internal goods realised in a practice: those of products and practitioners.  
In the first case, we estimate the internal goods of the virtue of technê. We are 
speaking of the internal goods of the products that can be found in both the 
performance and the work of a practice. The example of an artist painting a portrait 
might aid our understanding. The painter, by creating the picture, can show internal 
goods related to the performance of painting – the virtuosity in preparing the canvas 
and the mixing of the colours, for example – as well as the product itself – the feelings 
and ideas expressed by the portrait.  
The second type of internal goods are concentrated on the practitioner. In reality, this 
is to do with the ways in which the life of technê impact upon the life of the 
practitioner. From the information in Figure 1.3, it can be seen that this category is 
divided into three sub-categories. The first is the excellence of the character. It has 
been argued by MacIntyre (1990) that in the process of learning a practice, the 
practitioner needs to be transformed into a particular kind of person and must 
overcome the ‘inadequacies of desire, taste, habit, and judgment’ (p. 62). As Higgins 




Figure 1.3: A typology of internal goods adapted from Higgins 2011, p.  59 
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one’s sensitivities, and develop one’s powers – is good’ (p. 57). In the life of a dancer, 
for example, internal goods of character could be the development of persistence, 
precision, power and grace. 
Looking at the next sub-category, it is labeled the ‘biographical genre’. This 
characterisation denotes that any practice ‘offers its practitioners resources for 
shaping their lives’ (ibid., p. 58). Each practitioner can write their own history within 
the genre of a practice. For instance, the painterly life offers challenges to painters to 
write their narratives and present new technologies within their genre.  
Proceeding to the third sub-category, the ‘moral phenomenology’, Higgins (ibid.) 
elucidates that its articulation is inspired, too, by Gadamer’s (2004) theory that “every 
game has its own proper spirit” (p. 107). Accordingly, as Higgins points out, a 
practitioner needs to subordinate their personal goals to the goals of the game and 
accept its borders and rules. This phenomenon implies specific ways of being, distinct 
systems and modes of cultures within the life of a practice. 
Concerning further estimations that Higgins (ibid.) articulates about the diversity of 
internal goods, there are those experienced more synchronically, others that exist 
diachronically, and yet more that are ephemeral, like ‘moral phenomenology’ or those 
of products. Diachronic internal goods can be described as those concerned with 
character. Completing this discussion of internal goods, practice is now better 
comprehended not as a journey empty from virtues, but instead as a journey wherein 
the practitioner travels with a “bag of virtues” (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 63). That is to say, 
in many occasions, virtues themselves constitute good. 
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1.3.2 The Implications of Practice in Professional Ethics  
The nexus of MacIntyre’s theory is not merely the strong allegation for its practicality 
as a philosophy, but primarily, as Higgins (ibid.) concludes, ‘the way in which it 
requires a fundamental rethinking of professional ethics’ (p. 61). Higgins’ conclusion 
is firmly depicted in Wilfred Carr’s article The Role of Theory in the Professional 
Development of an Educational Theorist (2005). Carr reveals how MacIntyre’s work 
was so apocalyptic that it drove him to substantial and novel understandings about his 
own professional practice. He explains: 
… MacIntyre … gave me a clear indication of where this search should 
begin. … [T]he period of ‘modernity’ … has its roots in the 16th century 
and was, in part, facilitated by the demise and eventual collapse of the 
Aristotelian tradition of ‘practical philosophy’, … the aim of [which] was 
not to enable practitioners to become more technically effective but to 
become more reflective about the limits of their pre-philosophical self-
understanding of their practice by putting it, philosophically, to the 
question. For me this raised some obvious questions: does the now 
discarded Aristotelian tradition of ‘practical philosophy’ allow me to make 
some theoretical sense of the way in which my own professional 
development has evolved over the last 20 years? Can it provide me with a 
basis for reconstructing my own practice as an educational theorist? Does 
the practical philosophy hold out the promise of an approach to my 
professional role as an educational theorist, in which the tensions between 
theoretical rigour and practical relevance have been resolved? (ibid., p. 340, 
italics original) 
 
What we can speculate upon after Carr’s deep reflection are the possibilities of re-
vising and re-staging the worlds of our own practices, not imagining them as less 
ethical and more scientific or technical undertakings. Such ecology of practice 
permeates what MacIntyre’s sociological theory targets, as indicated by Higgins 
(2011):  
Practices are in fact our ethical sources: they are the sites where aspects of 
the good are disclosed to us as well as the primary scenes of our ethical 
education (p. 10). 
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It is apparent that MacIntyre stimulates an alternative understanding of practice 
remote from any deontological or utilitarian frames of work. Practice context is not 
restricted in a moral professionalism, which deals with certain general rules and 
principles of professional conduct and role-playing obligations to others (Carr, 2000, 
2006; De Ruyter & Kole, 2010; Higgins, 2011; Schwandt, 2005; Sockett, 1993). 
Referring to modern conceptions of professionalism, David Carr (2006) remarks that 
professions have been mostly defined according to forms of regulation, ‘which aim to 
draw a fairly precise line between the impersonal duties and obligations of public 
professional practice and the values and virtues of more personal or private aspiration’ 
(p. 172).  
What is more noticeable vis-à-vis practice is that it is completely intertwined with the 
idea of the good. As Higgins (2011) highlights: ‘in practices we not only have the 
occasion to do good, but to encounter (aspects of) the good and pursue our 
eudaimonia’ (p. 62). The exercise of internal goods and virtues within practice is a 
way of self-cultivation, in the sense that practitioners learn to regard the good ‘beyond 
their own ego needs’ (ibid.) and develop dispositions distinguished by “other-
regarding” characteristics (Schwandt, 2005, p. 324). Such a process is one of 
openness and receptivity to particular situations and persons (Noddings, 1992; 
Nussbaum, 1986). Schwandt (2005) therefore describes this self-educating approach 
in practice as a way of humanising: ‘it is in the interaction between teacher and 
student, counselor and patient, social worker and client that we become aware of what 
it means to be human, to live together, to prosper’ (p. 330).  
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1.4 EPILOGUE: FRAMING THE STUDY 
What the love of a father, a teacher and a philosopher – as Aristotle was – has taught 
us in this chapter is how we can discover eudaimonia, the highest ἀγαθόν (good), in 
our lives. The road is the life of the human soul, which can exist as the primary space, 
from where the education of the virtuous self can begin. He has presented to us a 
picture of a rich anatomy of the soul, or as MacIntyre (1999) would prefer a 
“metaphysical biology” (p. x), in which prevails a harmonised, dialectical connection 
among its parts: the ethical, the scientific and the practical. The unification of virtues 
of all these parts may contextualise the self in an authentic world of the good.  
The significance of Aristotle’s ethics becomes more universal, since it obtains the 
potentiality to be conveyed from a personal status to a social one. This can occur 
through the lens of MacIntyre’s (1981) sociological approach to the theory of 
practice. The life of a practice turns out to be the second home of the self, wherein it 
can experience the virtuous life. Our everyday life is represented by a link of 
practices, which can be characterised as such if they are founded on the 
communicative process of cooperation (ibid.). Practices accommodate a wealth of 
virtues and internal goods that could be found to belong either to the products made 
through practice or to the practitioners themselves; excellences of character, of moral 
phenomenology and of the biographical genre, for example (Higgins, 2011). All 
practices are influenced by their own histories in terms of the activation of their own 
idiosyncratic, diachronic or more ephemeral internal goods. Moreover, learning to be 
a good practitioner in a profession is framed by an identity that necessitates a kind of 
metamorphosis of the self. The standards of excellence that are expected in a 
professional identity depend on the development of virtues, ethical and intellectual, 
appropriate for that profession.   
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Such a transformation is the case of this study, with respect to the practice of teaching 
drama/theatre education. Given that its central aim is constructed on the investigation 
of how drama/theatre education can assist student teachers to understand their 
profession as an ethical, virtue-driven practice, both philosophies – Aristotle’s ethics 
and MacIntyre’s sociological theory of practice – occupy the core of its theoretical 
framework. However, the field of virtues and internal goods that will be explored in 
drama/theatre education remains open to the intrinsic particularities of its own 
practice and the special conditions of its context. While every practice encloses its 
own distinctive virtues and internal goods, so it is supposed to occur in this case.  
In view of that, it is proper that we next examine the practice of teaching, with the aim 
of understanding it as a practice of virtues energised in theoria, poetry and praxis. 
Thus, this leads us to the following chapter that opens up a dialogue based on the 
critical question of what makes good teaching and a good teacher. In this regard, the 
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Chapter 2 
THE PRACTICE OF TEACHING: RE-IMAGINING ITS GOOD LIFE 
The terrain of this book may therefore be unfamiliar to teachers and to 
teacher educators, because it grapples with the problem of the 
epistemological and the moral, arguing that we need sophisticated 
understanding not just of “content” or of “method” but of the problems of 
knowledge that lie at the heart of teaching–specifically, of how knowledge 
and virtue are profoundly linked in each part of the teaching enterprise  




2.1 INTRODUCTION: FACING OBJECTIONS AND DISBELIEF 
While the challenge this chapter addresses is to demonstrate the potential of seeing 
teaching as a practice in accord with Aristotelian virtue ethics and MacIntyre’s 
sociological approach, as delineated in the previous chapter, Sockett’s above 
pedagogical thesis incites a strong and refreshing argument towards this idea. In his 
book Knowledge and Virtue in Teaching and Learning: The primacy of Dispositions 
(2012), Sockett methodically guides us to a re-envisioned philosophy of what it 
means to educate children and how student teachers might be prepared to take on their 
profession. Fundamental to his theory is the notion of educating learners as persons, 
instead of simply teaching them knowledge and skills. As he proposes, the ‘person is 
the centre of education set in a moral space, a political order, and a framework of 
public and personal knowledge’, all of which require ‘the development of personal 
dispositions or virtues’ (ibid., p. xi).  
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In Sockett’s (ibid.) view, what a democratic society needs is not citizens with critical 
thinking or social skills per se, but citizens who are critical thinkers, holding 
intellectual and ethical virtues as an adequate prerequisite for them to flourish both as 
human beings and as citizens. In these terms, it is essential for education to provide 
the epistemological conditions wherein learners can be grown as persons. The 
indispensable necessity of education is therefore a model of person-centred pedagogy 
that will aim to boost the learners’ ethical and intellectual virtues, or else their aretaic 
development. This specific kind of pedagogy has been the subject of increased 
attention among educationalists, who have been interested in the Aristotelian virtue 
ethics of teaching for the last three decades (Carr, 2003, 2006, 2011; Dunne, 1993, 
2005, 2011; Fenstermacher, 1990, 2001; Higgins, 2011; Sockett, 1993, 2012; van 
Manen, 1994; Winston, 1998).  
Nevertheless, this prominence of virtue ethics in teaching is not immune from 
criticism and distrust. Two salient cases are Kohlberg (1970, 1984) and Oser (1994). 
Specifically, Kohlberg’s (1894) research, that is substantially an extension of Piaget’s 
account of children’s moral growth, shows obvious evidence of its influence by the 
Kantian deontology of moral autonomy. This is affirmed by the rational form of the 
universal morality that he establishes, by means of a sequence of six developmental 
stages, which mainly target the acquisition of the moral principles of social welfare 
and justice. His negative stance to virtue ethics is explicitly stated in his famous 
phrase: ‘The objection of the psychologist to the ‘bag of virtues’ is that there are no 
such things’ (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 63). As he further notes, the only constitutionally 
legitimate scheme of moral education in schools is the teaching of justice, for 
‘[j]ustice is not a concrete rule of action, such as lies behind virtues like honesty’ 
(ibid., p. 69). 
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The second instance, the critique of Oser (1994), is primarily concerned with the 
refusal of the notion of teaching based on virtues. Moral duties, rules and obligations 
are central to his approach to questions of ethics in teaching, with a prominent 
emphasis on professional responsibility focused on learners’ learning outcomes. A 
strong witness of his complete juxtaposition with the ethics of virtue is his view that 
‘professional morality includes more than virtues: Everyone must have virtues, but 
only teachers must succeed in applying professional teaching responsibility. … I 
prefer the regulative model’ (ibid., p. 66, italics original).           
Nonetheless, defending the significance of virtue ethics in teaching, Sockett (2012) 
comes to propose a model of an epistemological approach concentrated on a person-
centred pedagogy, through which the learners can develop their virtues while the 
teacher also needs to exercise his own professional virtues. He explicates that an 
epistemological approach can practically reveal the ethical aspects of what we teach 
as knowledge. That is to say, it is within the process of the acquisition of knowledge 
and the understanding of the truth that the learners’ aretaic development can be 
promoted. Given this logic, the ontology of teaching then can be perceptible as a 
predominantly ethical, virtue-driven practice.  
However, such a description of teaching has surprisingly been dismissed by 
MacIntyre himself. He, in a dialogue with Dunne (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002), 
declares that ‘teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to the 
service of a variety of practices’ (p. 5), clarifying that ‘teaching is never more than a 
means’ (p. 8). Two of his key arguments adduce teaching as an exclusively discipline-
based means. In particular, he contends that ‘[t]he life of a teacher of mathematics, 
whose goods are the goods of mathematics, is one thing; a life of a teacher of music 
… is another’ (ibid., p. 9). Moreover, he emphasises that in elementary stages, 
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teachers teach pupils skills, whereas ‘[a]t more advanced levels teachers enable their 
students to deploy their skills in order to achieve the goods of some particular 
practice’ (ibid.).  
Admittedly, MacIntyre’s beliefs provoked a scandal in the educational community. 
Many philosophers of education criticised his positions (Carr, 2003; Dunne, 2003; 
Higgins, 2011; Hogan, 2003; Noddings, 2003b), yet, as Hager (2011) highlights, ‘the 
debate remains inconclusive’ (p. 545). Nevertheless, if MacIntyre was right, it means 
that teaching would be limited to a technical profession and the teacher would be 
defined as a skilled technician. Given this speculation, it would be prolific, as Higgins 
(2011) exhorts, to work through it, suggesting how and why teaching is not solely a 
technical practice, but an ethical one, regardless of the discipline or even the level of 
education.  
In consequence, the first section of this chapter discusses teaching as a person-centred 
pedagogy, focusing on three key issues: (1) the status of knowledge in an 
epistemological approach, (2) the teaching conditions under which an epistemological 
approach can be applied and (3) what are the potential virtues that can result from 
such an approach. In the second section, the attention is shifted to the substance of the 
teacher’s presence in teaching, with a view to highlighting those important attributes 
of his/her presence that could promote the learners’ aretaic development. Since this 
research study is being conducted in the context of a teacher preparation programme, 
the contemporary tendencies in teacher education are also being examined with regard 
to the theory of teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice. Last, the chapter ends 
with a review of the essence of good teaching/teacher.  
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2.2 TEACHING AS PERSON-CENTRED PEDAGOGY 
The scope of a person-centred pedagogy, beyond Aristotelian virtue ethics, reveals the 
Socratic tradition too. As Dunne (2003) points out, ‘in any philosophical 
consideration of teaching it is hard to avoid the figure of Socrates’ (p. 364). In both 
Plato’s Socratic dialogues Gorgias and Meno, teaching is considered as an 
interpersonal journey, through which teachers are likely to ‘profit intellectually or 
morally from their educational associations with their pupils as much as their pupils 
may from them’ (Carr, 2006, p. 178). Socrates’ logos is confirmatory: ‘I am ready to 
carry out, together with you, joint investigation and inquiry into what it is’ (Meno, 
80a-80d). What Socrates essentially suggests is that good teaching brings into play a 
teacher-learner collaboration that ultimately aims to explore the fundamental states of 
good life. It is within this context that teaching develops into a process wherein one 
becomes ‘a certain sort of person – one who is capable of taking moral issues and 
questions seriously, and who is no less seriously committed to self-improvement than 
to the improvement of others’ (Carr, 2006, p. 178).  
2.2.1 The Status of the Epistemological Approach  
According to Sockett’s notion (2012), the practice of an epistemological approach in 
the process of teaching/learning is not at all simple, but ‘complex and tenuous’ (p. 4). 
Its intricacy, as he explains, arises from the necessity that teachers have to ‘shift from 
being technicians to becoming moral professionals that demands understanding the 
nature and character of knowledge and developing intellectual habits’ (ibid.). By this 
assertion, he makes clear that an epistemological approach does not merely depend on 
routine activities and memorising information, or simply on giving the right answers. 
Instead, it is firmly contingent on the interrelationship of knowledge and virtue.  
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Therefore, an epistemological approach can serve the purpose of aretaic development, 
because it combines a dialectics between public knowledge and private knowledge 
(ibid.). This combination is its primary principle and denotes that learners can 
experience not just the subject matter, but more importantly, a personal connection 
with the subject. In doing so, the learners are enabled to identify their own position in 
relation to the knowledge they are being taught. Virtue epistemologist Baehr (2013) 
has argued the significance of this epistemological process, stressing that ‘a good 
education should also be personal: it should be attentive to and demonstrate care for 
who students are (e.g. their fundamental beliefs and values)’ and, in consequence, ‘for 
the persons they are becoming’ (p. 251, italics original).   
Public knowledge, in essence, is constituted by truth, evidence, and belief (Sockett, 
2012). What allows knowledge to be justified as truth is evidence, a criterion that, as 
Sockett remarks, has come under intense study in recent decades. Belief is one facet 
of knowledge intrinsically united with truth and evidence. In his view, when we make 
assertions that things are true, ‘it is not imagination or intention or speculation or 
daydreaming that are the mental acts associated with knowledge, but belief’ (ibid., p. 
24). It displays a vital aspect of who a person is.  
Private knowledge is constructed on experience, commitment, and identity (ibid.). 
Each one of these elements composes a part of the self and together they shape its 
wholeness. In particular, experience determines the historical self: the memories and 
the cultural, social and ordinary position of the self, as well as how the self realises its 
experiences. Commitment depicts the belief-holding self: it shows the specific 
relationships of self with knowledge and the beliefs that the self holds. Identity 
portrays the consciousness of self: namely, the world of the meanings we adopt or 
make for ourselves out of what we believe and what we experience.  
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2.2.2 The Framework of the Epistemological Approach 
2.2.2.1 Learning as exploratory and explanatory journey 
Practically, an epistemological environment intensifies the exercise of philosophical 
research. It challenges learners, in Greene’s (1995) words, ‘to pose questions, seek out 
explanations, to look for reasons, to construct meanings’ (p. 26). Learning is 
metamorphosed into a workshop, wherein ‘labor and life [are] mixed face-to-face’ 
(Sennett, 2009, p. 53), and therefore obtains an exploratory and explanatory ethos. It 
turns out to be ‘an arena for ideas, not answers’ (Sockett, 2012, p. 139). 
Learners are stimulated to open-ended questions about both the truth of knowledge 
and self-awareness. For a thoughtful inquiry process, Sockett (ibid.) repeatedly makes 
reference to the question list of Belenky and colleagues (1986), which encompasses: 
(1) ‘belief questions: How do I know what I believe?’, (2) ‘self-revelation questions: 
How do I see myself?’ and (3) ‘search for truth questions: What is truth? What is 
authority? To whom do I listen?’ (p. 1, italics original).  
What is therefore indispensable in an epistemological approach is the ‘consistent 
consideration of alternatives to ensure the learner appreciates that there are different 
ways of looking at events, eras, and cultures’ (Sockett, 2012, p. 87, italics original). In 
this sense, learning needs to excite the learners’ imagination (Egan, 1992; Greene, 
1995; Warnock, 1976) and, in turn, their “epistemological curiosity”, without which, 
‘it is not possible to obtain a complete grasp of the object of … knowledge’ (Freire, 
1998, p. 32). On these terms, an epistemological search is evidenced as one reliable 
process that may drive learners to ‘discovery, invention and originality’, while they 
elaborate the ‘thought of possible than actual’ (White, 1990, p. 186). 
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2.2.2.2 Learning as collective activity 
An epistemological classroom space is fastened on communal spirit. The learning, as 
Freire (1970) puts it, is ‘carried out in communion with others’ (p. 78). The process of 
searching is a collaborative activity greatly dependent on the quality of the learners’ 
interactions. In the context of collectivity, learners take advantage of the dialogic 
activities that virtually impact on the shape of their concepts, meanings, values and 
beliefs. In this way, an epistemological approach can prove what, in his book 
Education as Dialogue (2010), Kazepides concludes: namely, ‘nothing … [can] 
improve our schools and our society more than rich and genuine dialogue’ (p. 6).  
Dialogical learning, on the other hand, employs the learners’ critical mode of 
thinking. Referring to this epistemological process, Sockett (2012) argues that it ‘is 
one in which we critique, reflect on, and revise what we already believe. In practice, 
the development of the discovery and the critical modes may run together’ (p. 88). So, 
there is always, according to Schön (1983), a reflective conversation with the 
situation, knowing-in-action and reflection-in-action: ‘we can think about doing 
something but we can think about something while doing it’ (p. 54).  
2.2.2.3 Learning as a counter to egocentrism   
It is evident from the discussion so far that an epistemological space is built on a 
triangulation of activities based on inquiry, imagination and dialogue. Within such 
conditions, every learner has the potential to realise his/her egocentric mode of 
thinking (Sockett, 2012). The study by Paul and Elder (2009) considers five ego-
centred weaknesses which, as Sockett (2012) contends, could be countered through an 
epistemological approach. These are: (1) innate egocentrism, that shows a low 
attention to others’ rights and needs; (2) innate socio-centrism, that underlines the 
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perceptions of one’s own family, peers, or culture as the right ones; (3) innate wish-
fulfilment, that leads a person to have no willingness to make changes or to admit any 
errors; (4) innate self-validation, that limits a person to his/her beliefs without 
examining the evidence, and (5) innate selfishness, that gives a person power, 
irrespective of the rightness or wrongfulness of his/her beliefs.  
Private knowledge, as affirmed by Sockett (ibid.), is a dynamic space, allowing 
learners to understand the ideas, feelings or values of others and to configure their 
own beliefs. The learners’ egocentric stances gradually undergo an alteration, given 
that they are used to seeing things through the lens of others’ eyes, and this constitutes 
a rich socially interactive process, aiding the formation of our self. As Sockett (ibid.) 
infers: ‘in learning about ourselves, we learn about others, and vice versa’ (p. 35).  
2.2.3 The Construction of Virtues 
Both the experiential and the inter-relational/intra-relational learning achieved within 
an epistemological approach can contribute significantly to the learners’ aretaic 
development. On the basis of the six epistemological elements combined in the 
learning process – truth, belief, evidence, commitment, experience and identity – 
Sockett (ibid.) establishes a scheme of virtues. As shown in Figure 2.1, the practice of 
each separate element results in a specific virtue, or even a nexus of virtues. 
Truth is connected with the virtue of truthfulness – the habit to tell the truth. 
Following Williams’ (2002) theory of truthfulness, Sockett (2012) identifies that it 
depends on two other virtues – accuracy and sincerity – which may be set in the 
context of trust, since they can both create trusting interpersonal relationships. As 
Williams (2002) posits, trust is a ‘necessary condition of cooperative activity, where 
this involves the willingness of one party to rely on another to act in certain ways’ (p. 
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88). From this view, Sockett (2012) emphasises teaching as ‘formally a paradigm case 
of cooperation’, stating that ‘such a context gives rise to the idea that the educational 
relationship itself is one of trust and the individuals within are trustworthy’ (p. 60). 
Belief sets the stage for the virtue of open-mindedness. This occurs because: 
If we seriously question whether we ought to believe what we believe, that 
is a necessary disposition or intellect habit for us: to be open to considering 
alternatives to the beliefs we are acquiring, and to be prepared to discard 
beliefs we find to be incorrect (ibid., p. 73). 
 
This speculation connotes that open-mindedness has no relevance with tolerance 
(ibid.). Although there are psychological indications that open-mindedness is 
uncommon and susceptible (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), Sockett (2012) alleges that 
it is teachable and, moreover, can be fundamental to other virtues, such as fairness or 
justice. This position is enhanced by Hare’s (1985) view that in cases where fairness 
or justice demanded, then open-mindedness ‘involves a willingness to form and revise 
one’s view as impartially and as objectively as possible in the light of available 
evidence and argument’ (p. 3).  
 
Figure 2.1: The construction of virtues through an epistemological approach in teaching 	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Evidence can result in the intellectual virtue of impartiality. It refers to the way we 
come to a judgment, or otherwise describes the way we think about those alternatives 
of a case. In reality, it reflects the process of our thinking and not the outcome of that 
thinking. The act of judgment is instrumental in developing impartiality, whereas the 
thinking of objectivity is its ground.   
Experience is linked with integrity. Sockett’s (2012) interpretation of integrity is 
influenced by Norton’s (1995) Aristotelian perceptions. Notwithstanding that Norton 
(1995) elaborates upon integrity, using three key ideas – the ‘integration of separable 
aspects of self’, “wholeness as completeness” and honesty (pp. 82-83), Sockett (2012) 
focuses only on the idea of “wholeness”. Thus, he outlines integrity as the virtue, 
according to which ‘a person knits together memory, intuitions, and understandings, 
and reasons, and motives in his or her experience of life–how he or she understands 
and experiences it’ (p. 123).  
Commitment allows the promotion of a set of virtues related to will and courage. 
Determination, carefulness, concentration, self-restraint, patience, and 
conscientiousness can empower our will, ‘if we regard the purposeful acquisition of 
some of our beliefs, as our achievements’ (ibid., p. 128). Virtue epistemologists 
Roberts and Wood (2007) contend that the will is ‘a central epistemic faculty’ (p. 60), 
possessing the following four key characteristics, through which commitment can be 
observable: ‘(1) attraction, desire, concern, attachment, etc.; (2) choice, effort, and 
undertaking; (3) willpower; and (4) emotion’ (p. 64).  
In addition, commitment can stimulate courage, for ‘a courageous response is always 
a personal commitment’ (Sockett, 2012, p. 137). Taking risks with ideas, challenges, 
and assignments displays freedom that, in turn, drives to courage. As Nussbaum 
	  	   47	  
(1997) maintains, ‘true courage requires freedom, and freedom is best cultivated by an 
education that awakens critical thinking’ (p. 55).  
Identity, lastly, may lead to self-knowledge. What is significant in the process of 
knowing one’s self is indicated in this abstract:  
Our self-knowledge is not a matter of applying the criteria of knowledge to 
our self-knowledge, but that self-knowledge is the process of constituting 
ourselves through understanding who we are, and it is that understanding 
that will require intellectual and moral virtues (Sockett, 2012, p. 153, 
italics original).  
 
MacIntyre (1999) proposes that ‘genuine and extensive self-knowledge’ becomes 
possible only as an effect of those relationships that ‘provide badly needed correction 
for our own judgments’ (p. 95). Self-knowledge, accordingly, is achieved both by 
critique and self-critique. The process of self-critique is basically a ‘self-
conversation’, through which consciousness is critically examined (Sockett, 2012, p. 
154).  
Conclusively, two crucial assertions arise within Sockett’s (ibid.) taxonomy of 
virtues. First, the epistemological approach is evidenced to be an effective 
methodology for the achievement of the learners’ aretaic development and, second, 
the ontology of teaching is attested as an ethical virtue-driven practice, as the two 
learning elements – knowledge and virtue – exist as one unified target. Given that the 
teacher is also a decisive coefficient for the promotion of the learners’ aretaic 
development, in the next section his/her contribution will be discussed with regard to 
the teacher self that is constructed in both his/her professional and personal self. 
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2.3 TEACHING: THE SITE OF A TEACHER’S PRESENCE 
A teacher is the human resource of contact with learners in the classroom and the 
status of his/her presence can function as a vehicle for the excellence of teaching. 
Rodgers and Raider-Roth (2006) define the concept of presence in this way:  
[It] is a state of alert awareness, receptivity, and connectedness to the 
mental, emotional, and physical workings of both the individual and the 
group in the context of their learning environments, and the ability to 
respond with a considered and compassionate best next step (p. 265).  
 
This definition indicates that teachers are called to develop a nexus of professional 
virtues. With respect to MacIntyre’s theory, practice, as Higgins (2011) reminds us, 
‘is the poetry of the moral life’ (p. 55). A teacher, in light of such a view, is the 
practitioner of teaching and therefore is expected to become a “poet”, namely a 
creator of an ethical teaching/learning ecology. Sockett (2012) is a strong advocate of 
this idea, arguing: ‘the teacher is the creator: he or she has the initiative’ in the 
teaching process (p. 51).  
Significantly, the world of a teacher’s presence is embodied in ‘a teaching persona 
(not a role)’, which means that it is built ‘out of the individual character’ (ibid.). 
Kristjánsson (2011) explicates this important notion, on the grounds of an Aristotelian 
paradigm of professional identity, making clear that: 
each person has one self. … [I]t is futile to study teacher selves or teacher 
identities in isolation. What matters is how they fit into a person’s moral 
character and resonate with one’s overall life plan (p. 116).  
 
Recent literature on teacher identity demonstrates that in cases where teachers present 
conflict between personal and professional selves, there exists the danger of a divided 
self (Beijaard et al., 2004; Palmer, 1998; Zembylas, 2002). Ball (2003) discusses how 
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the technology of performativity in teachers’ teaching life can produce what Lyotard 
(1984) calls the law of contradiction. He appreciates that performativity is a ‘culture 
and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons, and displays as 
means of incentive, control, attrition and change – based on rewards and sanctions 
(both material and symbolic)’ (2003, p. 216). Under these conditions, as he claims, 
the “costs” are ‘personal and psychological. A kind of values schizophrenia is 
experienced by individual teachers where commitment, judgement and authenticity 
within practice are sacrificed for impression and performance’ (ibid., p. 221, italics 
original). Manifestly, this logic of performativity privileges solely productivity and 
effectiveness and, thus, becomes ‘a vehicle for changing what academic work and 
learning are!’ (ibid., p. 226). In the opposite case, where a teacher’s worlds can hold a 
unified ethos, his/her presence in teaching can be better harmonised with the real 
learners’ learning needs, idiosyncrasies, interests and pleasures (Rodgers & Raider-
Roth, 2006). 
2.3.1 Teacher’s Pedagogical Knowledge  
Pedagogy, according to Shulman (1987), combines three main types of knowledge. 
First, teachers need to have content knowledge – knowledge of the subject matter to 
be taught. Second, it is necessary for teachers to possess pedagogical knowledge – 
knowledge of how to teach. This consists of skills, techniques, methods, approaches 
and strategies, regarding, for example, how to design lesson plans and assessment 
tests, as well as how to motivate learners. Third, for teachers it is essential to be 
capable to teach pedagogical-content knowledge. This includes the specific 
knowledge of how to explain the particular concepts of what is being taught (e.g., 
how to correct students’ misconceptions about subject matter or how to demonstrate 
Pythagorean theorem).  
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This pedagogical knowledge, as suggested by Shulman, gives witness to the 
Aristotelian intellectual virtues of epistêmê and technê examined in the previous 
chapter. They both constitute a teacher’s technical presence (Carr, 2003; Dunne, 
2005, 2011; Winch, 2004) and, as Carr notes (2006), promote his/her ‘instrumental 
efficiency or effectiveness’ (p. 171). Despite being unquestionably foundational in 
teaching, the teacher’s technical presence tends to be discussed in a way that, 
borrowing Sennett’s (2009) words on technique, seems to have ‘a bad name’ and is 
depicted as ‘soulless’ (p. 149). As commented by Sarason (1999), this problem is 
genuine, for a teacher is mainly treated as ‘a conduit of subject matter’ (p. 3).  
Therefore, van Manen (1994) sharply criticises Shulman’s exposition of the 
knowledge base of teaching, characterising it as ‘notably intellectualistic and 
rationalistic’ (p. 142). He also asserts that ‘Shulman … seems to be afraid of using a 
language that is appropriate to the moral nature of all teaching’ (ibid.) The necessity 
for understanding teaching as an ethical practice and, consequently, a teacher as an 
ethical agent, is recommended by Carr (2003), focusing on the value of teaching 
effectiveness as a matter of professional ethics. He advises teachers to see their 
teaching skills ‘as creative responses to the contextually defined demands of actual 
professional experience’ (ibid., p. 26), rather than merely technical skills.  
From this perspective, a good teacher is not expected to be present in teaching simply 
as a knowledgeable and skillful conduit, or even, as Bransford and his colleagues 
(2005) propose, as “adaptive experts” (p. 3). Discussing this particular idea of the 
“expert”, Sockett (2012) has the opinion that it is a narrow term, inadequate to 
‘capture the range and the depth of issues coming under the teacher’s moral and 
epistemological authority’ (p. 47). As he believes, it is a term that fits exclusively 
with the person who is competent in the application of knowledge. What follows is 
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the delineation of the teacher beyond this one-dimensional outlook, accorded with a 
wide spectrum of the pragmatic conditions of teaching in classroom life. 
2.3.2 Teacher’s Ethical Presence 
2.3.2.1 Teaching as togetherness 
A classroom can be, in Gilligan’s (2003) words, a ‘safe house for love’ (p. 31), and 
teaching a home of togetherness. This depiction calls attention to teaching as a 
relational space embedded in the ethics of care and love. According to Noddings’ 
(2003a) theory, the ‘first great good of teaching’ is the caring relationship and ‘its 
positive effects’ (p. 249). As she believes: 
Teaching is thoroughly relational, and many of its goods are relational: the 
feeling of safety … a growing intellectual enthusiasm in both teacher and 
student, the challenge and satisfaction shared by both in engaging new 
material, the awakening sense (for both) that teaching and life are never-
ending moral quests (ibid.). 
 
Noddings’ (2010) ethics of care posits ‘little faith in broad, abstract principles’ (p. 
243). It suggests an empathetic response to learners and the taking of responsibility 
for their needs. Adopting the ethics of care, teachers need to activate a response-
ability that relies on particular ethical virtues, such as sympathetic attention, 
sensitivity and receptivity. As Sockett (2012) points out, this background of caring 
relations unfolds a wider range of virtues, including tolerance, tact, patience, 
discretion, civility and compassion.  
When the ethics of care permeates classroom life, a teacher’s connectedness both to 
teaching and learners can become visible in many ways. Belenky et al. (1986) identify 
‘connected teaching’ as a practice wherein ‘connected teachers are believers’, able to 
meet learners’ own worlds of perspectives (p. 227). They aim at helping learners ‘in 
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giving birth to their own ideas, in making their own tacit knowledge explicit and 
elaborating upon it’ (ibid., p. 217). Such a teaching/learning environment can result in 
trusting relationships between teacher and learners (McDermott, 1977). Referring to 
trust, Rodgers and Raider-Roth (2006) stress that it ‘engenders confidence in the 
student’s capacity to trust herself as learner, thinker and creator’ (p. 275).   
In addition, togetherness in teaching might be empowered by a teacher’s virtue of 
love (Garrison, 1997; Cho, 2005; Halpin, 2009). According to Freire (1998b), ‘it is 
impossible to teach without a forged, invented, and well-thought-out capacity to love’ 
(p. 3). Furthermore, Liston and Garrison (2004) claim that love ‘is a creative, critical, 
and disruptive force’, capable ‘to fuel our intent to act against the barriers that block 
an abundant and engaged approach to teaching and learning’ (p. 3). 
2.3.2.2 Teaching as ethos-intellect nexus 
A key feature of a teacher’s presence in teaching is the dialectics between his/her 
intellectual and ethical energies (Campbell, 2008b, 2008c; Carr, 2003, 2006, 2007; 
Day, 2004; Fenstermacher, 1990, 2001; Goodlad et al., 1990; Hansen, 2001; van 
Manen, 1994; Sockett 2012). In this regard, a teacher’s behaviour, pedagogical style 
and methodology undergo a merger, because in teaching they function 
simultaneously, affected both by his/her special character and intellectual capacities. 
The use of language, as evidenced by empirical studies, is an added ethos-intellect 
driven aspect of a teacher’s presence (Sockett & LePage, 2002; Willemse et al., 
2008). As Fenstermacher (1990) has argued, in teaching, ‘matters of what is fair, 
right, just and virtuous are always present … The teacher’s conduct at all times and in 
all ways is a moral matter’ (p. 133).  
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Interestingly, Campbell (2008a) gives us a vivid and spherical depiction of what 
“[t]eaching ethically” means within the quotation below:  
[T]eachers’ use of pedagogical techniques or classroom management 
strategies, their choices of curriculum and teaching materials, their 
methods of assessment and evaluation, their interpersonal exchanges with 
students and others on behalf of students, or any other aspect of their daily 
practice … [have] the potential to influence student wellbeing emotionally, 
intellectually, and physically. … [It] may be recognised in the tone of 
voice a teacher uses to address students, … the casual remarks a teacher 
makes, the way a teacher arranges groups or adjudicates among the 
sometimes conflicting needs and interests of students (p. 4).   
 
It is therefore obvious that a teacher’s self is not limited simply to his/her teaching 
role, but it also releases the inner qualities of his/her ethos. In this way, a teacher 
brings his/her personal and professional virtues together. Sockett (2012) suggests that 
teachers need to practise a network of ethical virtues, like trustworthiness, sincerity 
courage, persistence, endeavour, perseverance and self-control. On the other hand, he 
emphasises the necessity for the intellectual virtues of truthfulness, accuracy, clarity, 
consistency, open-mindedness, fairness and impartiality.  
Additionally, phronēsis is recommended both by Carr (2003, 2006) and Dunne (1993, 
2011) as the most crucial intellectual virtue of a teacher. In particular, Dunne (2011) 
demonstrates that phronēsis comprises the ‘most precious source’ (p. 24) for good 
practical judgments. Teachers need phronēsis to deal with the countless inherent 
pedagogical challenges of a classroom life. Carr (2003), too, acknowledges phronēsis 
as the best agency for strict impartiality in combination with the Aristotelian virtue of 
justice, arguing that there ‘may be no less injustice in treating unequals equally than 
there is in treating equals unequally’ (p. 65). For both, phronēsis represents the best 
indication of the quality of professional reflection and practice. As highlighted by 
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Dunne (2011), when ‘the use of the term “professional” … connotes … [phronēsis]’, 
then, ‘“professional wisdom” has real purchase’ (p. 23).  
This last thesis of Dunne gives rise to vital questions related to teacher education, 
since such a context is the framework of the study. Among the most crucial questions 
are: (1) whether professional preparation programmes promote the student teachers’ 
aretaic development (see Figure 2.2)? (2) Are student teachers educated in terms of 
developing an understanding of teaching as an ethical practice? (3) Are student 
teachers prepared to be aware of how to apply an epistemological approach in 
teaching? All these matters are at the crux of the next sub-section and will be 
discussed with respect to contemporary tendencies in teacher education. 
 
 
 Figure 2.2: The quality of a teacher’s presence in teaching 
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2.3.3 The Accountability of Teacher Education 
A substantial body of literature is based upon the allegation that teacher preparation 
programmes carry a serious weakness in educating prospective teachers to understand 
both the ethical ontology of teaching and, concurrently, the ethical dimensions of the 
teacher’s presence  (Bullough Jr. & Pinnegar, 2009; Campbell, 2011; Mahony, 2009; 
Sarason, 1999; Sockett 2012; Zeichner, 2009). This paradoxical absence in teacher 
education, according to Campbell’s (2011) thesis, is not only unreasonable, but also, 
incompatible with the teaching profession. As she maintains, the ‘ethical knowledge 
is at the core of good teaching, [so] it would be logical that the starting point for its 
cultivation would be in pre-service teacher education programmes’ (ibid., p. 83). A 
recent research study among teacher educators by Willemse et al. (2008) affirms the 
lack of attention given to ethical responsibilities in teaching on the one hand, while on 
the other indicates that any attempt at emphasising ethical matters tends to be a 
‘largely implicit and unplanned’ process (p. 445). Furthermore, Mahony (2009) 
speaks of the nothingness of ethical literacy in teacher education and characterises this 
reality as ‘bizarre’, culminating in confusions, uncertainties and, ultimately, in an 
inadequate professional preparation (p. 988).  
One fundamental cause of this deficiency in teacher education, as argued by Zeichner 
(2009), is the great emphasis placed primarily on the student teachers’ technical 
competences and subject matter knowledge. In Sarason’s (1999) words, the ‘teacher 
preparatory programs are part of the problem and not of the solution’ (p. xi). In a 
similar vein to van Manen (1994), Sockett (2012) criticises Shulman’s (1987) theory 
of pedagogy as responsible for this pragmaticism in teacher education. As he infers, 
‘[u]niversities, devoted to the life of mind, seem oblivious to the damage they are 
doing to the teaching profession’, because of ‘the much-touted knowledge-base 
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initiative of the late 1980s (see Shulman, 1987) that promised so much and yielded so 
little’ (p. 217).  
Consequently, if we want teacher education to make a difference, then what is 
essential is a radical change in the educational philosophy that pervades its 
programmes. Crucially, Campbell (2011) suggests that the most imperative is the 
teaching of a separate foundation course concentrated on teaching ethics. As she 
explicates: 
If teacher education programmes neglect to make professional ethics 
education an intentional and central aspect of their curricula, then they will 
continue to miss a significant opportunity to try to influence the collective 
ethical knowledge of the profession (ibid., p. 92). 
 
Likewise, Sockett (2012) contends that the presence of a context of philosophical 
inquiries needs to be central to teacher education. The same purpose is demonstrated 
by Greene (1995), indentifying the necessity for a humane and liberating pedagogy 
through literature and art, offering the potential for philosophical thoughtfulness. This 
form of pedagogy, as she claims, can awaken the student teachers’ consciousness and 
yet develop their professional notion of teaching ‘as an address to others’ 
consciousness’ (ibid., p. 26). Consciousness, as captured by Greene, is the 
transformative space of our self and, in this sense its cultivation can be pondered as 
the core premise of aretaic development.   
Moreover, other scholars elaborate ways for promoting phronēsis. Notably, 
Lunenberg and Korthagen (2009) contend that an accessible approach to this purpose 
is the practice of reflection and self-critique, based on actual teaching experiences in 
the course of school practicum. In their view, this combination of both practices of 
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teaching and reflective thinking is the most constructive method for the understanding 
of the synergy between theory, practice and phronēsis.  
Notwithstanding that all these positions give strong evidence of the possible influence 
of teacher education on the student teachers' aretaic development, Oser (1994) 
maintains an antithetical perspective. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, 
Oser rejects any idea of teaching and learning as virtue-driven processes and believes 
that virtue is an impossible target in teacher education. As the fundamental 
assumption of this study is clearly opposed to Oser’s view, its empirical findings 
might possibly problematise his position.  
 
2.4 EPILOGUE: GOOD TEACHING/TEACHER 
To become an educated citizen, as Nussbaum (1997) points out, does not simply mean 
‘learning a lot of facts and mastering techniques of reasoning, it means something 
more. It means learning how to be a human being capable of love and imagination’ (p. 
14), If this is true, then it is manifest that the question what is good teaching needs to 
be inquired beyond its ‘technical rationality’ (Dunne, 2011, p. 15). Before all else, it 
is essential to understand pedagogy as an ethical undertaking and, consequently, the 
inner life of teaching as ethical too. Regardless of the contemporary educational 
discourse that prefers to be quite apathetic to this vision, but more sympathetic to the 
idea of the instrumental effectiveness of teaching, this chapter has argued that good 
teaching emphasises an aretaic pedagogy based on a person-centred vision, aiming at 
the learners’ development of intellectual and ethical virtues. 
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Practically, this philosophical perspective of pedagogy can be achieved, according to 
Sockett’s (2012) thesis, through the application of an epistemological approach. It can 
serve as the scaffolding for a dialectical learning between knowledge and 
understanding of self. The fusion of public and private knowledge is the key 
epistemological condition towards this outcome. The learners’ aretaic development 
can become feasible, since they elaborate knowledge on the basis of a series of six 
constituents: evidence, truth, belief, commitment, experience and identity.    
The presence of the teacher in the framework of an aretaic pedagogy needs to be 
perceived far beyond Hanushek’s (2002) assertion that ‘good teachers are ones who 
get large gains in student achievement for their classes; bad teachers are just the 
opposite’ (p. 3). The alternative paradigm, as proposed within the chapter, is the 
teacher’s engagement in an authentic relationship with learners, where he/she knows 
and responds with pedagogical/emotional/ethical sensitivity to them and their learning 
needs. In other words, as Nias (1996) highlights, we want teachers ‘to be whole 
persons in the classroom’ (p. 305). Good teachers, then, are those who love and 
delight in their profession, understanding the academic success of their learners as one 
inseparable aspect of their ethical accountability. So, what teachers need is a serious 
and responsible harnessing of the pedagogical virtues – epistemic, technical and 
ethical – that, in fact, together constitute the essence of their professionalism. 
Last but not least, in an aretaic pedagogy both learners and teachers share the 
potential to develop a virtuous self. In light of this idea, teaching offers the 
pedagogical/ethical/social conditions that could enable the promotion of a 
eudaimonistic life. According to Aristotelian ethics, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, a person manages to become eudaimon when he/she exercises virtues both in 
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private and public life. Undoubtedly, teaching might then be speculated as a prime 
paradigm of eudaimonia-driven space.  
What follows is the consideration of the eudaimonistic dynamics of the practice of 
drama/theatre education, given that this is the specific context of the study. Thus, the 
next chapter focuses on the epistemology of the field and its possibilities for the 
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Chapter 3 
THE EUDAIMONISTIC SPACE IN DRAMA/THEATRE EDUCATION 
And in connecting the idea of goodness with that of the good life, beauty 
can provide us with a conceptual and analytical base from which to re-
engage with an idea of the arts and of education as pursuits morally 
worthwhile for their own sake, for the life-enhancing qualities they can 
bring rather than economic or social purposes they can serve. … [I]t is to 
re-introduce it as a means to expand and heighten our consciousness 




3.1 INTRODUCTION: THE HARMONY BETWEEN BEAUTY AND VIRTUE 
The scope of this chapter is to articulate ways of seeing virtue ethics in the space of 
drama/theatre education. This effort, however, is amplified by a fresh sense of 
goodness interwoven with beauty that comes to enrich our perception of eudaimonia, 
as has been formed so far. In Beauty and Education (2010), Winston attempts to 
embody beauty in the educational discourse, from which it ‘is entirely absent’ (p. 1). 
Unlike education, as he observes, beauty is a habitual concept of our everyday 
communication. So, he expounds a novel and powerful re-interpretation of the 
serviceability of beauty in the arts and education in general. His approach to beauty 
goes beyond Kant’s deontology, which posits beauty as being detached from its 
impact on the ethical and practical concerns of our ordinary/professional life. The 
central idea to the revival of beauty is its recognition as an ethical value that holds an 
esoteric and unselfish energy of the human mind and heart. Beauty is made manifest 
as a channel of refinement of the self’s consciousness. 
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Significantly, Winston was mostly inspired by the Platonic positions of the 
philosopher Murdoch (1991), who illuminates our philosophical/aesthetic 
understanding of teaching through beauty as ‘a training in the love of virtue’ (ibid., p. 
86). Given the Platonic ideal, ‘to love the beautiful is to desire the good’ (Nehamas, 
2007, p. 127), Winston (2010) proceeds to unify both ideas – beauty and good – 
arguing that ‘an education in beauty is also an education in goodness’ (p. 85). 
Remarkably, this correlation clearly advocates both ethical values as educational 
goals and, moreover, suggests that their attainment depends upon the synergy of both. 
Determining the role of beauty in drama/theatre education, it is essential for its 
epistemology to be assumed in terms of art (Bowell and Heap, 2010). Defining the 
field as an art, in O’Toole’s (1997) view, means that ‘by its nature [it] explores the 
metaphysical construction of alternative realities in aesthetic configurations’ (p. 186). 
As Best (1996) has argued, its effectiveness relies substantially on ‘the dynamic, 
expressive potential of the character of artistic meaning and learning’, which can open 
‘fresh horizons of insight, and therefore feeling’ (p. 15, italics original). It is overt that 
Best places emotional development at the heart of artistic work, a critical position that 
also displays its contribution to the promotion of virtues. According to Aristotelian 
theory, as discussed in Chapter 1, ‘[v]irtues are dispositions not only to act in 
particular ways but to feel in particular ways’ (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 149).  
The idea, however, of correlating aretaic development with the epistemology of 
drama/theatre education is not novel; it is in fact a long-established notion. Despite its 
broad popularity within the field, what is new is the idea of educating student teachers 
to understand teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice through drama/theatre 
education. The fact that no other study, as evidenced in the review of the literature, 
has explored this prospect gives this study an added innovative perspective. 
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Classically, Neelands’ (2004, 2009b) writings speak passionately of the inherently 
“humanising” role of drama/theatre education, emphasising its transformative ethos as 
‘[a] pedagogy of hope, change and choice’ (p. 15). More specifically, he establishes 
the ‘priority and primacy to the personal and social development of the students’ 
(2004, p. 50). To be precise, aretaic development is placed within this ideological 
frame, further exploring a third dimension: that of professional development.  
During the second half of the twentieth century, a growing body of literature classifies 
drama/theatre education as a pedagogical medium closely connected to the growth of 
virtues (Courtney, 1980; Heathcote, 1984; Heathcote & Bolton, 1995; Neelands, 
1984; O’Neill, 1995; Slade, 1954; Wagner, 1999; Winston, 1998). Indicatively, 
Bolton (1990) suggests: ‘sensitivity, commitment, confidence, self-assertion, 
eagerness to learn, the development of positive thinking and the acquisition of 
wisdom is a kind of natural outcome of drama’ (p. 11). Recognising that the range of 
aretaic development cannot be either predetermined or predicted for all cases, but 
always depends upon context, the virtues being examined in this chapter are those 
mainly originated from dialogue and the ethics of the beautiful, as these have been 
studied by three leading practitioners: Jonothan Neelands, Helen Nicholson and Joe 
Winston.  
Thus, the study of virtues occupies the second section of the chapter, whereas the crux 
of the first is the epistemology and pedagogy of the field. Because the study adopts 
the term drama/theatre education, this is an added theme being explored with respect 
to contemporary views of literature. Finally, the chapter concludes with an argument 
on the convergence of the two practices – of teaching and the teaching of 
drama/theatre education – on the basis of aretaic pedagogy.  
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3.2 THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DRAMA/THEATRE EDUCATION: 
TOWARDS A PEDAGOGY OF SELF IN RELATION TO OTHERNESS 
The witness of the dynamics of theatre is alive in the (re)presentation of living 
realities embedded in human existence. Arendt (1998) is one leading philosopher 
who advocates such theatre aesthetics and states: 
The theatre was the political art par excellence; only there is the political 
sphere of human life transposed into art. By the same token, it is the only 
art whose sole subject is man in his relationship to others (p. 188). 
 
For Arendt, as demonstrated, the theatre is a metaphor of the public space of human 
condition in an inextricable association with alterity. According to her philosophical 
notions, the human self is seen and recognised by others primarily through the 
energies of action and speaking. This social premise of the interplay between the self 
and the other is the one that also underpins the drama/theatre education epistemology. 
3.2.1 Delineating the Art of Drama/Theatre Education 
As a new researcher and a relatively inexperienced teacher in the field(s), I find the 
task of defining drama education and theatre education challenging, since the relevant 
literature does not figure the field(s) as static or monolithic practice(s). Contemporary 
drama and applied theatre, as Dunn and Anderson (2013) point out, come across with 
a refreshing ‘eclecticism’, which gives witness to the fact that the fields continually 
reshape themselves according to their ‘context, purposes and participants’ (p. 293).  
Given that my personal teaching experience is predicated on the two courses that I 
teach in a teacher preparation programme – Drama Education and Theatre Education 
and Theatrical Play – it is important to note that both courses are designed around the 
idea that, on the one hand, they share common theatrical components – ‘focus, 
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metaphor, tension, symbol, contrast, role, time, space’ (Bowell & Heap, 2001, p. 1) – 
but, on the other hand, each one concentrates on different approaches and purposes. 
Taking into account critical themes, historical information and pedagogical contexts 
regarding the field(s), this discussion is an attempt to describe the two separate fields 
as integrated in one wider pedagogical-artistic area.  
3.2.1.1 Identification of the field(s) 
Martin-Smith’s (2005) imaginative and playfully illustrated suggestion of the 
aesthetic similarities of drama education and theatre education is influential in seeing 
the two fields as one. In particular, he indicates: 
Examining the aesthetics of the complementary fields of educational drama 
and theatre is like looking through a kaleidoscope. If you turn it one way, 
you see one colourful pattern; if you turn it the other way, you see yet 
another. The multiplicity of approaches to drama and theatre education, 
each with its own aesthetic pattern, often obscures the common ground they 
all share (ibid., p. 3). 
 
What becomes clear through the thesis of Martin-Smith is the fact that both fields are 
closely interconnected. Essentially, they have the same ontology, and it does not 
matter if they deploy different methods.  
A second key source that reinforces the propensity for unifying the two fields is 
Bowell and Heap’s (2005) discussion of the contemporary necessity to educate 
student teachers to become teacher-artists. On the basis of this proposal, they stress:  
… it would seem a more prudent policy to train teacher-artists who have 
the ability to meld their pedagogical understanding and skill with the 
aesthetic craft and sensibility than to rely on visiting artists as the “natural” 
or “normal” providers of arts education (ibid., p. 59, italics original). 
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Focusing on the art of theatre in education, they consider the outlook of how the 
teacher might function ‘as an artist within the particular genre of applied theatre 
known as process drama’ (ibid.). Interpreting their view, it is apparent that they 
discern applied theatre as an umbrella art, within which process drama is determined 
as one specific genre. In another case, when Bowell and Heap (2001) examine the 
question “Where does drama fit into education?”, they demonstrate that there exists a 
‘newly emerging consensus among practitioners [that] recognises an inclusive model 
of drama within education: a model which seeks to accommodate a range of genres 
which are all grounded in performance’ (p. 1).  
A third supplementary, providing strong evidence and further corroborating the 
positions of Bowell and Heap, is Neelands’ article The Diversity of Drama Education: 
Models and Purposes (2008). Significantly, Neelands discusses both historically and 
geographically the different approaches to drama applied in schools, through which 
the evolutionary course of the field is so emphatic. Following Neelands’ historical 
line, Drama in Education – the model of Dorothy Heathcote and Gavin Bolton – was 
fundamentally built on the techniques of teacher in role and role-playing. It is this 
model that has subsequently evolved into Process Drama. Cecily O’Neill (1995), one 
of the pioneers of Process Drama, defines it as a new participatory approach, which 
presupposes: 
 … a complex dramatic encounter … that evokes an immediate dramatic 
world … [and] depends on the consensus of all those present for its 
existence. Process drama proceeds without a script, its outcome is 
unpredictable, it lacks a separate audience (p. 5).   
 
In addition to these two models is Neelands’ (2008) proposal of Drama Education 
that moves ‘beyond the boundaries of process drama’ (p. 49). Substantially, it 
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integrates a diversity of conventions and theatrical techniques, and therefore has also 
become known as the “conventions approach” (p. 60). As Neelands has argued, this 
more recent model ‘seeks to use drama as a learning medium and also to teach the 
techniques, histories, forms and codes of the theatre’ (ibid.). Moreover, Neelands 
highlights that Drama Education is an approach absolutely advocated by Heathcote 
(1982), who demonstrates its importance in this way:   
So we come to the fascinating area of conventions which can be used to 
enable children to become involved in drama experiences of many types. 
The ability of children to achieve truthful behaviour under both TiE and 
classroom drama, and to become committed to the decisions … is 
phenomenal. Conventions, as I shall outline, seem to me to be a most useful 
additive to both types of work (p. 28).  
 
It is evident from Neelands’ positions that Drama Education succeeds in combining 
the very closely related fields of Theatre in Education and Process Drama. This 
conclusion is validated by Neelands (2008), who underlines that ‘[t]his model is 
distinctive because it does not distance classroom uses of drama from the broader 
field of theatre in society’ (p. 60). Consequently, in light of this brief history of the 
models of drama and the recent tendencies in preparing student teachers as artists, this 
study adopts one term for both fields: that of drama/theatre education. Therefore, 
drama/theatre education is herein conceived of as art in education, which 
accommodates all those approaches that allow for an exploration of human conditions 
through the creative aesthetics of theatre performance.  
3.2.1.2 Determination of pedagogical background  
In essence, drama/theatre education, as Neelands (ibid.) elucidates, is a model of 
pedagogy rather than a vehicle for artistic ends, which is informed by key educational 
theories. Dewey’s (1934, 1938) progressive pedagogy is one theory that has 
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fundamentally influenced its epistemology. The prominence given to empirical and 
artistic learning is a clear demonstration of Dewey’s key pedagogical principle that 
real world experiences should be integrated into school life and the learning context. 
For Dewey, artistic practices are the ones that may incorporate the development of 
perception, emotion and action. 
Social constructivism is another basic theoretical frame of drama/theatre education 
(Neelands, 2008; Wagner, 1999). Bruner’s theory of scaffolding and Vygotsky’s 
theory of social learning have given impetus both for the enhancement of teamwork 
and the application of affective and cognitive activities. The teacher is seen as the 
facilitator of the teaching/learning process, who is called to draw special attention to 
the technique of teacher-in-role. In addition, Freire’s humanistic pedagogy underpins 
the dialogic learning strategies of drama/theatre education, while their primary 
intention is to give a leading role to the learners’ presence, resulting in the 
configuration of knowledge by the learners themselves (Neelands, 2008).  
Furthermore, the pedagogy of the field is inextricably intertwined with theories of 
theatre and performance (ibid.). The Brechtian theory of theatre, which is focused on 
the transformation of spectators from passive recipients to critical thinkers (Brecht 
cited in Willet, 1964), boosts the attention on a more critical participation by means of 
theatrical conventions. Participants, both as artistic actors and social actors, are 
encouraged to (re)present the world, acting on their own worlds through imaginative 
conditions (Neelands, 2000, 2008). Likewise, the methodology of Boal’s forum 
theatre, inspired by the idea of the spectator as actor, reinforces the engagement of 
learners in and out of role, offering them the space for dialogised questioning and 
discussion (Neelands, 2008).  
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Last, perceiving drama/theatre education as a performative art means that the 
aesthetics of its teaching/learning prepares participants for all those performances of 
our everyday life. In Nicholson’s (2011) view, this learning outcome is of paramount 
significance. As she strongly highlights, ‘learning to participate in different forms of 
theatre and understanding the conditions and constructions of performance is, 
arguably, one of the most important elements of education’ (p. 200).  
3.2.2 Articulating the Aesthetics of Dramatic Engagement 
As has been inferred so far, one essential epistemological condition of drama/theatre 
education is the multimodal participation and spectatorship both of teacher and 
learners, observable in continual sequence and interaction. Neelands (2004) stresses 
that the teacher/author is a key contributory factor in the poetics of the field. 
Certainly, when Wagner (1999) contends that drama is ‘powerful because its unique 
balance of thought and feeling makes learning enjoyable, exciting, challenging, 
relevant to real-life concerns’ (p. 5), Neelands (2004) shows his disagreement with 
this perception, commenting:  
What is hidden in the claim that “drama is powerful” are the distinctive and 
preferred values, ethics and aesthetics of the author and how these socially 
constructed subjectivities have shaped pedagogical actions, intentions and 
the interpretation and presentation of the efficacy of the ‘results’ or effects 
of drama (p. 48). 
 
Neelands’ hermeneutic view makes lucid that the dynamics of drama/theatre 
education as a pedagogical implement rest significantly upon human agency.  The 
teacher’s “worlds”, as being elucidated, is a decisive coefficient, not only for the 
effectiveness of the teaching of the field, but also for the ways by which he/she can 
understand its educational outcomes.  
	  	   69	  
3.2.2.1 Quadripartite presence  
Beyond the pedagogical/artistic/ethical presence of the teacher/author, a second 
fundamental principle of the power of the field is the configuration of the theatrical 
ensemble. In Bowell and Heap’s (2005) words, this condition is built on the idea that 
the ‘external audience of the theatre is replaced by an internal audience, so that the 
participants are both the theatrical ensemble that creates the “play” and the audience 
that receives it’ (p. 60, bolded original). Seeing the space of action within this 
perspective, let us give further recourse to Neelands’ (2000) observations: it is 
‘informally divided into “stage” and “auditorium”’ (p. 51), while all participants ‘are 
physically and psychically engaged in the dramatic action, which requires actions-to-
be-taken in order to progress’ (p. 50). Wagner (1999) indicates that the theatrical 
presence/engagement of all participants is practically evidenced through the different 
roles they perform, such as: playwrights, actors, spectators and critics.  
A more analytical interpretation of the above quadripartite roll of the participants is 
given by Bowell and Heap (2005). Their essential idea is the ‘self-spectator’, who is 
activated as “spectator-actor”, “spectator-playwright”, “spectator-director” and 
“spectator-learner”’ (p. 66). The inspiration of this participatory schema is Dorothy 
Heathcote’s pedagogy, which highlights ‘a process of “education for self-direction”’ 
(ibid.). Given that these roles are enacted in a reciprocal interplay between teacher 
and learners, the result is the building of a spiralled interactivity (see Figure 3.1). In 
this interactive process, the learners become teachers and the teacher becomes a 
learner, and thus all work in a context of “colleagueness” and ‘co-creativity’ (ibid., p. 
67).  
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 Figure 3.1: The topography of the spiralled interactivity between teacher and 
learners, adapted from Bowell and Heap 2005, p. 67 	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3.2.2.2 ‘Sociology of aesthetics’ 
The aesthetics of participation/spectatorship in drama/theatre education, as has been 
illustrated, enables us to assume an element of plasticity in the exploration of stories 
and concepts. Gallagher (2005) defines this quality as the ‘sociology of aesthetics’ (p. 
82). She argues that this kind of aesthetics depicts the learners’ cognitive and 
embodied responses in their attempt to represent human realities. In her own words, 
the dramatic “frame” ‘serves to distance the players from the subject in such a way as 
to ultimately engage them aesthetically and offer to them a simultaneous sense of 
recognition’ and ‘the potential for change’ (ibid., p. 83, italics original).  
In this regard, the fictional context of drama/theatre education opens up spaces of 
social understanding, within which the role-players scrutinise and perform different 
possible decisions and actions. Therefore, imagination operates as a “gateway” 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 272) that permits the learners to engage aesthetically through 
‘critically examining and physically embodying their own and others’ sensuous 
perceptions and interpretations’ (Gallagher, 2005, p. 93). This prospect of seeing self 
and others by means of the sociology of aesthetics, as Gallagher (ibid.) estimates, 
contributes to a social education that should be a vital concern of schools. What is 
therefore needed is the enhancement of the learning process with aesthetic 
experiences. 
Critically, the process of the sociology of aesthetics as a rich source of social 
awareness might also be regarded as a significant isotope for the development of 
virtues. While this consideration is at the crux of the study, the next investigation 
focuses on the possibility for learners to achieve aretaic development through their 
practical/aesthetic participation in drama/theatre education.   
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3.3 VIRTUE-CENTRED ISOTOPES IN DRAMA/THEATRE EDUCATION 
As noted in the introduction of the chapter, drama/theatre education provides a poly-
dynamics towards the practice of virtues. This notion denotes that it affords a large 
range of sources that can promote aretaic growth. For example, Winston’s (1998) 
work shows evidence of the role of traditional tales in drama as a vital isotope, within 
which the virtues ‘can be problematized, played with, subverted, reframed, or brought 
into conflict with one another’ (p. 176).  
This discussion draws our attention to two other isotopes of the field, related to 
dialogue and the ethics of the beautiful. Both are built on the binary aesthetics of 
participation/spectatorship that entails a nexus of bodily, cognitive, emotional and 
social experiences/responses. All these conditions, in accordance with Aristotelian 
ethics (see Figure 1.1, p. 19), constitute a poetical virtue-driven process, given that 
they can result in virtuous dispositions, emotions and habits. 
 3.3.1 The Virtues of Dialogue 
Despite its pluralistic vision, in drama/theatre education, dialogue exists ‘not just as a 
philosophical concept’, but as ‘a more actionable and widely practiced effort of 
inquiry and learning’ (Isaacs, 2002, p. 204). An appropriate definition of the model of 
dialogue exploited in the field is proposed by Isaacs as:  
a special way of thinking and talking that invites people to open a space 
for learning together. Its purpose is to bring out change at the source of 
people’s thoughts and feelings rather than at the level of results their ways 
of thinking produce (ibid., p. 203). 
 
On the basis of this description, a typical misconception could be to perceive dialogue 
exclusively as a language communicative technique, or as a mere conversation. Even 
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worse, we may see it as a trading “discussion”, ‘where the effort is to win and avoid 
losing’ (ibid., p. 205). As argued by Isaacs, ‘[d]ialogue’s power resides in 
understanding it in use. … its nature is in its living application’ (ibid., italics original).  
A deeper comprehension of this fashion of dialogue leads us, once again, to the school 
of thought of the classical Greek philosophers, Socrates and Aristotle. As stressed by 
Linder (2002), ‘[c]lassical wisdom locates the origins of modern dialogue in the 
Classical Greek polis’ (p. 53). Banathy (2002) illustrates that Socrates invited 
Athenians to dialogue sessions, which ‘became an essential part of the classical Greek 
experience’ (p. 38). So, Socratic dialogue, as mentioned in section 2.2 of the previous 
chapter, was a ‘principal way to build character’ (Linder, 2002, p. 56).  
Still, for Aristotle, “Agora” was the place for ‘Strategic Dialogue’, by which 
Athenians made ‘collective decisions about their collective lives’ and the future of 
their polis (Banathy, 2002, p. 37). Such a dialogic culture was grounded on the ideal 
of self-governance, known as the “polis-praxis” idea (ibid.). Its fundamentals were: 
δηµοκρατία (democracy) – “the power of the people” – συζήτηση (discussion) – 
“searching together” in a dialogue mode – and δηµοσοφία – the “wisdom of people” 
(Banathy, 1996, p. 338).  
Understanding dialogue’s value in the classical epoch of Athens, it becomes apparent 
that its semantics were equivalent to its existential essence. As Isaacs (1999) 
interprets, the Greek etymology of διάλογος (dialogue) includes the concepts: δια –
‘gather[ing] together’ – and λόγος – ‘the flow of meaning’ (p. 19). Taking into 
consideration the pedagogical background of drama/theatre education, as evidenced 
both by the spiralled interactivity between teacher and learners (see Figure 3.1, p. 70) 
and the practice of the sociology of aesthetics, we could then characterise the 
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teaching/learning space of the field as a paradigm of dialogic practice tantamount to 
“a community of enquiry” (Wells cited in Bowell & Heap, 2005, p. 67). Thus, in these 
terms, the dialogic space of the field could enable the fostering of a web of social and 
democratic virtues.  
3.3.1.1 Social virtues 
Cooperation is one fundamental virtue than can be developed through dialogue. 
Defining drama/theatre education, Nicholson (2002) indicates that it is ‘an interactive 
and dialogic art form’ that ‘depends on collaboration and positive group dynamics’ 
rather than ‘individualised learning practices’ (p. 82). Likewise, Neelands (2009b) 
describes the field, stressing its high potentials for social cohesion and cooperation. 
As he explains: 
Drama and Theatre is the quintessential social art form and this quality is 
also essential to its educational uses. People come together in order to make 
and to share in its makings. It is the art of togetherness even if much of its 
content and form is about representing un-togetherness (ibid., p. 16). 
 
In his book Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation (2012), 
Sennett contends that “the art of togetherness” is a practice of ‘hard cooperation’ (p. 
6). What he suggests, in fact, is something ‘beyond the sense that working together is 
an interpersonal challenge’ (Fine, 2012, p. 374). Working collaboratively requires, as 
he explicates, not “social skills” but ‘dialogical skills’ (2012, p. 6). A dialogical 
person, then, is acquainted with the process of ‘listening well, behaving tactfully, 
finding points of agreement and managing disagreement, or avoiding frustration in a 
difficult discussion’ (ibid.).  
Within this specific context of cooperation, Sennett (ibid.) discerns two dissimilar 
ways of practising a conversation: the dialectic and the dialogic. In dialectic 
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procedure, the conversational endeavour is built on a statement of synthesis, which 
means that contraries and disagreements are driven to common ground. Antithetically, 
the dialogic conversation remains open-ended. People converse with the aim of 
exchanging views and experiences, without the necessity of a shared agreement.  
Both sorts of conversation cherish an inherent perspective for cultivating ethical 
dispositions and virtues. Empathy and subjunctivity as opposed to sympathy and 
assertiveness can be developed by means of dialectic and dialogic conversation, 
correspondingly. The sympathetic response involves an imaginative awareness of 
alterity and relies on one’s own subjective reactions, such as: “I understand how you 
feel” and “I can feel your fear”. While sympathy ‘activates one’s own ego’ (ibid., p. 
21), empathy puts the stress instead beyond one’s ego, getting outside himself/herself. 
This comparison indicates that an empathetic response, albeit it is a cooler one, is 
concentrated on the terms and the needs of the other. As Sennett infers: ‘[b]oth 
sympathy and empathy convey recognition, and both forge a bond, but the one is an 
embrace, the other an encounter’ (ibid.).  
The subjunctive and assertive mood operate in an analogous trajectory. The first 
disposition provides a space of possibilities: ‘an indeterminate, mutual space in which 
strangers dwell with one another’ (ibid., p. 23), whereas, the assertive disposition 
maintains its own political site with the risk of creating irreconcilable discussions. 
This nexus of dialectic and dialogic dispositions and virtues described by Sennett has 
been demonstrated as a potential consequence of the collaborative ethos of 
drama/theatre education (Cahill, 2002; Winston, 1999; Winston & Strand, 2013).  
Moreover, the practice of dialogue can result in the development of trust. As noted by 
Bolton (1992): ‘above all, members of the group have to learn to trust each other, and 
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they as a group have to learn to trust drama’ (p. 121). In her article The Politics of 
Trust: Drama Education and the Ethic of Care (2002), Nicholson articulates a theory 
of trust on the grounds of the feminist philosophers, such as Annette Baier (1995), 
whose philosophy originates from Hume’s moral psychology, and Nel Noddings 
(1984) and Madelaine Grumet (1988), who champion the ethics of care. As an effect 
of these influences, Nicholson (2002) considers that trust involves ‘a correspondence 
between belief and expectation, commitment to a person or situation, responsibility 
for oneself, co-operative behaviour and care for others’ (p. 82). On the other hand, she 
highlights that trust may be recognised practically ‘through the public actions of the 
body–what participants say, how they act towards others, and how they relate to each 
other physically within the specific context’ (ibid., p. 83).  
Nicholson (ibid.) also estimates that the practice of trust is always conditional and 
depends on the context, denoting that it ‘is continually negotiated and re-negotiated as 
new and unexpected circumstances arise’ (p. 84). This practical politics of trust, as 
she points out, demands a caring, learning environment and respect for difference. 
The teacher, she suggests, needs to construct a flexible design of dramatic activities in 
order to stimulate learners’ engagement, with the readiness to give the proper support 
and intervention throughout the course of work. Under such teaching/learning 
conditions, trust has the potential to be transformed into a poetical virtue, on the basis 
of which a series of virtuous dispositions may be unfold: risk-taking, generosity, self-
reflexivity and artistic creativity (ibid., italics not original).  
Following the bigger historical picture, however, it is evident that dialogue, as 
delineated in section 3.3.1, can impact not only upon the social life, but also on the 
civic life. This facet of its dynamic brings democratic virtues to the heart of the next 
discourse. 
	  	   77	  
3.3.1.2 Democratic virtues 
According to Neelands’ (2007, 2009a, 2009b) thesis, central to the ethos of the 
ensemble-based model of drama/theatre education is the building of a dialogic 
democracy. The development of democratic virtues can be perceived as the synergy 
between dialogue, cooperation, activity and performance (Nicholson, 2011). Neelands 
(2009a) argues that the ensemble-building environment is a reliable way to urge the 
learners to construct an active community and a common culture, within which they 
can begin ‘to model the conditions for a future society based in the necessity of 
learning how to live with the grave importance of our interdependence as humans’ 
(pp. 175-176, italics original).  
The theoretical underpinning of Neelands’ (2009a) notion of democracy emanates 
both from McGrath’s (2002) views of the παιδεία (pedagogy) of theatre and 
Castoriadis’ (1997) ideas of the genesis of democracy in ancient Athens. In essence, 
Neelands’ theory guides us to a politics of citizenship that is shown to be largely 
inspired by the politics of the “polis-praxis” idea. As discussed in section 3.3.1, this 
political idea is fastened to the trilogy: democracy, discussion and demosophia. Along 
this line of thinking, Neelands (2009a) indicates that the social, egalitarian and safe 
conditions of the communal space of drama/theatre education aid learners to become 
‘a self-managing, self-governing, self-regulating social group’ that works artistically 
with shared experiences and purposes (p. 182).  
Therefore, in light of this philosophical context, Neelands (ibid.) suggests a concrete 
system of democratic virtues. Based on the principles of the Eκκλησία του Δήµου 
(Church of Demos) – the major democratic meeting of ancient Athens – he deliberates 
five democratic virtues: isonomia – equality in respect of the law – isegoria – the 
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right to speak – isopsephia – equal representation – parrhesia – the ethical obligation 
to speak your mind and – autonomia – the right to self-determination. In 
drama/theatre education the politics of democracy, through the practice of these 
virtues, has an even more powerful influence on the learners’ ethics as a result of the 
potential they are given to participate in a performative space of political aesthetics. In 
this sense, the artistic work transforms into a public sphere (Arendt, 1998), wherein 
the learners obtain an empirical knowledge of democracy as an internal good of their 
learning linked both with respect and freedom of expression. 
3.3.2 The Virtues of “Soft Beauty” 
In this discussion the attention is turned to real-life aesthetic virtues, mostly suggested 
by Winston (2006a, 2006b, 2009). Drawing upon Scarry’s (2001) analysis of Kantian 
concepts of – the beautiful and sublime – Winston demonstrates a nexus of virtues 
that originate from the ethics of the beautiful. Taking into consideration the notion 
that ‘[t]he sublime is principled, noble, righteous; the beautiful is compassionate and 
good-hearted’ (ibid., p. 84), he connects the sublime with the emotions of ‘awe and 
wonder, admiration and fear’ and the beautiful with sentiments that are ‘gentler, more 
reassuring in the pleasures they afford’ (2006a, p. 289). Given these different 
emotional responses to the two concepts, Scarry (2001) argues that the sublime moves 
and displays an aesthetics of power, whereas the beautiful charms and shows an 
aesthetics of less powerfulness. Within this theoretical framework, Winston (2006a) 
proceeds to define those ‘softer virtues of charm, sentiment and comfort’ (p. 289), 
integral to the teaching/learning space of drama/theatre education.   
Laughter, as he contends, is a charming virtue that connotes ‘a spontaneous sign of 
companionship’ (2009, p. 39). According to his argument, laughter is a responsive 
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action with multimodal characters and intentions, often combined with the learners’ 
frivolous and antisocial reactions. However, laughter can be proclaimed as a virtue 
when its dispositions convey that liberating energy that helps learners overcome their 
ego and take on ‘a new, communal and playful identity for the temporality of the 
drama experience’ (ibid.). In this view, laughter turns out to be the vitalising element 
that bridges teaching/learning with fun, playfulness and risk taking, all signifying 
qualities of good pedagogy. Winston chooses to liken playful laughter with a picture 
of togetherness derived from warm home life. As he notes: 
It is more reminiscent of the shared laughter of the happy family, the kind 
of laughter that can be seen as a characteristic of the good life. Laughter, in 
other words, as a virtue’ (ibid., p. 41). 
 
In so doing, he highlights the poetical impact of laughter beyond itself. It has the 
power to regenerate the virtues of ‘gaiety and cheer, compassion and good-
heartedness’ (ibid., p. 43, italics not original). Moreover, in a classroom atmosphere 
of joy, laughter can be correlated with wit and humour; virtues that further promote 
the learners’ connectedness and liveliness (ibid.). Importantly, the practice of these 
virtues reinforces the development of both subjunctive and dialogic dispositions in 
conversational encounters (Winston & Strand, 2013).  
Civility is another virtue that may be seen as a virtue of the beautiful. Using Sennett’s 
(2012) account, Winston and Strand (2013) elaborate upon civility as a virtue that 
‘consists of a certain lightness of touch, of irony, an ability to sustain a discussion that 
is openly inquisitive rather than overly assertive, to create an atmosphere of good 
will’ (p. 70). In these terms, certainly, civility could be recognised as a virtue of 
dialogue too. This is a perspective clearly evidenced by Sennett, who determines 
civility as ‘treating others as though they were strangers and forging a social bond 
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upon that social distance’ (2003, p. 264), and yet as ‘an exchange in which both 
parties make themselves feel good about the encounter’ (2012, p. 120). Nonetheless, 
connecting Sennett’s theory of civility to the ethics of the beautiful, Winston and 
Strand (2013) elucidate that both call attention to ‘charm, liveliness and good-
heartedness’ (p. 70), sentimental energies that configure the form rather than the 
content of a conversation. Civility, therefore, can considerably affect the virtuous 
dispositions that unfold in a social encounter.  
For Winston (2009), the imperative when regarding the virtue ethics of the beautiful 
is, first, the right comprehension of its pedagogy and, subsequently, its employment. 
As he suggests, the ethics of the beautiful can contribute to the awakening of beauty 
and thus to the creation of a world that ‘actually feels as we would like the world to 
feel’ (p. 44). Surely, all the other virtues that have been explored both as social and 
democratic (see Figure 3.2) can also serve in the building of such a world of beauty. 
Their end, overall, is the building of the virtuous self and the understanding of good 
life, both of which are based on ‘a continual beginning afresh’ (Dewey, 1916, p. 360).  
 
 Figure 3.2: Virtue-centred isotopes in drama/theatre education 
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 3.4 EPILOGUE: CONVERGENT EPISTEMOLOGIES  
This chapter has examined the contribution of drama/theatre education to aretaic 
development. As demonstrated, the epistemology of the field encourages a person-
centred pedagogy and, in consequence, the flourish of virtues. In this regard, such an 
assertion allows the correlation of the epistemology of drama/theatre education with 
the epistemological approach to teaching proposed by Sockett (2012), as considered 
in the previous chapter. Summarising the essential epistemological parameters of the 
field, we can therefore focus on four key virtue-building conditions, similar to those 
that Sockett identifies as fundamentals for the construction of virtues.  
First, given that an epistemological approach depends significantly on the dialectics 
between public and private knowledge (see Figure 2.1, p. 45), in drama/theatre 
education this principle is integral to the nature of the dramatic/theatrical work. It is 
evident that the components of private knowledge – experience, commitment and 
identity – are at the heart of the learning space of the field, while the learners’ artistic 
practices, substantially, are an original product of these components; at the same time, 
it is clear that they can be further expanded through them. Concerning public 
knowledge, this still exists in the learning process, since its elements – truth, belief 
and evidence – customarily function as inherent traits within the investigation of 
stories and human realities, since they comprise the prime source of artistic work. 
Second, the ensemble-based model of teaching/learning in drama/theatre education 
constructs the required communal culture that, according to Sockett (ibid.), is one 
indispensable condition for the promotion of virtues. In essence, as previously 
discussed, the nature of work within the field is completely collaborative and, as a 
consequence, boosts the virtues of dialogue, democracy and even the virtue ethics of 
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the beautiful. Unquestionably, one feasible effect of the development of these virtues, 
and one that could be regarded as a third resemblance with the expectable outcomes 
of an epistemological approach, is the potential confrontation of the learners’ 
egocentric stances. The frequent recurrences of both public and private conversations, 
within the process of making the artistic work, enable the learners to problematise 
their belief-holding self and, furthermore, to enrich their social awareness through the 
lens of its sociological aesthetics (Gallagher, 2005). 
Lastly, in drama/theatre education, as is also the case in an epistemological approach, 
the teacher’s presence is a crucial factor in the development of virtues. His/her 
presence, as argued in the previous chapter, may influence both intellectually and 
ethically the process of teaching/learning and, accordingly, the learners’ aretaic 
development. In drama/theatre education the teacher’s aesthetic/artistic/ethical values, 
integrated in the teaching/learning space as highlighted by Neelands (2004), are 
crucial coefficients of the poetics of the field. However, because the teacher works as 
a co-author with learners (see Figure 3.1, p. 70), playing simultaneously the roles of 
playwright, director and actor, these conditions make his/her presence decisively 
important for the excellence of the teaching/learning. As it becomes perceptible, some 
of the pedagogical/ethical qualities needed for his/her quadripartite presence are 
playfulness, imagination and creativity, as well as believing in dialogue, reciprocity 
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES AND RESEARCH CONTEXTS 
Like other applied fields, education research serves two related purposes: to 
add to fundamental understanding of education-related phenomena and 
events, and to inform practical decision making (Shavelson & Towne, 




4.1 INTRODUCTION: AN INVITATION TO QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
The delineation of the theoretical stage of the design of this research study is the 
central aim of this chapter. In order to achieve the teleological character of education 
research evidenced in the above quotation, Merriam (2001) proposes that the most 
appropriate approach is the planning of the research journey as a ‘vacation trip’ (p. 3). 
The real meaning she ascribes to this idea makes the design seem a persistently 
action-guided investigation, which, if it is concentrated on ‘discovery, insight, and 
understanding from the perspectives of those being studied, offers the greatest 
promise of making a difference in people’s lives’ (2009, p. 1).  
In the last two decades, literature on research has witnessed a general consensus that 
the key driver of research design is not methodology, which is used precisely to 
answer knowledge-constitutive questions, but the questions that are themselves under 
study (Creswell, 1998; Ercikan & Roth, 2006; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011; Merriam, 
2001; Sale et al., 2002; Suter, 2012). This emphasis on research questions is 
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transparent in the report Scientific Research in Education (2002), generated by a 
National Research Council Committee in Washington, US, in the following way: 
Recognising the design must go hand in hand with the problem 
investigated, we examine education research design … across three 
common types of research questions: What is happening? Is there a 
systematic effect? and How or why is it happening? (Shavelson & Towne, 
2002, p. 27). 
 
Discussing these three modes of research questions, Ercikan and Roth (2006) identify 
that the first invites qualitative methodologies, such as ethnography, 
phenomenography and case study. For the second type of question they suggest case 
studies, while the third type can combine both qualitative and quantitative research. 
Given this research prime, this study adopts a qualitative design because of the social 
and exploratory nature of its central research question and sub-questions.  
Creswell (1998) defines qualitative research as ‘an inquiry process of understanding 
based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human 
problem’ (p. 15). Specifically, this study falls within the parameters of two qualitative 
methodological traditions: case study and phenomenography. This synthesis of 
approaches is expected both to present a more complete picture of the quality of 
issues and variables embedded in the research situation and, also, to provide more 
valid insights with respect to the participants’ perceptions. Beyond this particular 
combination of approaches, ethnography, as indicated above, or even critical 
ethnography are qualitative traditions that might possibly be exploited. Especially, 
critical ethnography, as argued by Gallagher (2006), may also offer a ‘rich theoretical 
scaffolding’ (p. 63) in order to help the researcher examine ‘the dialectical 
relationship between social/structural constraints on human actors and the possibilities 
of human agency’ (p. 64).  
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Thus, the chapter traces the theoretical scheme of this study divided into three main 
sections. First, it starts with a discussion about the basic terminology of research and 
the research questions being investigated. Second, it examines the inquiry paradigm 
of qualitative research and the methodologies selected. Third, it describes the 
sociocultural and pedagogical contexts of the study and, finally, ends with a summary. 
 
4.2 KEY RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS 
There are many aspects of research aside from methods, although college-
level courses are often misleadingly called “research methods” instead of 
“research practice”. The major dimensions of research are ontology, 
epistemology, methodology, and methods. Each dimension impacts how a 
research question is formulated, how a project is conceptualized, and how a 
study is carried out (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011, p. 4). 
 
4.2.1 Terminology: Fundamental Issues In Social Research 
Research logic is based on a body of terms. Irrespective of the mode of research 
design, according to Hesse-Biber and Leavy (ibid.), four conceptual fields exist that 
the researcher needs to take into consideration. What is most important is that all of 
these research factors operate interrelated in a hierarchical sequence (Crotty, 1998).  
Starting with ontology, it is defined as the ‘nature of being’ (ibid., p. 10) or ‘the nature 
of reality’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 37). For the purposes of the social sciences, 
Blaikie (1993) demonstrates that it encompasses ‘claims about what exists, what it 
looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other’ (p. 6). 
Two essential general ontological theories have shaped the social sciences: realism 
and idealism (Ormston et al., 2013). Realism relies on the idea that ‘there is an 
external reality which exists independently of people’s beliefs about or understanding 
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of it’ (ibid., pp. 4-5). Idealism, on the other hand, is a ‘fundamentally mind-
dependent’ theory; that is, reality is harmonised with socially constructed meanings, 
in the sense that there is no other reality beyond them (ibid.). 
Epistemology refers to the assumptions connected to the potential ways of gaining 
knowledge of social reality (Blaikie, 1993). Crotty (1998) estimates that ontology and 
epistemology are difficult to be distinguished in the scope of research: ‘to talk about 
the construction of meaning [epistemology] is to talk of the construction of a 
meaningful reality [ontology]’ (p. 10). Substantially, both terms as philosophical 
belief systems articulate the concept of the inquiry paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), 
meant as worldview (Kuhn, 1962).  
As regards the other two dimensions of research design – methodology and methods – 
they each logically coexist in the frame of an inquiry paradigm. Following Harding 
(1987), methodology is ‘a theory and analysis of how research does or should 
proceed’ (p. 3). In other words, it discloses the ways upon which particular theoretical 
perspectives can be empirically applied on the basis of scientific principles. Method is 
described as a technique that supports the gathering of evidence (ibid.). As Hesse-
Biber and Leavy (2011) advise, it is important for the researcher to imagine 
methodology as a bridge that links the research paradigm with methods and to 
remember that he/she ‘travels this bridge throughout the research process’ (p. 6).  
4.2.2 Research Questions: The Drivers 
In light of the principle that research design is the ‘logic that links data to be collected 
(and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study’ (Yin, 2009, p. 
24), then the necessity that appears is the more analytical consideration of the research 
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questions. In this way, the cohesion and reasoning of the design of the study can be 
clearer understood. 
Taken as granted that the general research question of the study is how can we 
educate student primary teachers to lead them to a familiarity with aretaic pedagogy, 
this is being explored through the lens of four specified sub-questions. The first 
addresses those ecological conditions that could be developed within the 
drama/theatre education courses, contributing to the promotion of teaching/a teacher’s 
virtues. The second important research sub-question focuses on the kinds of virtues 
that could be highlighted in the courses. The third sub-question refers to the extent to 
which student teachers could apply aretaic pedagogy in their teaching practices of 
drama/theatre education. The fourth and final sub-question bound up with the context 
of the student teachers’ education is concerned with those learning experiences that 
they could describe as critical in shaping their perception of teaching as an ethical 
practice.  
Considering the nature of these research sub-questions, it is inferred that they are 
‘open-ended, evolving, and nondirectional’ (Creswell, 2013, p. 138) – centred on 
“how” and “what” rather than “why”. In this regard, they strengthen the requirement 
for an ‘“insider” perspective’ (Creswell, 1998, p. 16), namely an interpretive and 
holistically descriptive vision of the investigated phenomenon. In such a case, the 
model of quantitative research is demonstrated as the most appropriate one (Creswell, 
2013; Crotty, 1998; Merriam, 2009). 
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4.3 RESEARCHING THROUGH QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 
The genesis of qualitative research has its roots in anthropological and sociological 
studies, which aimed at understanding people’s lives with respect to their social and 
cultural contexts (Merriam, 2009). This tradition of qualitative research is evident 
within the spectrum of its several definitions (Creswell, 1998, 2007, 2013; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994, 2005; Merriam, 2001, 2009; Patton, 2002). Following an older, 
concise definition articulated by Van Maanen (1979), qualitative research is: 
[A]n umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek 
to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the 
meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring 
phenomena in the social world’ (p. 520). 
 
4.3.1 The Paradigm of Qualitative Inquiry 
As there exists a broad agreement about the character of qualitative research, Merriam 
(2009) argues that ‘there is almost no consistency across writers in how this 
[philosophical] aspect of qualitative research is discussed’ (p. 8). Given this view, it 
seems constructive for the qualitative paradigm to be illustrated through some basic 
juxtapositions with the quantitative paradigm.  
Positivism, as the typical paradigm of quantitative research, is sharply contrasted to 
interpretivism, which is closely aligned with qualitative research design (Creswell, 
2013; Merriam, 2009; Sale et al., 2002; Suter, 2012). Empirical, experimental 
verification of the truth represents the philosophical frame of positivist ontology. 
Primarily, this position derives from the theory of realism; there is a single, objective 
and measurable reality, regardless of the researcher beliefs. Epistemologically, the 
quantitative, positivist investigator and the investigated phenomenon remain detached. 
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The findings, hence, are a product made in a supposedly value-free framework 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).  
Interpretivism, antithetically, adopts the philosophical orientation that reality is 
relative, multidimensional and socially constructed. Thus, constructivism is a term 
often used interchangeably with interpretivism (Merriam, 2009). A lucid and coherent 
depiction of the ontology of interpretive research is the one given by Creswell (2007):  
In this worldview, individuals seek understanding of the world in which 
they live and work. They develop subjective meanings of their experiences. 
… These meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look 
for the complexity of views. … Often these subjective meanings are 
negotiated socially and historically. In other words, they are not simply 
imprinted on individuals but are formed through interaction with others 
(hence social constructivism) and through historical and cultural norms that 
operate in individuals’ lives (pp. 20-21). 
 
From an epistemological view, personal perceptions and experiences have a dominant 
role in the construction of multiple social realities that are constantly changing (Sale 
et al., 2002). Consequently, the foremost goal of qualitative research is the 
comprehension and explanation of complex and human phenomena examined in their 
natural environments (Creswell, 2013; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007; Suter, 2012).  
Within this philosophical frame, the researcher and the researched phenomenon are 
not independent, as is presumed in positivist research; they are interactively 
connected. As stressed by Merriam (2009), a fundamental characteristic of qualitative 
research is that ‘the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and 
analysis’ (p. 15). Nevertheless, there is the assumption that the researcher’s biases or 
“subjectivities” may affect the study (ibid.). For this reason, it is necessary for the 
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researcher to recognise these influential factors and estimate in what ways they may 
be shaping the collection and interpretation of data (ibid.).  
Another essential epistemological feature of qualitative research is the application of 
the inductive process regarding the analysis of data (ibid.). In this way, the qualitative 
researcher follows an artistic procedure: he/she collects data in order to build 
knowledge by the emergence of conceptual themes (Suter, 2012), rather than 
deductively testing hypotheses, as it is used in positivist epistemology. This final 
product is a holistic and rich descriptive portrayal (Creswell, 2013), ‘opening the 
world to us in some way’ (Patton, 2002, p. 544).  
Notwithstanding that different philosophical positions have created different research 
paradigms, both quantitative and qualitative research designs demand the research 
virtues of rigor, sophistication and impartiality. These internal goods of the research 
practice are strongly highlighted by Suter (2012): ‘Both … value rigorous data 
collection and analysis coupled with sound, logical arguments that characterize 
scientific reasoning, namely a compelling chain of evidence that supports 
conclusions’ (p. 345). Εach type of research design, however, possesses a series of 
different methodological approaches that share common qualities. Even so, every 
methodology evidences a distinctive, unique scheme, which it is essential to match 
with the scope of the research.  
4.3.2 The Rationale of Selecting the Qualitative Approaches  
In particular, this study is built on two approaches. Among the five basic, commonly 
used qualitative traditions elaborated by Creswell (2013) – biography, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, case study and ethnography – it is definable as a 
qualitative case study. In addition, because the study belongs to the field of education, 
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the second qualitative approach used is phenomenography, that can boost the 
comprehension of participants’ awareness of educational phenomena (Marton, 1986).  
4.3.2.1 Qualitative case study: Focus on exploration 
The decision for the employment of a qualitative case study approach is twofold. 
First, there is the definition of a case study as ‘an in-depth description and analysis of 
a bounded system’ (Merriam 2009, p. 40), which means that the case is being studied 
in a specific time and place (Creswell, 1998); it is ‘a phenomenon of some sort 
occurring in a bounded context’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 25). Second, the case 
study emphasises ‘discovery and interpretation rather than hypothesis testing’ 
(Merriam, 2001, pp. 28-29). Under these two conceptual frames, it is being inferred 
that this case study could simultaneously respond to three different kinds of case 
study. 
Initially, it can be an exploratory case study design (Yin, 2003), since it is necessary 
to investigate the conditions under which the phenomenon being examined occur. 
While their impact is not predictable, they can potentially lead to diverse outcomes. 
At the same time, this study is a holistic, single-case study, for the case needs to be 
explored in its own environment, as it is a unique situation (ibid.). Furthermore, 
according to Stake (1995), it can be described as an intrinsic case study, ‘not because 
by studying it we learn about other cases or about some general problem, but because 
we need to learn about that particular case’ (p. 3). As Stake (ibid.) and Merriam 
(2009) explain, an intrinsic case study might be useful and applicable when a 
programme is being evaluated. In the present case this possibility is anticipated, as the 
findings could be considered an evaluation of the drama/theatre education courses. 
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Although a qualitative case study offers interpretive insights and illuminative 
meanings, its ‘poor basis for generalization’ (Stake, 1995, p. 7) is often discussed as a 
weak trait of its methodology. This limitation implies that it cannot be a good vehicle 
for scientific development (Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, Stake (1995) replies to these 
misunderstandings by demonstrating that ‘[t]he real business of case study is 
particularization, not generalization’ (ibid., p. 8). Yet, he elucidates that the reader of 
a case study is free to utilise the knowledge and the unique results of the study in a 
personal, constructive way.  
Likewise, the question of how powerful the case study is in relation to the 
particularities of the “case” is highlighted in the field of drama/theatre education. As 
argued by O’Toole (2006), the social context of the field is so unique in each case 
study, which cannot be a product of reproduction, that it substantially requires a 
holistic analysis. Winston’s (2006c) position that ‘we use case study to seek out rather 
than solve problems, provoke rather than answer questions, deepen our understanding 
rather than rush to closure’ (p. 45), makes clear that case study is the proper 
methodology for discovery-oriented findings, beyond the familiarity and commonness 
of our own perceptions.  
4.3.2.2 Phenomenography: Focus on difference 
In Marton’s (1981) words, phenomenography is ‘a kind of [empirical] research … 
complementary to other kinds of research’ (p. 177). By definition, phenomenography 
maps (-graphy) the lived experiences (phenomena) of learners. Its ontological aim, 
therefore, is the identification of the qualitatively different ways learners experience, 
conceptualise and apprehend the various aspects of phenomena (ibid.).  
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Because of its intimate connection with conceptions of human experience, 
phenomenography might be correlated with phenomenology. But, there exist key 
dissimilarities. According to Marton (ibid.), phenomenology is ‘directed towards the 
prereflective level of consciousness’, thus manifesting its intention, which ‘is to 
describe either what the world would be like without having learned to see it or how 
the taken-for-granted world of our everyday existence is lived’ (p. 181). Such a 
philosophical orientation signifies that phenomenologists locate immediate experience 
as a general condition of reality (Marton, 1986). In contrast, phenomenography deals 
with ‘both the conceptual and the experiential, as well as with what is thought of as 
that which is lived’ (Marton, 1981, p. 181). Hence, the focal point is not the individual 
experience, as applies in phenomenology, but the collective meaning.  
In consequence, the epistemological significance of phenomenography depends on the 
description of knowledge constructed on the variations of perceived meanings about it 
(Svensson, 1997). The researcher is interested in finding the ‘variation and the 
architecture of this variation in terms of different aspects that define the phenomena’ 
(Marton & Booth, 1997, p. 117). In so doing, the emerging variations are potentially 
structurally and referentially related, so that they can be mapped, forming hierarchies 
according to certain criteria.  
Nevertheless, this potentiality of a multiplicity of meanings might be more deeply 
understood if we examine how Marton and Booth, in Learning and Awareness (1997), 
elaborate the question: ‘What does it mean to experience something in a certain way?’ 
(p. 86). Following their deliberation, when we experience something in a particular 
way, first we have to discern it from its context. Thus, everything that ‘surrounds the 
phenomenon experienced, including its contours, we call its external horizon’ (ibid.). 
On the other hand, we have to identify the parts of the phenomenon: the way they are 
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connected to each other and the way they all relate to the whole. The recognition of 
all these relationships, ‘together with the contours of the phenomenon’, represents its 
internal horizon (ibid.). While both the external horizon and internal horizon comprise 
the structural aspect of the experienced phenomenon, there exists also the referential 
aspect, which rests on the making of meanings (see Figure 4.1). For instance, in the 
instance that we were to meet a deer in the woods, we could see its stance – if it is 
relaxed/non relaxed, aware/unaware of our presence or ‘even alert to sounds unheard 
by us’ (ibid.). All these observations empower the quality of the referential 
experience.  
Similarly to case study, phenomenography can be reckoned as a methodology of 
particularisation. In the context of this study, they can both potentially contribute 
significantly to the “thick description” and “experiential understanding” (Stake, 1995, 
p. 43) of the participants’ variations/aspects of their views, associated with the virtue-
driven character of the teaching/learning space within the drama/theatre education 
courses. Given that particularisation is an attribute drastically dependent on a nexus of 
contexts related to the phenomenon being examined, this subject drives the discussion 
to a new section.    
Figure 4.1: The anatomy of experience, adapted from Marton and Booth (1997, p. 88) 
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4.4 DETERMINING RESEARCH CONTEXTS 
Adopting a socio-cultural perspective, Mercer (2000) defines context as a combined 
socially structured frame of reference. By this definition, context is more than a 
physical environment; it can be determined as ‘a mental phenomenon’ too (Maloch, 
2005, p. 5). Correlating these views with the contextual frames of this research 
project, there exist two major groups of contexts that may have a significant impact 
upon it: the socio-cultural context and the pedagogical context. While the university, 
the country education system and the teaching policies/reforms in place constitute its 
socio-cultural context, its pedagogical context is mainly constructed by the teacher 
preparation programme, the drama/theatre education courses and the research 
participants. The significance of the description of these two groups of contexts is that 
they can give a more holistic picture of the research conditions and, also, can facilitate 
the understanding of potential research findings and conclusions.  
4.4.1 Socio-cultural Contexts 
4.4.1.1 University profile 
The University of Nicosia is the socio-educational site of this study, located in 
Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus. It is a young independent institution of higher 
education, registered by the Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) since 
2007. In a short period, it has succeeded in becoming a global education centre with 
international students. It offers career-oriented undergraduate and postgraduate 
studies in a diversity of fields, under the function of five schools: Business, 
Humanities-Social Sciences-Law, Sciences, Medicine and Education. Despite the 
official language of teaching being English, there are some fields of study that are 
taught in Greek. “Excellence in Education” is its formal motto (University of Nicosia, 
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2014).    
 4.4.1.2 Cyprus education system – Teacher policies/reforms 
Cyprus still maintains a very centralised-bureaucratic education system (The World 
Bank, 2014). One of the main characteristics of this system is that both primary and 
secondary schools are considered as governmental, rather than community 
institutions. Under the MoEC’s authority lies the responsibility for educational 
policymaking and the administration of education. 
Regarding initial teacher education, a Bachelor’s degree equivalent to ISCED 5A 
(International Standard Classification of Education) is required – academically and 
practically/occupationally oriented (ibid.). As referred to in the report of the 
Committee of Seven Academics (CSA) in 2004, ‘the teaching profession is highly 
valued and attracts top candidates in Cyprus’ (ibid., 2014, p. 5). In 2007, a new 
teacher policy provoked an even greater attraction to the teaching profession; 
accordingly, three new departments of education at private universities – in addition 
to that of the public University of Cyprus – were given official permission to offer 
initial training programmes for primary education.  
What is further related to the scope of this study is the incorporation of a 
drama/theatre education curricular programme in the recent revision of the national 
curriculum of pre-primary and primary education (MoEC, 2010). The chief purpose 
of this new curriculum is to give students the opportunity to understand their personal 
and collective identity by means of the poetical tools of theatre education. Two key 
pedagogical outcomes expected to be achieved through its application are: (1) the 
creation of iconic realities discerned by critical thinking, imagination and emotions 
and (2) the effective communication and deep understanding of language. 
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4.4.2 Pedagogical Contexts 
4.4.2.1 Teacher education programme in relation to the drama/theatre 
education courses 
In the department of education, the undergraduate students who can enrol are those 
interested in studying to become pre-primary or primary teachers. The training 
programmes last for four years and combine academic education with field 
experience.  
The positions of the drama/theatre education courses are differentiated in the two 
preparation programmes of pre-primary and primary education, although they are 
common for both programmes. Drama Education (Edus 326) is a compulsory course 
for pre-primary education, included in the methodology courses, whereas it is optional 
for those studying primary education and can be found in the specialisation of Arts. 
Theatre Education and Theatrical Play (Edus 325) is an elective course in the 
framework of the specialisation of Greek Language for both programmes. The student 
teachers who can enrol on these courses are those who are in their third or fourth year 
of study. From the above information, we can observe that it is highly likely that 
students of primary education will complete their studies without attending any of the 
drama/theatre education courses, given that among the four specialisations offered to 
students they are allowed to choose only one.  
4.4.2.2 Drama/theatre education courses 
Both courses are designed and taught by the researcher of this study. They are three-
hour-long modules, carrying six ECTS (European Credit Transfer and Accumulation 
System) each and have the same architecture. Accordingly, they both follow a design 
framework constructed upon a theoretical and a practical component (in each session). 
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The process of their teaching is based on a combination of lectures, small-group and 
hands-on activities, circle discussions and workshops concentrated on a variety of 
approaches, strategies, conventions and games of drama/theatre education, as well as 
readings and various assignments, such as: reflective diaries, midterm examinations, 
the planning of lessons, microteaching and storytelling.  
The primary goals of both courses are essentially tripartite. The first is focused on the 
capability of student teachers to comprehend and interpret the different aspects of the 
significance of drama/theatre education as a pedagogical-artistic tool integrated in 
teaching. The second refers to the acquisition of the competence of planning and 
implementing the teaching of drama/theatre education. At the crux of the third 
objective is the readiness of student teachers to discern those distinctive pedagogical 
dispositions and virtues of the teacher needed in the teaching of the field. 
Drama Education  
Aside from the similarities of their general structure, the two courses rest on a 
different content outline. In the course of Drama Education, student teachers examine 
theoretical themes associated with the history, nature and key epistemological 
characteristics of drama (Clark et al., 1997; Heathcote & Bolton, 1995; Neelands, 
1984; O’Neill, 1995; Somers, 2001; Taylor & Warner, 2006) and the instrumentality 
of the various drama conventions (Avdi & Xatzigeorgiou, 2007). In this framework, 
student teachers study the pedagogical dimensions of drama through the theories of 
Bruner (1990), Freire (1970), Vygotsky (1978) and Winston (1996, 1999). Yet, much 
emphasis is placed on the quadripartite process of designing, writing, organising and 
teaching a drama lesson (Avdi & Xatzigeorgiou, 2007; Bowell & Heap, 2005; O’ 
Neill, 1995; Taylor & Warner, 2006).  
	  	   100	  
In the time period of this research study (2012-2013), a large range of workshops 
conducted by both the course’s teacher/researcher and the student teachers 
significantly enriched the empirical knowledge of drama of both parties. Some 
examples of these are: The Ugly Duckling, The Sleeping Beauty and The Odyssey – 
conducted by the courses’ teacher/researcher and – How do I Feel, The Hedgehog that 
Desired to be Cuddled and The Mouse that Struggled to Touch a Star – performed by 
the student teachers.  
Theatre Education and Theatrical Play  
This course is substantially built on three thematic units of theatre education firmly 
correlated with the practice of teaching, in the following hierarchy: theatre and 
performance, theatrical play and narration/storytelling. First, student teachers are 
introduced to the world of theatre and explore issues regarding the contribution of 
theatre, its characteristics as a performance and the various models of performances, 
including teaching (Neelands, 2008; Neelands & Dobson, 2000; Patsalides, 2004; 
Sarason, 1999). Second, they investigate the implications of theatrical play in child 
development and identify the indispensable components for both the device and 
application of theatrical games (Eleni & Triantafillopoulou, 2004; Kouretzis, 2008; O’ 
Toole 2008; Piaget, 1973; Vygotsky, 1978). Third, they examine the concept of 
narration, its place both in our everyday life and in teaching, the preconditions of its 
effectiveness and how storytelling can be a theatre performance (Alfreds, 1979; 
Galantis, 1997; Sextou, 1998).  
The theatrical games of Boal (MacDonald & Rachel, 2009) comprise an important 
source of inspiration for the student teachers when they are called upon to devise their 
own games. During the conduct of the study, the theatrical games designed by the 
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students basically corresponded to two themes: Exploring my senses and Why 
recycling? Concerning their storytelling, they narrated the following tales both solo 
and in groups:  Hercules, The Princess and the Pea and The Love of a Mermaid. 
Some additional workshops, mainly designed and taught by the course’s 
teacher/researcher, were: Stories Beyond Mirrors, Speaking of the Opposites and 
What Comes Next?  
Finally, what is also worth noting in regard to the differences between the two courses 
is the physical environment of their teaching. Taking into consideration that the space 
signifies an influential learning factor (Ellsworth, 2005), the two classrooms used for 
the courses had dissimilar equipment, creating therefore alternative possibilities for 
the use of space (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Specifically, in contrast to the classroom 
used for Theatre Education and Theatrical Play, which was a typically academic 
space, the classroom used for Drama Education was equipped similarly to a pre-
primary/primary schoolroom. This condition noticeably affected, among others 
things, the integration of objects, toys and symbols by the students in the dramatic 
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Figure 4.3: The classroom of Theatre Education and Theatrical Play 	  
Figure 4.2: The classroom of Drama Education 
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4.4.2.3 Research participants 
According to Merriam (2009), as ‘generalization in a statistical sense is not a goal or 
even justifiable in qualitative research’ (p. 77), the most appropriate sampling strategy 
is the purposeful selection of participants (Patton, 2002). It is the method that can give 
answers to qualitative problems, ‘such as discovering what occurs, the implications of 
what occurs, and the relationships linking occurrences’ (Honigmann, 1982, p. 84). On 
these terms, from each course, three student primary teachers were selected to 
participate in this study (i.e., a total of six participants with an equal number of the 
two genders). The participants had been considered as ‘articulate respondents’ (Sale et 
al., 2002, p. 45), and in this sense they could be ‘information-rich cases’ (Patton, 
2002, p. 230, italics original).  
The criteria of this selection was essentially twofold. The first focused on the student 
teachers’ personal views, both of the nature of teaching and the teacher’s presence in 
teaching, which were gathered through the specially designed activities of the three 
first sessions of the courses (reflective diaries, classroom and group discussions, and 
drawings). The second criterion was related to the students’ field of study and, in this 
regard, student primary teachers were preferred for one key reason. Beyond my roles 
as the courses’ teacher/researcher, I was also the coordinator of the courses of School 
Experience (Edue 297, Edue 397 and Edue 497) in the programme of primary 
education. Consequently I had access to public primary schools in which to conduct 
the ‘practical’ phase of data gathering, since the research participants would teach 
drama/theatre education in these schools.  
At the time that this research study began, five of the six participants were completing 
the first semester of their fourth year of studies. This meant that they were going to be 
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placed in primary schools for their field experience – for ten weeks, in the spring 
semester. Although one participant was a third-year student and would therefore not 
have his practicum like the rest of the group, he was selected because of his strong 
perspectives of teaching/teacher. For this student we made a special arrangement, 
giving him the opportunity to attend and teach some lessons in the class of one of the 
other participants. In so doing, he would be more prepared to participate in the 
‘practical’ phase of the research.    
The participants’ detailed profiles are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Essentially, 
they include six key points concerning both their personal and study life: (1) age and 
academic performance, (2) traits of character and personality, (3) other studies before 
enrolling in the education department, (4) influences on becoming a teacher, (5) best 
memories of primary school teachers and (6) drama/theatre education experiences 
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4.5 EPILOGUE: BUILDING THE CURRENT CASE 
The rationale of research design and notably of the qualitative research model, as 
portrayed in this chapter, leads to two crucial and interrelated allegations of its nature. 
First, it operates on the basis of the nexus between dialectics and philosophical 
paradigm and, second, this relationship itself makes clear that the theoretical research 
design demands coherence, consistency and reflexivity. Specifically, the research 
design of this study rests on the ontology and epistemology of two qualitative 
methodologies: case study and phenomenography. Therefore, they are both embedded 
in the social theories of constructivism and interpretivism, central to which is the 
philosophical belief that social reality is mirrored in people’s views, whether ‘lived’ 
or ‘felt’, or ‘undergone’ (Sherman & Webb, 1988, p. 7).  
Proceeding to a tangible articulation of the substance of the case being studied, 
Merriam’s (2009) clarification that ‘the unit of analysis, not the topic of investigation, 
characterizes a case study’ (p. 41, italics original), significantly enlightens this 
process. Accordingly, the case of this study may be described in the following terms:  
• It is a group of six student primary teachers, mostly in their fourth year. 
• Its bounded system consists of two drama/theatre education courses – Drama 
Education and Theatre Education and Theatrical Play – and their potentiality 
to aretaic pedagogy. 
• Its bounded context is a teacher preparation programme in a period of ten 
months (data collection). 
In light of this qualitative research orientation, the researcher is called to accomplish 
two critical aims: (1) to explore in-depth the instrumental parameters that assist 
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student primary teachers to experience aretaic pedagogy through the drama/theatre 
education courses and (2) to trace those potentially different structural and referential 
aspects of their experiences of aretaic pedagogy. Significantly, this scope of 
investigation practically reflects the exploratory, intrinsic and holistic ethos of the 
current phenomenographic case study.  
Beyond the three key areas of research design – the philosophical paradigm, 
methodologies and contexts – that have already been discussed, there certainly exist 
additional, more practical issues to be examined. Essentially, these are related to – 
methods, data analysis and ethical issues – whose examination drives to the second 
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Chapter 5 
 METHODS, DATA ANALYSIS AND ISSUES OF VALIDITY 
The type of understanding sought by qualitative interpretivists demands 
great flexibility in the data analysis process, as it does in the design and 
data collection phase. Qualitative research methods are not “routinized”, 
meaning there are many different ways to think about qualitative research 




5.1 INTRODUCTION: THE MISSION OF A QUALITATIVE RESEARCHER  
There exists the assumption, as discussed in the previous chapter, that the 
investigator’s ethical and intellectual presence plays a contributory role in the 
planning of the empirical phase of a qualitative research. As the investigator is the 
primary mediator/negotiator of gathering and analysing data, it entails that he/she is 
invited to a dynamic engagement in research processes that demand continuous 
decision-making while dealing with dilemmas and unforeseen events. Therefore, the 
quality of his/her presence influences the overall validity and credibility of a study 
(Merriam, 2009). As Patton (2002) identifies, the researcher’s credibility per se, 
meant as ‘intellectual rigor, professional integrity, and methodological competence’ 
(p. 570), is one of the basic factors of the general credibility of the study. 
Literature on qualitative research evidences a nexus of significant requirements 
concerning the investigator’s research identity (Creswell, 2013; Dickson-Swift et al., 
2007; Grafanaki, 1996; Merriam, 2009; McLeod, 1996; Patton, 2002). Becoming a 
good communicator is the central aim of a qualitative researcher (Merriam, 2001). It 
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is essential for him/her to be a ‘sympathetic listener’ (Merriam, 2009, p. 107) and ‘an 
active learner who can tell the story from the participants’ view rather than as an 
“expert” who passes judgement on participants’ (Creswell, 1998, p. 18).  
Since data collection processes, especially interviewing, are constructed on trust, the 
researcher’s sensitivity and respect are indispensable. Grafanaki (1996) precisely 
explains the real benefit of these two ethical dispositions, by noting:  
The researcher’s degree of sensitivity and respect … affects the depth and 
the quality of the interview and the material shared. … [They] can be 
portrayed both in the style and in the content of the questions asked, as well 
as in the way the researcher reacts and responds to the answers (p. 331). 
 
In this regard, a respectful researcher is expected to convey both the energy of rapport 
(Patton, 2002) and empathy (Merriam, 2001). In addition, while qualitative research 
processes are inescapably intertwined with ambiguity, the researcher is advised to 
have ‘enormous tolerance’ (ibid., p. 20, italics original) and patience with its 
confrontation. 
Therefore, this chapter intends to illustrate the ways in which such a philosophical 
framework of the researcher’s presence is channelled through the processes of data 
collection and analysis, in the context of the current study. Thus, in the first of the 
three sections of the chapter, the focus lies on the rationale of the selection of the 
research methods used. In the second section, the discussion is based on the data 
analysis process, with emphasis on the four basic stages followed and the procedures 
adopted each time. Issues of trustworthiness and ethics constitute the main body of the 
third section. Lastly, the chapter summarises the epistemological orientation of the 
study, as this stems from its empirical design. 
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5.2 COLLECTING DATA: A PROCESS OF TRACING REALITY 
Since techniques of data collection constantly expand in the field of qualitative 
research, there are however four general categories of methods: observations, 
interviews, documents and audio-visual materials (Creswell, 1998). It is not 
uncommon for qualitative studies in education to employ only one or two techniques 
for gathering information (Merriam, 2009), but in case studies, the use of multiple 
data sources is recommended (Creswell, 1998; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009). This 
hallmark of case study research serves as a scaffold for building a holistic and 
thorough picture of the cases (Creswell, 1998). Strong emphasis is placed on 
‘information-rich’ data (ibid., p. 123), aiming at both the ‘breadth and depth of data’ 
(Merriam, 2001, p. 134). It is a methodological approach that enhances data 
credibility (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003), as will be further examined in section 5.4. 
5.2.1 The Logic of Synthesising Methods 
Two supplementary principles have guided the data gathering process of the study. 
The first stems from the idea that case study data collection may look like something 
of a puzzle. Referring to this metaphor, Baxter and Jack (2008) highlight that ‘[e]ach 
data source is one piece of the “puzzle”, with each piece contributing to the 
researcher’s understanding of the whole phenomenon’ (p. 554). One might value this 
reasoning as closely correlated to Merriam’s (2001) notion of the ‘interactive nature 
of data collection in case study research’ (p. 135). By this characterisation, it is 
suggested that one data strategy may integrate or lead to subsequent sources of data. 
Substantially, data collection is evidenced as a holistic process, requiring a nexus 
between sources.  
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The second principle has arisen from Creswell’s (1998) suggestion, which emphasises 
the use of more personalised approaches to participants, as they might be described. 
He proposes data gathering through videotapes and photographs and, notably, 
underlines the technique of “photo elicitation” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), ‘in which 
participants are shown pictures … and asked by the researcher to discuss the contents 
of the pictures’ (Creswell, 1998, pp. 120-121). This exhortation has directed the data 
process towards a chain of personalised information sources, like drawings, 
photographs and videotapes.  
In parallel, this strategy could also satisfy the needs of the phenomenographic 
methodology of the study. Because its focal point rests on the participants’ 
beliefs/emotions/experiences with respect to the phenomenon being investigated, 
these sources might therefore assist them to externalise the inner 
impressions/ideas/dispositions of their participation in the particular activities 
depicted through them. In essence, this principle functioned within the perspective of 
the holistic design of data gathering.  
5.2.2 The Applied Methods 
This phenomenographic case study has been founded on a matrix of data information 
primarily gathered by interviews, observations, documents and audio-visual materials. 
Starting with a synoptic image of the whole data collection process, as shown in the 
figure below (see Figure 5.1), it lasted an academic year (2012-2013) and can be 
sketched in two phases. The first phase (fall semester: October – January) can be 
defined as more ‘theoretical’, while data sources solely depended upon the 
drama/theatre education courses. During this semester, all four types of data methods 
were employed. In  the  second  phase (spring/summer semester: February – July), the 
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more ‘practical’ work was conducted, when the participants were placed in primary 
schools for their field experience (10 weeks). The data methods used in this period 
were mainly classroom observations, video recordings and interviews.  
Presenting now an analytical description of the methods used, they are separated on 
the basis of their final data form. So, this criterion implies two categories of research 
data:  (1) narrative/text-based data and  (2) audio-visual-based data  (see Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2: The database of the study 
	  
	  	   114	  
The first category of information resulted from the methods of interviews, 
observations and documents. However, interviews and observations could be called 
indirect narrative/text-based data, in comparison with documents, which were 
collected as direct narrative/text-based data. Also, the audio-visual-based data 
gathered included drawings, photographs and videotapes.    
5.2.2.1 Narrative/text-based data 
Indirect narrative/text-based data 
Interviews 
Three person-to-person, semi-structured interviews with each participant were 
conducted by the researcher (i.e., 18 interviews). The interviews were audio-recorded 
and about 90 minutes long. Each interview encounter concentrated on different 
aspects of the study’s scope. All of the interviews were also transcribed and translated 
from Greek into English by the researcher, transforming them into verbatim 
transcripts. Since the translation from one language to another can be regarded as a 
basic issue of internal validity, a more detailed account of how this was carried out is 
subsequently exhibited in section 5.4.1. 
The first interview (November 2012) was mostly focused on the participants’ views 
regarding the following three topics: (1) their biography, (2) teaching/teacher and (3) 
the courses of their programme. Moreover, this interview revolved around the 
participants’ two drawings, which referred both to their character/personality and 
opinions on good teaching/good teacher. 
Taking into consideration that the core discussion of the second interview would be 
centred on the drama/theatre education courses, the meeting was intentionally held 
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after the completion of said courses, when the students’ grades had already been 
notified (late January 2013). The rationale of this decision was twofold. First, I 
assumed that the participants would have created a more rounded view about the 
courses, and second, they would be in the position to discuss them more openly and 
genuinely with fewer biases.  
This interview was based on the participants’ thoughts/suggestions concerning the 
following three thematic questions: (1) the place of the courses in the programme of 
primary education, (2) how they experienced themselves and their fellow students 
within the courses and (3) the importance of the courses in relation to their 
professional preparation, with emphasis on the development of teaching/a teacher’s 
virtues. Importantly, the dialogue of this interview was enriched by the technique of 
“photo elicitation”, enabling the participants, through a series of photographs of the 
courses’ workshops, to converse with more specific information about their 
experiences. Also, in this interview, the participants talked about their drawings for 
the courses. In the case of the participants of Theatre Education and Theatrical Play, 
the interview included an open conversation about their videotaped storytelling 
performances, which they watched during the discussion. 
The third interview was carried out after the video recordings of the participants’ 
drama/theatre education teaching practices (June and July 2013). Obviously, the 
central theme of this interview was essentially the participants’ reflections both on the 
design and implementation of their teaching practices, pointing out the pedagogical 
virtues they applied. Our conversation was unfolding as we were watching the 
episodes of their teaching. In this last encounter, key issues gathered from the two 
previous interviews were also discussed, aiming at verification and further 
clarifications. 
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In addition to the above three interviews, questions relating to specific prompts were 
sent to the participants via e-mail (Merriam, 2009) by a colleague/critical friend 
(university of Nicosia, CY) – for trustworthiness issues. This electronic interview 
served as secondary data (June, 2013). Basically, the participants were asked: (1) to 
describe and justify their views of the drama/theatre education courses and (2) to 
evaluate the courses’ teacher, giving strong and weak points of her professionalism.  
Observations 
The researcher’s position as an observer may possibly vary. Following the classic 
typology of Gold (1958), the spectrum of the observer’s roles embraces four different 
schemes: (1) complete participant, (2) participant as observer, (3) observer as 
participant and (4) complete observer. Defining my roles as a researcher-observer-
teacher of the courses, I remained steady throughout as a participant as observer. 
That is, the researcher’s observer activities were subordinated to the researcher’s role 
as a participant (ibid.). Alder and Alder (1998) name this type of observer the ‘active 
membership role’, which suggests that the researchers are ‘involved in the setting’s 
central activities, assuming responsibilities that advance the group, but without fully 
committing themselves to members’ values and goals’ (p. 85). It is also noteworthy 
that I incorporated my observations about the courses’ life in my journal, without 
keeping any separate document/protocol. 
What is more, during the process of data collection there existed two cases where, as a 
researcher, I adopted the role of a complete observer. The first time I undertook this 
second type of observation was during a workshop (December, 2012) performed by 
visitor Dr George Rodosthenous (Associate Professor in Theatre Directing at the 
university of Leeds, UK), in the context of the courses. As an observer/“insider” 
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spectator I had the opportunity to reflect upon my students’ quality of work. The 
second occasion was upon visiting the primary schools when attending the 
participants’ drama/theatre education teaching practices (mid April 2013). In both 
cases, the observations gathered were principally written by hand, with an 
unstructured format. 
Direct narrative/text-based data 
Documents 
In their wholeness, the four different kinds of documents collected – participants’ 
reflective diaries, midterm examination papers and lesson plans, as well as the 
journal of the courses’ teacher/researcher/observer – constituted a critical source of 
data. The two first were typical criteria of the courses’ assessment.  
With respect to diaries, the students used to send them by e-mail to the courses’ 
teacher every week; over the course of the semester I gathered ten diaries from each 
participant. The students could write freely about issues relating to the 
activities/conditions/matters of the courses, or could answer to given open-ended 
questions (e.g., describe the reasons, for which you enjoyed/did not enjoy an episode, 
in today’s workshop). Alternatively, they could do both. Additionally, the six lesson 
plans of drama/theatre education designed by the participants were collected during 
the ‘practical’ phase of the data gathering process.  
Lastly, the researcher’s journal was a document kept throughout the entire data 
collection period. It was a dual journal written in English, covering both courses. 
Particular attention was drawn to the writing of speculations, observations and the 
teaching of challenging moments, as well as unsuccessful efforts, feelings and wishes.   
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5.2.2.2 Audio-visual-based data 
Drawings, photographs and videotapes synthesise the gamut of audio-visual data 
used, as has already been noted in section 5.2.1. Both drawings and photographs were 
gathered through the drama/theatre education courses’ activities/workshops. In total, 
the drawings from each participant were threefold (i.e., about participants’ 
character/personality, the nature of good teaching/good teacher and drama/theatre 
education courses).  
The six video recordings of the participants’ drama/theatre education teaching 
sessions – with a duration of 80 minutes each (watch on Digital Videodisc attached) – 
were carried out in public local primary schools (mid April 2013). Also, a second 
video recording of the storytelling performances of the participants of Theatre 
Education and Theatrical Play was part of the data information collected (mid 
December, 2012).  
A last issue worth mentioning connected to the data collection process is that it 
inevitably advanced in combination with the data analysis process. In practice, both 
processes emerged as reflexively related and their progress evolved simultaneously. 
Thus, the next subject being described is the process of data analysis. 
 
5.3 ANALYSING DATA: A PROCESS OF MAKING SENSE OF REALITY 
This is the course that brings to light the meanings hidden within data “treasure”. 
Above all, as Merriam (2009) makes clear, ‘the practical goal of data analysis is to 
find answers to your research questions’ (p. 176, italics original). For this reason, it is 
no wonder that this is typically presented as the most intricate and ambiguity-guided 
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path and, at the same time, as the most creative and insightful one of the whole 
research process (Merriam, 2009; Suter, 2012). As affirmed by Stake (1995), ‘there is 
much art and much intuitive processing to the search for meaning’ (p. 72).  
5.3.1 Preliminary Steps in Analysis 
A set of preparatory techniques for analysing data was applied throughout the data 
gathering process. Initially, the reading of data information several times, shortly after 
the completion of its collection, enabled me to start thinking about the first themes 
arising. For instance, in the case of the midterm examination papers, once I had 
finished their marking I started re-reading those of the participants for a second round. 
This time, my efforts were focused on their responses beyond and between the lines. 
In this sense, I attempted to spot written signs relevant to the basic research questions 
expressed as syllogisms, phrases, words and illustrated ideas. On a copy of the tests, I 
circled this information manually (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and then wrote some 
field notes, possibly important for additional evidence. These first implications of the 
data were later included in the interviews, for further discussion and elucidation.   
Similarly, interview transcripts were a highly important source for starting analysis. In 
this case, the elaboration of data was done electronically, on a MacBook using 
Microsoft Word. Guided by the suggestion of Bogdan and Biklen (2007) for the use 
of visual devices, I highlighted data related to the research scope by shading it with 
different colours. Each colour signified a different aspect/issue of the interview 
conversations. Logically, the same colours were used in all interview transcripts for 
similar information. Ultimately, this activity was based on a legend with a rainbow-
like facet that substantially represented a summary of important issues arisen from 
each interview.  
	  	   120	  
The last and not least important strategy that I followed in this pre-stage of data 
analysis was the systematic examination of the literature of my research field (ibid.). 
This tactic was virtually too helpful, while the study in parallel to data gathering was 
evidenced as a good driver both for the expansion and deepening of the dialogues in 
the interviews.  
5.3.2 The Process of Final Analysis  
As the preliminary stage of data analysis may be determined as a process of 
‘organization, reduction, consolidation, comparison, and reconfiguration’ of 
information (Suter, 2012, p. 360), its final phase becomes a more methodical process, 
in relation to this nexus of actions. The data analysis of the study involved categorical 
aggregation and a search for correspondence and patterns based on the nature of the 
research questions (Stake, 1995). This schema of analysis was built on open-coding 
strategies consistent with constant comparative analysis (Glasser & Strauss, 1967). In 
this way, the process of analysis could satisfy both methodologies. All the 
narrative/text-based data – interview transcripts, observations and participants’ 
documents (e-mail interviews, reflective diaries and midterm examination papers) – 
were the data included in this analytical process. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the 
main stages of the whole process, indicating the basic procedures used each time. 
Table 5.1: The process of data analysis 
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5.3.2.1 Coding 
Speaking of the term coding, Merriam (2009) identifies that it ‘is nothing more than 
assigning some sort of shorthand designation to various aspects of your data so that 
you can easily retrieve specific pieces of the data’ (p. 173). Open codes can therefore 
be ‘single words, letters, numbers, phrases, colors, or combinations of these’ (ibid.). 
Thus, the descriptive codes of the study are derived from a sentence/paragraph 
analysis approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as shown in Table 5.2.  
 
 
Table 5.2: The process of coding 	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5.3.2.2 Category construction 
The next step of data analysis is referred to as category construction, a process 
alternatively called axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2007), or analytical coding 
(Merriam, 2009). This strategy suggests a refinement of codes, again using the 
research questions as a guide. As it is explicitly defined by Merriam (2009), 
‘[a]ssigning codes to pieces of data is the way you begin to construct categories’ (p. 
179). Essentially, it is a classification of codes in regard to their conceptual nexus (see 
Table 5.3), since it is: ‘coding that comes from interpretation and reflection of 
meaning’ (Richards, 2005, p. 94). Therefore, following this path of analysis means 
that from each data source arose a long list of categories.  
 
 
Table 5.3: The process of category construction	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5.3.2.3 Sorting categories 
The guiding question in this step was: “How might these categories be connected?” 
Here, it was a point of comparative analysis. Proceeding to the comparison of the 
different lists of categories, a new master list of categories/themes was formed. This 
analytical process was driven by two criteria: the correspondence and the recurring 
patterns of the original categories. In other words, it was a process of thematic 
analysis (Shank, 2006), in the framework of which some original categories became 
subcategories under “family” categories/themes. At this stage, the contribution of a 
colleague as an external analyst (the same person involved in the data collection 
process, as noted in section 5.2.2.1) was valuable. Initially, my colleague and I 
worked separately. We then compared the potentials of the final plan of themes before 
finally mapping a common field of categories/themes.   
The last concern of the data analysis process was related to the question of: “How 
could all the data evidence be sorted out in the last scheme of categories/themes?” 
The directional idea articulated by Marshall and Rossman (2006), to imagine the 
“family” categories as ‘buckets or baskets into which segments of text are placed’ (p. 
159), was much enlightening. Accordingly, for each “family” category, I created a file 
folder in which units of data coded, with reference to that category/theme, were put 
together.  
In this final stage of data analysis the process transformed into a deductive one, in 
contrast to that of the construction of categories which, at first, was highly inductive. 
This change in the type of thinking denoted that the goal, at this stage, mainly 
depended on finding data evidence to support the set of categories/themes. When this 
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deductive procedure reached the point of saturation – where there existed no new data 
information to be added – the data analysis signaled its completion. 
 
5.4 TRUSTWORTHINESS AND ETHICS  
Both of the above terms compose the concept of the authenticity of a study; that is, to 
what extent the findings and conclusions are the true ones, ‘sufficiently authentic ... 
that I may trust myself in acting on their implications?’ (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 
178). Trustworthiness is traditionally examined with respect to the terminology of 
validity and reliability of a study (Merriam, 2009), while ethics is mostly focused on 
the human relationships between the researcher and the researched (Simons, 2009). 
But experientially, both terms undergo an interdependence: ‘[e]nsuring validity and 
reliability in qualitative research involves conducting the investigation in an ethical 
manner’ (Merriam, 2009, p. 209).  
5.4.1 Dealing with Validity and Reliability  
Validity can be built in two dimensions: internal validity or credibility and external 
validity or transferability/generalisability (Merriam, 2009). The emphasis in this study 
was predominantly placed on its internal validity, because – as has been examined in 
the previous chapter, specifically in section 4.3.1 – external validity is an 
epistemological orientation with no significant implications for qualitative 
methodologies, such as phenomenography and case study. Given that internal validity 
is bound up with the question: “How do research findings correspond to reality?”, 
literature on qualitative research proposes a series of strategies for its achievement 
(Denzin, 1978; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 2009; Patton, 2002).  
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The internal validity of the study, consequently, is largely guided by the method of 
triangulation, which ‘involves cross-checking multiple data sources and collection 
procedures to evaluate the extent to which all evidence converges’ (Suter, 2012, p. 
350). More concretely, it is based on a triple triangulation from Denzin’s (1978) 
fourfold typology that advocates the use of: (1) multiple methods, (2) multiple 
sources, (3) multiple investigators and (4) multiple theories. As regards the gravity 
given to the first two types of triangulation, this is demonstrated in both accounts of 
the data collection and analysis processes that have preceded. Moreover, in my 
attempt to minimise the researcher-teacher bias concerning the data interviews, as 
earlier noted in section 5.2.2.1, an external researcher sent specific prompts to the 
participants through e-mail. The purpose was the triangulation of data collected by 
means of interviews. As the analysis of these data showed, there was a total 
agreement between these two sources of data.  
Because investigator triangulation occurs when there are multiple investigators 
collecting and analysing data, this principle could not be applied in the case of my 
study. However, by way of compensation, I adopted a related strategy suggested by 
Patton (2002): that of ‘triangulating analysts–that is, having two or more persons 
independently analyze the same qualitative data and compare findings’ (p. 560, italics 
original). Thus, as mentioned in section 5.3.2.2, a second analyst participated in the 
process of data analysis, with whom I compared my ideas about the construction of 
the broad categories/themes of the findings. Concerning the fourth type of 
triangulation, the use of multiple theories is regarded as an uncommon 
epistemological principle of qualitative research, since it aims at testing hypotheses 
(Merriam, 2009).  
	  	   126	  
Member checks or respondent validation was an additional strategy employed for the 
purposes of internal validity. According to this approach, the researcher needs to 
discuss the emerging themes and findings with the participants in order to corroborate 
their real meanings (ibid.). As referenced in section 5.2.2.1, this approach was mainly 
integrated into the interview encounters, notably, in the third of these. It was a 
practical manner through which to acquire secondary feedback about important issues 
and critical findings.  
Given that reliability or consistency is concentrated on the question of whether 
research findings can be the same, the repetition of a study is evidently an appropriate 
approach to the epistemology of a quantitative research paradigm (Wolcott, 2005). 
However, in the context of qualitative research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest an 
alternative strategy, called the audit trail, as a valid technique for estimating 
consistency. Applying it, it is necessary for the researcher to expose a detailed record 
of data collection and the rationale for important decisions. As demonstrated in 
sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, this strategy was employed with rigorous attention. The 
emphasis placed on the terms under which both the processes of designing and 
collecting the data were implemented is clearly evidenced.   
One last factor that enhances the internal validity of the study is the process of 
translation. To this end, I used both typical strategies that Merriam (2009) 
recommends for cases where data information needs to be translated into another 
language. Regarding interviews, as already stated in section 5.2.2.1, I initially 
transcribed them in Greek and, afterwards, I translated them verbatim into English. In 
contrast, I analysed the e-mail interviews and the participants’ reflective diaries and 
midterm examination papers in Greek, translating into English only the descriptive 
codes related to my findings, which I later presented as evidence. It merits attention to 
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note that the rest of the narrative/text-based data sources – the researcher’s 
observations and journal – did not need translation, because they were written directly 
in English. 
Translating the data information into English meant that I also had to think about a 
pivotal question: ‘How do you signal that a translation is accurate and captures the 
subtle meanings of the original language?’ (Rossman & Rallis, 1998, p. 162). 
Investigating this matter, literature on research methodology provided limited 
guidance towards this area. Therefore, I followed the little advice that was available, 
focusing on the use of a “back translation” strategy (Maxwell, 1996; Merriam, 
2009). Specifically, I acted in accordance with the three stages of this strategy, as 
these are determined by Maxwell (1996), applying the entire process to a sample of 
my data.  Thus, after I had translated a few of transcripts from Greek into English, I 
asked a colleague to translate the translated version back into Greek and, finally, we 
compared the original transcripts with the back translation. The strategy proved to be 
effective, for through the comparison of both transcripts I made some adjustments in 
order to achieve the highest possible level of accuracy in the translations. As Merriam 
(2009) substantiates: ‘The closer it comes to the original, the more reliable is your 
translation’ (p. 270).   
5.4.2 Dealing with Ethical Issues  
The starting point of the empirical phase of the study was a collective meeting with 
the six student primary teachers who were selected as research participants. This first 
encounter had a decisive role in the formation of good communication between the 
researcher and the researched. Initially, I informed them both of the nature and the 
aims of the research, also describing to them the key phases of data gathering. In 
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addition, I explained that if they desired to participate in the research, they could still 
withdraw at any point without having to justify their decision. After a constructive 
dialogue, all of the students seemed ready to accept this research invitation and, 
therefore, gave their personal, verbal consent.  
The communication that developed throughout the data gathering process, both 
among the participants and between the participants and the researcher, might be 
described as a cooperation-building process. Within a context of reciprocity and trust, 
it did not take long to create a team of co-researchers (Grafanaki, 1996). As Hesse-
Biber and Leavy (2011) point out, for qualitative researchers it is essential to ‘reduce 
the degree of status hierarchy between the researcher and the researched … by placing 
themselves on the same plane as their respondents and working cooperatively’ (p. 
105). In interview meetings, the participants appeared open and willing to share 
consciously their personal experiences. The process of video recording the 
participants’ drama/theatre education teaching practices was also a strong witness of 
their “research alliance” (Grafanaki, 1996, p. 329) with the researcher, while they 
were eager to collaborate both for the preparation and the implementation of this 
process.    
The biggest dilemma I faced, in relation to the data gathering process was the issue of 
the participants’ anonymity. Though anonymity and confidentiality of data are 
regarded as imperative strategies in qualitative research (Merriam, 2009), most of the 
participants preferred their real names to be used in the study. When they were asked 
for a second time, almost at the end of the data collection process, the steadiness of 
their choice was the final signal to respect their decision. Therefore, the names used in 
the next chapters are, in nearly all cases, the participants’ forenames, whereas the 
names of the participants’ pupils, referred to mostly in section 6.5.2, are pseudonyms. 
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With reference to my entry as a researcher into the four primary schools, I 
encountered a very supportive stance both by the administration and the staff at the 
schools. After I had ensured the relevant written permission from the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (late March 2013), the headmasters of the schools sent an 
informative letter to parents, in which they were requested to give their permission for 
the participation of their children in the video recordings of the participants’ 
drama/theatre education teaching practices. In one unique case, although a boy did not 
have the authorisation from his parents to take part in the teaching, he still 
participated as a spectator and, at the end, was invited to join in the closing reflective 
discussion and applause.  
 
5.5 EPILOGUE: TOWARDS FINDINGS 
This chapter on the design of both processes of data gathering and analysis has 
portrayed the empirical conduct of the study, in accordance with both methodologies 
of case study and phenomenography. Following this model of qualitative design, the 
epistemological field of the study can be defined by a nexus of five characteristics: 
• The research questions act as a stable guide in each process of the design.  
• The processes of data gathering and analysis correspond to both qualitative 
methodologies. 
• The internal validity of the study is based both on the reasoning and the 
intrinsic procedures of implementation of the processes of data collection and 
analysis, as well as on the strategies adopted for ensuring the trustworthiness 
of the study.   
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• Given the complexity of data analysis, the use of high-level types of thinking, 
like – critical examination, careful interpretation, creative thinking and 
synthesis – mirrors the coherence and the logical consistency of the 
intellectual effort required. 
• Good rapports built on cooperation and respect show evidence of the ethics 
applied between the researcher and the researched.  
Thus, the application of this research design resulted in the configuration of a 
conceptual body of findings, whose compositional process was a new, challenging 
path in the research journey. As has been argued by Yin (2003), this is the most 
demanding process of the whole research practice, having a non-stereotypical 
form. For this reason, Merriam’s (2009) depiction of this process as one of 










	  	   131	  
 
 
PART THREE  
 
MAPPING THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THEIR THEORY: 
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Chapter 6 
 ARETAIC DEVELOPMENT: A PROCESS OF ‘SELF-BUILDING’ 
Narratives–those linguistic patterns that give body to, or “body forth”, 
emotional rhythms–can provide a powerfully engaging access to 
knowledge of all kinds. Narrative was in the past generally neglected in 
educational research, though of late it has attracted quite a lot of attention 




6.1 INTRODUCTION: A VIRTUE-SEMIOTIC APPROACH 
One fruitful approach to the presentation of research findings, according to Egan’s 
above notion, is narrative. So, this phenomenographic case study adopts a narrative-
based model for the documentation of its findings, a process that tends to resemble ‘as 
much an art as a science’ (Merriam, 2009, p. 264). Considering that this chapter 
accommodates the personal stories of the research participants, and their experiences 
within the context of drama/theatre education, these can at times be described as 
surprising, metaphorical, or even confessional tales.  
Further, drawing upon Geertz’s (1980) theory that ideas ‘are not … unobservable 
mental stuff. They are envehicled meanings, the vehicles being symbols (or in some 
usages, signs)’ (p. 135), the narrative-based approach that I employ functions 
simultaneously as a semiotic approach. To be precise, given the central aim of the 
study – the participants’ understanding of teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice 
through drama/theatre education – this semiotic approach turns out to be a virtue-
driven semiotic approach. That is to say, the process of analysis is firmly focused on 
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meanings and ideas, signs and symbols, all raised from the participants’ stories and 
learning/teaching experiences, which can be interpreted as empirical evidence of the 
development of their virtues.  
The second key characteristic of the analysis of the participants’ aretaic development 
is the consideration of this phenomenon as a process of ‘self-building’, one that brings 
their personal and professional development together. The origin of this idea is the 
notion of ψυχαγωγία (recreation) as used by Plato in Phaedrus, meaning the leading 
or education of the soul (Werner, 2010). This logic of ‘self-building’ is embedded in 
almost the entire body of discourse in the following chapter.  
Thus, the chapter is divided into five parts. At first, it introduces the profiles of the six 
research participants, focusing mainly on their biographical details and perceptions of 
teaching/teacher. Subsequently, it concentrates on the examination of those ecological 
conditions within the context of the drama/theatre education courses that could 
promote their aretaic development. At the crux of the third subchapter is the 
delineation of the different virtue ethics that the participants developed within the 
courses. The next discussion shifts the attention to the participants’ pedagogy, applied 
in their teaching practices of drama/theatre education in primary schools. The 
chapter’s epilogue addresses the fourth question of the study, emphasising the 
participants’ views of the contribution of their education programme to the support of 
their understanding of teaching as an ethical, virtue practice. Lastly, it concludes with 
a brief review of the required conditions of aretaic development, as these stem from 
the participants’ learning experiences within both contexts: the drama/theatre 
education courses and their wider teacher education programme. 
	  	   134	  
6.2 WELCOMING SIGNATURE STORIES: A DIALOGUE OF 
PEDAGOGICAL ORIENTATIONS  
The participants’ portraits are the major theme of this subchapter. Key features of 
their personal life/character and essential beliefs of teaching/teacher, as these 
subsisted at the beginning of the data collection process, are the two chief sources of 
this delineation. The consideration given to the participants’ perceptions of teaching 
possesses a threefold sense, enabling us to understand: (1) their conceptual and 
pedagogical background, (2) whether and how do they conceive teaching as an ethical 
practice and (3) the influence of the drama/theatre education courses on the 
development of the their aretaic development.  
It is important, however, to note that studies on the preparation of prospective 
teachers document that their pre-existing knowledge, beliefs and experiences of 
teaching/learning have an important effect on their development as professional 
teachers (Lortie, 1975; Kennedy, 1999; Richardson & Placier, 2001; Wideen et al., 
1998). Specifically, Richardson (2003) has argued that many students enter teacher 
education programmes having ‘an understanding of teaching that suggests that the 
role of the teacher is to place knowledge into the heads of their students’ (p. 2). As 
she also contends, ‘[the] difficulty in changing beliefs of teacher candidates is 
particularly problematic’ (ibid.). 
In addition, as regards the data sources of the subchapter, they are twofold: the first 
person-to-person interview and the participants’ two illustrated pictures of their self 
and teaching. The value of their pictures justifies what Aristotle affirms: that 
‘ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can 
best get hold of something fresh’ (Rhetoric, 1410b). The subchapter closes with a 
summary of the participants’ ideas of teaching/teacher’s role.  
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6.2.1 The Vignette of Stefanos: Teaching as a Path of “life, love and virtues” 
Speaking of his concerns, Stefanos raises a nexus of contemporary global issues, such 
as the economy and the globalisation, as well as the identity and freedom of self. He 
projects strong doubts of the benefits of the politics of 
globalisation. As he believes, this kind of politics has a 
significant impact on our daily life, because “what globalisation 
actually attempts is to abolish the identity of a nation, of a 
country, of family; … Its worst impact is the loss of the personal 
freedom”. Following this spirit of his thoughts, he draws the symbol of the all-seeing 
eye, or else the eye of Providence (see Figure 6.1). He explains that although it is an 
ancient symbol and has its roots in religious symbolisms, in modern years it is 
deployed in different editions by many organisations as a globalised identity logo (1st 
Interview, 25.11.2012).  
 
For Stefanos, there are two major keys to achieving success as a teacher: good 
preparation and good communication with students. His further ideas of teaching are 
depicted in the following description of his drawing of teaching (see Figure 6.2).  
“I have drawn a child with an open head and 
some things inside it. The teacher has four 
thought-clouds around his head: a computer, a 
book, an exclamation mark and the word 
“how?”. The book was always the symbol of 
knowledge and the computer shows the 
development of technology in teaching. The 
“how?” is the permanent question of the teacher. 
Figure 6.2: The teacher as 
ingenious 
Figure 6.1: The 
all-seeing eye 
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He should do everything to help the child perceive the knowledge, which means he 
must be ingenious. Also, the teacher admires his job, namely he likes what he does. 
The three words, life, love and virtues, that I have written in the head of the boy, are 
the knowledge that the teacher has to teach. And the knowledge comes from the head” 
(ibid.). 
In this account, Stefanos indicates a very traditional view of teaching, primarily 
restricted to a ‘technical rationality’ (Dunne, 2011, p. 15). It is a teacher-centred 
model of teaching, according to which the learning process is characteristically 
thought to consist of a knowledgeable or “ingenious” teacher, who constructs and 
transmits knowledge to learners by using instructional technologies, such as books 
and computers. In this sense, the knowledge is suggested as an external product, 
absolutely dependent on the learners’ “head”. At this point, Stefanos appears to be a 
typical student in relation to Richardson’s (2003) previously cited position.  
In consequence, teaching/learning is perceived by Stefanos not as a socially driven 
activity, but solely as an individualistic process. Manifestly, what is missing from his 
depiction is any constructivist perspective of teaching, whose goal is the 
internalisation of knowledge and its deep understanding on the part of the learners 
(Cohen et al., 1993). Nonetheless, there exists a paradox in his narration that seems 
incompatible with the model of teaching he proposes; it is apparent within his words: 
“life, love and virtues … are the knowledge that the teacher has to teach”. These are 
“knowledge” that can be taught by means of a collaborative and empirical pedagogy. 
6.2.2 The Vignette of Philia: Teaching as a “GPS” Route 
Like all the girls, I used to play the “teacher”. Everybody was telling me, 
“You will become a teacher”. I was writing beautiful letters and good 
compositions. My poems were being published in newspapers. It was a 
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dream, but I regard all the girls at that age of primary school have the same 
dream. Of course, by growing up, I lost this dream. … I wanted to become 
a journalist. But, it returned again, when I met my aunty and uncle, 
academics in Australia. It was a meeting of a lightning flash (Philia, 1st 
Interview, 26.11.2012).   
 
Her painting that follows (see Figure 6.3) is a beautifully articulated signifier of what 
she calls “moments of flash that give the light of hope”. 
“A black sky. A sky of pessimism. But, at the 
same time is one of optimism. In a dark sky, 
there exist the flashes, the red stars. These 
stars are my targets. No matter how black the 
sky is, it can never hide the stars. 
Substantially, this sky is me” (ibid.).  
In Philia’s view, the teaching profession is not at all an easy one. In essence, she does 
not understand it as a profession that “is simply chosen for a living”. “It is far beyond 
this term. The genuine teacher is the person who can do his/her job unselfishly” 
(ibid.). In delineating the teacher-identity, she relates a list of attributes that 
should/should not characterise the teacher. Thus, in her estimation, a teacher needs to 
have:  
sensitivities to and knowledge of many areas. He/she is neither worker nor 
technician; sometimes he/she may be an actor/actress, or even a clown. 
Certainly, he/she has to be competent, well organised, well prepared – all 
of these in one packet (ibid.). 
 
A more integrated picture of Philia’s ideas of teaching/teacher unfolds, while she 
interprets her own symbolic representation (see Figure 6.4). 
 
  Figure 6.3: The sky with red stars 
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“I attempted to symbolise the role of the teacher in a classroom using the traffic 
lights. As one can see, it is divided into three parts. The orange is the starting point of 
the lesson. The teacher sets the pupils in the process of thinking. The green signals the 
route, where the teacher and the pupils are together. During this route, the teacher 
has the role of a guide. But, the steering is in the hands of the child. The teacher 
protects the child from obstacles that he/she can predict. Also, the teacher teaches it 
how to overtake them. Of course, sometimes, he/she may intentionally present 
difficulties. This must happen, for it is necessary, the pupils must have new challenges 
and face their own personal misinterpretations… Pupils should not be passive 
receivers. ... The red is the end of this route, where the teacher reminds the child of 
the course they walked together. It’s the recapitulation of the lesson” (ibid.). 
In comparison with Stefanos, Philia presents a constructivist classroom, wherein the 
teacher and the learners undergo a journey of togetherness, co-constructing meanings 
and understandings. By this conception of instruction, Philia explicitly suggests a 
learner-centred teacher, whose central concern is to enable his/her learners to become 
competent “drivers”. As she makes lucid, the teacher has to methodologically arrange 
the learning surroundings around tasks that will bring the learners into contact with 
Figure 6.4: The teacher as predictor 
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knowledge through an insightful and conscious process. Encouraged by the safety and 
trust that the teacher offers, the learners may become capable to “drive”, by taking 
initiatives and risks and applying their decisions.  
Moreover, for Philia, such an epistemological approach seems to aim at the learners’ 
self-construction. While this dimension of teaching is essentially an ethical one, Philia 
further highlights that “the teacher’s predictability is a very important qualification” 
in teaching. She interprets predictability as the “GPS” of teaching that “shows from 
where a child can start and where it can go” (ibid.).  
6.2.3 The Vignette of Constantinos: Teaching as a Friendly, Childlike Space 
Constantinos considers himself privileged, since he has 
learnt to work hard ever since he was a primary school boy. 
The major advantage of this aspect of his life, as he 
acknowledges, is that he has been taught how to think and 
use his mind. He is particularly interested in the recent 
happenings of economic crisis and the politics that is followed by the Cyprus 
government. He, too, appears to be sceptical about the true causes of the failure of the 
banks. The linear figure he has drawn (see Figure 6.5) evidences his judgment that 
“the money is not lost, but is just stolen. And the politicians don’t say the reality”. 
Also, he estimates that the “economic crisis is a matter which will largely affect the 
future, especially of young people” (1st Interview, 24.11.2012).  
Before his studies, Constantinos had the sense that the teaching profession was not 
difficult. He justifies his attitude by explaining: 
 
Figure 6.5: The stolen 
euro 
	  	   140	  
Easy. Yes, based on my experiences I had, it seemed easy. My primary 
school teachers used to come into class and open a book. They basically 
focused on the exercises of the book and that was all (ibid.).  
 
In accordance with his personal position, the effort of a good teacher “is to expand 
pupils’ critical thinking and to teach them to think about whatever they hear”. The 
most important aim of teaching “is to assist pupils to obtain competences that they can 
use beyond the school, in life” (ibid.). His broader beliefs of teaching are reflected in 
the analysis of his drawing (see Figure 6.6).  
“I am going to start from the class. I have coloured it, because I don’t like the 
traditional classrooms painted in white that have a green board and some notice 
boards. The class is beautiful, when it has colour. This makes pupils want to learn. I 
have set the desks in groups. Pupils use their own thoughts and experiences for 
teaching activities. These appear in the clouds.   
The teacher is in a corner and 
has very very long arms. He 
uses them, when and if the 
pupils need some feedback. He 
is smaller than the children. 
This denotes that the teacher 
is there, but is invisible. I 
don’t like the teacher standing 
above the pupils’ heads, all 
the time, by demonstrating 
how the pupils must work. It is 
	  	  
Figure 6.6: The teacher as invisible 
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necessary for pupils to make mistakes, they learn from them. … 
I want to show that it is essential for the pupils to feel their class is like their own 
homeroom. It’s nice for the children to feel more comfortable in the class, willing to 
work and to love this place, as they do with their room. … As I have drawn, the 
children are smiling. It is because the space makes them happy. And they have a 
teacher, not a typical one, but a friend” (ibid.). 
Constantinos associates teaching with the perspective of progressive pedagogy. Based 
on a series of ideas, he enriches our sense of what good teaching is through 
suggestions that bridge the aesthetics of teaching with the beauty of the learners’ 
everyday lives, outside of the school. His views set teaching well beyond a traditional, 
teacher-centred practice; instead, he regards it as a space that may make learners feel, 
in Dewey’s (1934) words, ‘fully alive’ (p. 18). The social and peer-based work, the 
embodiment of learners’ experiences in the teaching/learning process, the interaction 
of learners within a home-like classroom environment, as well as the presence of a 
discreet and warm teacher, synthesise those pedagogical circumstances necessary for 
an active and effective learning, aesthetically formed from everyday life experiences. 
The greatest result of this kind of pedagogy, as Constantinos unambiguously states, is 
the “smiling” and “happy” faces of learners – a picture denoting the aesthetics of the 
beautiful (Scarry, 2001), so vital for the eudaimonia of their life.  
6.2.4 The Vignette of Maria: Teaching as a “cauldron of smells and colours” 
“Leaving my village to come to Nicosia for my studies, I had to take my life in my 
hands. This made me stronger and more mature; I changed the way of my thinking. …  
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For this reason, I have sketched the blue stairs (see Figure 6.7). I 
liken the life to them. I mean that in life, we continually learn new 
things and every time we learn something, it is like we walk up a 
stair” (1st Interview, 22.11.2012).  
Maria understands the intricacy of teaching to a great extent. This becomes strongly 
perceptible within her narration of the multifaceted challenges she confronted in her 
previous school experience: 
The way you have to approach the pupils is not a simple thing. You must 
decide how to stand in the class. It was taking me a lot of time to decide 
what activities to do. … Then, I had to be careful of how to speak, what 
words to use for each different situation or what thoughts I had to have, in 
order to communicate effectively with the pupils; it’s not like our everyday 
life. … Personally, I found teaching a quite difficult job (ibid.).  
 
Apart from her empirical knowledge, Maria also gives an extended image of how she 
defines good teaching by interpreting her illustration (see Figure 6.8), below. 
“I have drawn a cauldron. It is the class. Inside there are children, books, letters and 
a big spoon. While all these are stirred 
by the spoon, it comes out a smell. 
It is a smell created by the imagination, 
critical thinking, creativity, magic, 
love, diversity, outcomes and 
colour. These are elements of good 
teaching. … 
Teaching has some objectives that are 
always the criterion for the 
 
 Figure 6.7: The 
stairs of life 
 
Figure 6.8: The teacher as magician 
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teaching results. In the background of the picture I have coloured a rainbow. It 
appears while the pupils gain the knowledge. When the teacher gives a smile or says 
something humorous and the children laugh, all these are colours. For me, they are 
like a rainbow. … I prefer the teacher to have the red colour. The red colour is love! 
The teacher needs to show the pupils that he/she loves them. Teaching also has 
something magic. I am referring again to the teacher. It’s the person who can magic 
the pupils” (ibid.).  
Among the nine constituents of good teaching discussed by Maria, there exists one 
that attracts particular attentiveness; this is the “magic” of teaching. According to 
Maria, it is a quality that pertains to the teacher’s presence in the teaching process. 
While she elaborates this idea, she infers that “the teacher is the magician; he/she stirs 
the cauldron and, accordingly, nice smells emerge” (ibid.). In other words, the 
“teacher-magician” has the energy to charm the learners into learning with his/her 
“magic stir”. If we reasonably ask what the awakening “tricks” of this “magic stir” 
could be, Cook (2000) offers us an enlightening answer: ‘[his/her] power rests upon 
special skills and knowledge rather than coercion’ (p. 26). Cook also suggests that the 
teacher as “magician” is a good model that ‘the modern teacher should aspire 
towards’ (ibid.). What is hopeful is that Maria seems to desire to embrace such an 
aspiration. 
6.2.5 The Vignette of Maria-Eva: Teaching as a Process of Contagious     
Connectedness  
In the first session of Theatre Education and 
Theatrical Play, Maria-Eva introduced herself by 
writing (see Figure 6.9), in black letters, her  
Figure 6.9: Maria-Eva’s signature 
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signature. As she notes, it took her a long time to determine the shape of her 
signature, doing many “experiments”. Maria-Eva sees a signature as a sign of 
expression; it must be liked by the one who signs it. 
Maria-Eva, depicting the model of the teacher that she admires, primarily places 
emphasis on two qualities: 
I would like to be good at communicating with children, namely, to be in 
the position to understand them. In the case, I would see a broody or a 
worried child in the class, then, during the break, I would call it to converse 
with it. … The second thing I really want to achieve is to have the pupils’ 
attention. From the beginning of the year, I would discuss with them some 
learning motivations. For example, I could tell them that if they were good 
at lessons, they could have extra time for games, in and out of the class. 
Moreover, I would try to include in my teaching pleasant activities and 
games. I would try to attract their concentration with my movements and 
gestures and with audio-visual aids too. I think, in these ways, I could be 
close to pupils (1st Interview, 28.11.2012). 
 
Given her deep understanding of the significance of the teacher’s powerful presence, 
Maria-Eva pictures (see Figure 6.10) the possible implications that lurk in an opposite 
case, where the teacher remains detached from the pupils. 
“In my drawing, there is a teacher and a girl, in a class. The desks seem empty and 
the girl is preparing to escape. By this, I 
have basically thought that even though, 
the teacher stands and instructs, the pupils’ 
bodies are in the class, but their mind 
travels – that is, they are mentally absent. 
In reality, the teacher speaks to himself, 
which means, he is substantially not 
connected with the pupils. … Sometimes, 
Figure 6.10: The teacher as connected 
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we meet teachers who are good persons, but they are not good teachers. They can’t 
get things over to the pupils; they don’t have a contagious enthusiasm. … (Smiling) In 
this case, everybody is absent” (ibid.). 
Maria-Eva, by her own imagery, mirrors the absence of a “teacher-magician” who 
could instruct with “a contagious enthusiasm”. In so doing, she underlines that the 
teaching/learning process is not an impersonal matter, but a process of ‘human touch’ 
(Carr, 2003, p. 24), or as Noddings (2003a) suggests, an ideal road for creating a 
relational aesthetics. Learning becomes feasible when there is a scheme of 
conversation between teacher and pupils that may capture the pupils’ spirit. Looking 
at the picture, Maria-Eva succeeds in presenting a prototype of a very traditional, 
teacher-centric lesson. The classic rows of desks, the nonappearance of any teaching 
materials, the position of the teacher’s desk and the posture of the teacher are some of 
the basic external characteristics of such a weak and ineffective teaching style. In their 
wholeness, they have the force to create an unchallenging and monotonous learning 
environment. In such cases, the pupils’ ‘mental inertia’ (Dewey, 1910, p. 148), as 
Maria-Eva states, becomes the only energised response to teaching.  
6.2.6 The Vignette of Odysseas: Teaching as a World of Signifying Expressions  
“This image is Son Goku, the protagonist of Dragon Ball (see 
Figure 6.11). Son Goku was my beloved hero! I was fond of his 
cartoons. They showed war arts. I was admiring Son Goku for 
his cleverness; he always was the winner. I still draw his figure 
in my books and everywhere” (1st Interview, 21.11.2012).  
Once Odysseas started his studies, he had a vague idea of the large range of demands 
entailed in teaching. While he reflects on his second school experience, he ascertains:  
Figure 6.11: Son 
Goku 
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Now, I can understand that teaching is not so straightforward. Teaching is 
all about pupils’ engagement. There must be interaction between teacher 
and pupils. The aim is not merely for the pupils to gain knowledge, but to 
be able to correlate it with their everyday life. This aim is not an easy one 
(ibid.).  
 
Within this theoretical frame, Odysseas outlines a wider horizon of what good 
teaching comprises while he speaks of his painting (see Figure 6.12). He mostly 
places emphasis on points that witness a good presence of both the teacher and the 
pupils.    
“In the class, the pupils are sitting in groups. They are not just sitting in groups, but I 
want to underline that they work collectively. … 
Regarding the teacher, I would like to indicate that his posture and movements have a 
key role in teaching. His body language signifies whether he loves his job. It is 
important, the teacher to speak and gestures together.  Here, he seems like dancing. I 
like the teacher to be energetic and attract the pupils’ attention by his glance. … 
I understand that the instruction proceeds well if I see the pupils to participate. … I 
mean, not only, if  they  speak and what they say, but also, how  enthusiastic  they  are  
 
Figure 6.12: The teacher as dancer 
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with what they do. And this can be recognised from their expression. … From the way 
they speak to each other and how much they are absorbed in the activities” (ibid.). 
The underlying idea of Odysseas’ narration is the “speakable” properties of the body, 
suggested as signs of a good presence in teaching. One, of course, might rightly allege 
that Odysseas sets this theme in a contradictory context, as exhibited within his 
picture and words: on the one hand, the learners “work collectively” and, on the other 
hand, the teacher as “dancer” becomes the focus of classroom attention. 
Nevertheless, beyond this ambiguity, Odysseas makes a strong allusion to the 
association of “body, mind and spirit” (van Bakelen, 2009, p. 17). The mobility of the 
body signals, as Odysseas demonstrates, precise emotional and cognitive responses, 
such as love, enthusiasm, energy, participation, speech, expression, as well as 
concentration and absorption of the mind. In this way, he comes to expand Maria-
Eva’s idea of the “connected” teacher and, moreover, of the “connected” pupil. 
Essentially, he elaborates the pedagogical significance of the virtue of alertness in 
teaching. Both concepts – connectedness and alertness – are two interrelated virtues, 
whose aesthetics synthesises the substance of the teacher’s presence proposed by 
Rodgers and Raider-Roth (2006) in Chapter 2, section 2.3. The presence both of the 
teacher and the learners, therefore, is very much concerned with the liveliness of the 
body and no less so with the liveliness of the mind and spirit.  
6.2.7 Concluding Remarks  
The pedagogical voices of the participants are certainly different; some, at times, 
sound both idealistic and romantic, while others even appear inconsistent. However, 
they share common visions of teaching. Transcending these paradoxical opinions, we 
might see that the participants recognise teaching as a rich, experience-driven 
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practice, built on challenging and life-based activities in a beautiful learning 
environment. Within this perspective, they have demonstrated teaching as an ethical 
practice embedded in the ethics of togetherness, care (Noddings, 2003a, 2010) and 
love (Freire, 1998; Halpin, 2009; Garrison, 1997). The characterisations they ascribe 
to the teacher – as “ingenious”, “predictor”, “invisible”, “magician”, “connected” and 
“dancer” – are evidence that they see his/her pedagogical/technical/emotional/ethical 
presence as extremely significant to the pupils’ learning. In this view, the teacher per 
se becomes one key epistemological factor. 
In addition, their views of teaching seem obviously influenced by progressive 
pedagogy, mostly Dewey’s (1934) philosophy, in close interrelation with social 
constructivism. The impact of these theories on their pedagogy can be seen to be a 
result of their academic programme, given that they are being schooled in the 
Introduction of Education Science (Edus 100), Educational Psychology (Edus 211) 
and Philosophy of Education (Edus 305). However, in the context of this study, this 
pedagogical background obtains a deeper importance, since it founds the 
epistemology of drama/theatre education. It is therefore expected that this will enable 
the participants to understand its implications in drama/theatre education too. Such a 
possibility seems to be what ordinarily occurs, because ‘students interpret experiences 
through the filters of their existing knowledge and beliefs’ (Putnam & Borko, 1997, p. 
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6.3 TRACING THE PARTICIPANTS’ LEARNING EXPERIENCES 
This subchapter draws upon the analysis of two relational parameters, with a view of 
understanding the participants’ new empirical knowledge within the drama/theatre 
education courses. Thus, it examines how the participants conceive: (1) the courses’ 
identity and (2) the distinctive features of the courses’ ecology, a term being 
considered later in section 6.3.2. The entire discussion is therefore bound up with the 
first research sub-question of the study: What ecological conditions developed within 
the drama/theatre education courses could be seen to contribute to the promotion of 
teaching/a teacher’s virtues?  
The sources used for this particular question are a combination of narrative/text-based 
data and visual data. Specifically, it is exploiting the second person-to-person 
interview, the interview through e-mail, the participants’ reflective diaries and 
midterm examination papers, as well as the teacher’s diary. The participants’ pictures 
again are a substantial source for the description of the courses’ identity, while for the 
analysis of their ecology a series of the workshop photographs have a key role. 
6.3.1 The Identity of the Drama/Theatre Education Courses 
6.3.1.1 Drama as a Lego toy 
Stefanos’ depiction of the identity of drama revolves around the concept of building a 
“tower” (see Figure 6.13). The interpretation of this idea is exposed in his narration. 
“Each group has a block … and creates its own work. But the result of drama is the 
union of all groups’ work. The lesson is built little by little. We watch the other 
groups’ work and take information for the next activities. So, we are building a tower. 
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The background of the picture is a book. This reminds us that our job is closely 
related to books. And also, the book symbolises the story we explore in drama. The 
blue lines on the top of the page 
denote the beginning of the story. 
The crimson lines, on the other 
page, show that the story doesn’t 
finish in the same way as it 
begins, but we guide how it might 
close. These lines are longer and 
out of the book; this means that the story is endless. The investigation of the theme 
has no end” (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
It is manifest that Stefanos understands drama as a joint-making practice, indicating 
that the participants, in their dual role as actors/spectators, become scenarists/directors 
of the story being explored. The “tower”, in other words, is the final shared product of 
drama that suggests the continuous interactivity and co-creativity of all participants. 
Central to the exploration of stories is the ‘dialogical open-endedness characteristic’ 
(Winston, 1998, p. 27), since, as Stefanos clarifies, “we examine values of life and so, 
the story can go outside of the book” (Midterm examination paper, 28.11.2012).  
6.3.1.2 Drama as a conversational process 
For Constantinos, drama has the image of a dialogue (see Figure 6.14); the 
participants are constantly in a joint discussion and negotiation. He explains both the 
operation and the significance of this practice in the following excerpt. 
“A group of students discusses in order to decide what to dramatise; they work 
collectively. The one student speaks and another student adds something else. In this 
Figure 6.13: Drama as a Lego toy 
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process, it is likely that students either 
agree or disagree. But, at the end, the 
opinion of the majority is the one that 
the group will follow. It is a decision 
taken with calmness and respect. I 
would like to show that in drama, 
participants can succeed, only if they 
work collectively and not as individuals” (2nd Interview, 29.1.2013).   
Presenting drama as a model of dialogue, Constantinos defines chiefly the internal 
goods of a democratic discussion in the context of cooperation and egalitarianism. In 
this regard, he points out Neelands’ (2009a, 2009b) thesis, discussed in Chapter 3, 
that drama as an ensemble-based approach can boost the development of the 
democratic virtues: of isonomia, isegoria, isopsephia, parrhesia and autonomia (see 
Figure 3.2, p. 80). Constantinos also forms the conviction that the implications of a 
democratic ethos within drama are not simply confined to the quality of drama work, 
but instead, they extend to our social, daily life. As he stresses: “it is what we need in 
our every day life; it is so necessary like cooperation that is required in every job” 
(ibid.).  
6.3.1.3 Drama: Is it a play or a performance? 
Philia’s drawing of drama (see Figure 6.15) is inspired by the theory of John Somers 
(2001). In her narration, below, it is obvious how she understands and elaborates this 
theory. 
“The straight line I have drawn has neither a beginning nor an end. At the one edge, I 
have written the word “παιχνίδι” (play) and, on the other one, “θεατρική παράσταση”  
Figure 6.14: Drama as a conversational 
process 
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(theatre performance). I have also put a speckle at the centre of the line, in order to 
indicate the position of drama. When the children are too young, then, drama tends to 
be a play. When children obtain a closer acquaintance with drama, then it tends to be 
more a theatre performance. But, drama never “touches” a theatre performance.     
I have dressed the teacher as a butterfly to show one of the drama techniques, the 
teacher in role. In drama, the teacher acts in roles. … In some cases, I have regarded 
as important to make smaller the figure of the teacher, because, in drama his/her 
presence sometimes is small and sometimes is big. … 
 The three intersected circles aim at showing the interaction existing among the child, 
the teacher and the knowledge. In such a course as drama, these terms are 
interconnected. In drama, nothing is ready and things are not foreseen. I regard this 
as the most crucial thing of drama that I must keep” (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
For Philia, drama is a complex process strongly contextualised by the culture of play 
and theatre; it stands between these two cultures. In this light, she displays that the 
meaning-making process heavily relies on drama conventions, whose functionality is 
not irrelevant to the world of play. The classroom drama, as Somers (2001) infers, 
    Figure 6.15: Drama: Is it a play or a performance? 
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demands an atmosphere full of the mood for play that varies depending on the 
participants’ age and maturity. However, Philia highlights that the teacher’s flexible 
presence has an influential role in the creation of this playful learning space. 
6.3.1.4 Theatre Education and Theatrical Play: The “home of imagination 
and emotions” 
In general, this course’s identity is defined both by the aesthetics of imagination and 
emotions. First, through Odysseas’ illustration, the interest is focused on a beautiful 
house (see Figure 6.16). The ways in which it symbolises the course is visible in this 
conversation.  
A: (Smiling) Odysseas, you are a good architect! Is it a real house? 
O: (Smiling) It’s of my imagination. This home emerges from the course. I mean the 
course demands a lot of imagination and emotions. … Its beauty shows the good 
things that Theatre Education and Theatrical Play can offer us.  
A: What does it have, which shows, it’s an imaginative house?  
O: Its shape is extraordinary. There is, here (touching the picture), this canopy that is 
based on two columns and covers a part of the pool. The pool is in front of the 
Figure 6.16: “The home of imagination and emotions” 
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house and this is a rare thing. A pool is usually in the back yard, for privacy 
reasons. 
A: You don’t mind about your privacy? 
O: Here, I want to say, it’s important for someone to allow him/herself to be 
expressed comfortably. In the course, we were feeling very free. It’s good to be 
spontaneous. Personally, I could express what I wanted and that I was feeling, in 
all levels. Generally, in the sessions, I was too “cool” (2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
Now, it becomes intelligible that Odysseas’ “imaginative house” mirrors the 
delightful emotions he experienced within the course. Determining the course’s 
identity in this way, he gives witness to the existence of a domestic and stress-free 
teaching/learning environment. Some of his phrases, such as – “to be expressed 
comfortably”, “we were feeling very free. It’s good to be spontaneous” and “I was too 
cool” – are strong indications of the ‘liberating energy’ (Winston, 2009, p. 39) of 
students, who work in a safe classroom. He connotes, too, that these kind of emotions 
act as an awakening incentive for energetic and poetical participation. Consequently, 
he points to the pedagogical merit of security and spontaneity in the space of learning.  
The next conversation rests upon a picture of a group of smiling students, who dance 
in a rotating circle (see Figure 6.17). According to Maria, this circle represents her 
course, as she describes a series of signs that are shown within it.  
M: There are 8 students and a teacher, as many as we were in the course. … The 
circle has many colours. These colours are the emotions of our everyday life. 
Theatre is all about life’s emotions. … The different colours, namely the emotions, 
depict the diversity of emotions we experienced in the course.  
	  	   155	  
A: Could you, please, explain what 
were the stimuli for these emotions 
in the course? 
M: The stories and the different roles 
we performed. Of course, in an 
activity, we didn’t have the same 
feelings. A student could 
experience one colour and another 
student could feel a different one.  This also happens in life. In our life, emotions 
move in a circle and change; they may leave and may come again. This idea, too, 
exists in theatre (2nd Interview, 25.1.2013). 
It is in evidence that Maria understands the wealthy world of colours as a metaphor 
for emotions that signify the course’s identity. She regards life and theatre as two 
spaces inextricably connected to emotions. This belief therefore brings to light the 
significance of the politics of emotions within the course, as articulated by Nicholson 
(2013) regarding the space of theatre: 
The political efficacy, morality and sensibility of theatre are predicated, one 
way or another, on the affective qualities of emotion, how they are caught 
and their effect on the actors and audience’s minds and bodies (p. 20).  
 
The last picture, drawn by Maria-Eva, presents a bright sun in a blue sky (see Figure 
6.18). Within the following dialogue, she describes how this metaphor signifies her 
course. 
M: (Smiling) I have drawn Theatre Education and Theatrical Play like the sun, which 
gives light to our life, because it is a course so bright like the sun. 
Figure 6.17: The circle of emotions 
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A: Can you elucidate a little more?  
M: Yes. I am at the end of my studies, I have attended so many courses and can’t 
characterise a course like the sun. I can also say that 
the sun is love.  
A: It sounds a big statement. 
M: In this course, we experienced love; that is why, I 
linked it with the sun. ... When we have love, we feel 
our life better. I regard that the course offered us 
many things that helped us a lot.   
A: Can you refer to some examples of this love? 
M: The cooperation and the bonds that have been created among the students and 
also with you. Especially, in our final storytelling performance, (smiling) it was 
proven how cooperative we were (2nd Interview, 26.1.2013).     
Likewise, Maria-Eva shapes the course’s identity within an affective frame. In her 
case, the prevailing emotion is “love”, the emotion that may gift the power of “light” 
in our life, as she asserts. She highlights that both the cooperation and emotional 
bonds developed among the participants were factors that made her feel “love”. 
However, Nicholson (2002) might affirm here that the flourishing of such 
interpersonal relationships discloses a high level of trust that always depends on the 




Figure 6.18: The sun of love 
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6.3.1.5 Concluding remarks 
Summarising the participants’ perspectives of the courses’ identity, there exist clear 
evidence of the following four important considerations, concerning their knowledge 
of drama/theatre education. 
First, the participants perceive the field as a social, communal space, wherein 
knowledge is built on the vitality of the interplay created by all participants. 
Second, although the culture of drama is neither purely a play nor a conventional 
theatre performance, it still has a playful ethos that needs to be diffusible both by the 
learners and the teacher. 
Third, the participants of Theatre Education and Theatrical Play place great emphasis 
on the cultivation of emotions within the course that may be achieved by means of: 
(1) the exploration of life’s realities and acting in roles, (2) the intimate relationships 
built up among the participants and (3) the safety provided by this. 
Fourth, if we draw a parallel between the participants’ views of the teaching identity 
and the drama/theatre education courses’ identity, it is noticeable that to a great extent 
the participants indicate a steady sequence in their thinking on both occasions. For 
example, Constantinos’ correlation of the drama identity with the dialogic virtues 
appears as a response to his belief that the aim of teaching “is to assist pupils to obtain 
competences that they can use beyond the school, in life”. A similar case is Philia’s 
description of drama identity, that has common elements with her perspectives of 
teaching as a practice driven by active learners and a “predictor” teacher.  
The connection of the identity of Theatre Education and Theatrical Play to the growth 
of emotions by Odysseas, Maria and Maria-Eva is, of course, a thesis not irrelevant to 
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their initial perceptions of good teaching. Characteristically, in both descriptions, 
Maria and Maria-Eva make reference to love as a good pedagogical condition that 
enables the learners to feel safe and promotes their connectedness with the 
teaching/learning. Also, Odysseas’ idea that the learners’ “enthusiastic” response may 
be seen as a sign of good teaching is evidently being broadened by his views that a 
“spontaneous”, “free” and “cool” engagement is a potent clue of their activation.  
Last, Stefanos is the case with the biggest divergence between his positions on 
teaching and drama. Given that he has described teaching as a traditional, teacher-
centred practice – “the knowledge comes from the head” – his identification of drama 
as a joint-making practice states a lack of sameness in the manner he perceives the 
identity of both. In his case, what is potentially certain is his understanding of how 
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6.3.2 The Ecology of the Drama/Theatre Education Courses 
At the first session of drama, I was angered, when I realised that the course 
would have workshops. I said to myself: “What to do now? I think, I have 
to drop this course!” I didn’t like it, for I was a pretty shy character. But, 
afterwards, things were so different; this course eventually is the only one I 
have loved so much! (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
 
The happy ending of Constantinos’ story invites a deeper and holistic comprehension 
of the spectrum of the participants’ learning experiences within the courses. What 
follows therefore is the consideration of their ecology, a term with significant 
conceptual semantics. According to Davis (2004), although ecology is originated from 
the Greek word οικολογία and means the study (λογία) of the home (οίκος), today it 
has evolved so as:  
to encompass the webs of relationships in which we find ourselves and out 
of which our identities are established. … To speak of ecology of an entity 
or phenomenon is to speak of everything that influences it and everything 
that it influences (p. 103).   
 
6.3.2.1 Depicting the courses’ internal goods 
In delineating the ecology of the drama/theatre education courses, we can make good 
use of Higgins’ (2011) theory of internal goods. If we recall his typology (see Figure 
1.3, p. 30), there exist two basic categories of internal goods: one describes the 
excellence in the products of a practice and the other is related to the practitioner. 
Besides this, the first sort of internal goods covers two subcategories: the goods 
recognised in the performance of a practice, and those that stem from its final work. 
The participants’ personal conceptions of the courses signal the starting point of the 
analytical process of identifying their internal goods. From the data in the following 
centralised figure (see Figure  6.19),  it can be seen that each participant expressed six  










characterisations for the courses, that are subsequently classified in two clusters. At 
first glance, we can observe a large number of recurring concepts, among which – 
“effective”, “emotional”,  “enjoyable”, “pleasant” and “creative” – are those with the 
highest frequency. On the other hand, nearly half of the features (in black script) 
appear only once. In this group there are a number that seem unique, in the sense there 
is no other description with an analogous meaning. These are: “theoretical/practical”, 
“recreational”, “philosophical”, “not fleeting” and “good criteria assessment”. As 
Figure 6.19 shows, the internal goods related both to the performance of the courses 
and the final work constitute two big “family” categories. What is more, Figure 6.19 
presents the internal goods of the courses’ teacher, as appreciated by the participants.    
Figure 6.19: The internal goods of the drama/theatre education courses 
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6.3.2.2 The internal goods associated with the courses’ performance 
The fifteen internal goods displayed in Figure 6.19 will be discussed under three 
thematic unities. The first of these traces the courses’ epistemological conditions, 
including the combination of theory and practice as well as the participants’ 
interactivity and cooperation, imagination and creativity. The second unity considers 
the methodological approaches related to the courses’ non-fleetingness, effectiveness 
and good criteria assessment. The third unity examines the courses’ emotional work, 
with emphasis on enjoyment, pleasure, excitement, enthusiasm and authenticity. 
The Courses’ Epistemological Space  
“The big differences”: Theory-practice-theory 
For the participants, the synergy between theory and practice in the design of the 
courses was a factor of paramount significance. In their estimations, this teaching 
scheme had two great advantages: (1) it enabled them to become acquainted both with 
the planning and application of a drama/theatre education lesson and (2) it enhanced 
the potential for building intimate relationships among the courses’ participants. 
Below, we can see the participants’ reasoning for these benefits. 
The first thing, for the students, is to live drama and later to learn its 
technical terms and the names of techniques. It is easier for them to 
understand how and when they can be applied. The understanding in 
practical level is the best motive for the students to want to teach drama in 
school (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
 
If I had been taught drama solely theoretically, I couldn’t be able to teach 
it. If drama was constructed only on workshops, yet again, I couldn’t know 
how to work theoretically, in order to design a drama lesson. Students need 
both. … In workshops, I was acting as a student, but at the same time, as a 
prospective teacher (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
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The course had some big differences in comparison with the other courses 
of our programme. … It was the unique course that had workshops in every 
session. So, the theory was transformed into practice. We could understand 
the theory within the practical activities. This helped us learn practically, 
how to plan a lesson of Theatre Education and Theatrical Play. … It was 
also different from other courses, because both in the theoretical and 
practical part, we never had desks and … thus, we created better 
relationships (Maria-Eva, 2nd Interview, 26.1.2012).  
   
We become more receptive, for, there exist no barriers, no desks, among 
us; and then, we all sit on the floor, face to face. Because we are all so near 
to each other, our words, our thoughts and our movements have a better 
coherence; something that can’t happen in an ordinary class (Odysseas, 2nd 
Reflective diary, 8.10.2012). 
 
These participants’ views incite a reflective discussion about the pedagogical 
implications both of the empirical knowledge and the aesthetics of the learning space 
as epistemological conditions. In her book Places of Learning (2005), Ellsworth 
reconsiders the idea of pedagogy ‘not in relation to knowledge as a thing made but to 
knowledge in the making’ (p. 1). This approach to pedagogy substantially connotes 
the importance of the network of experiences that the ‘learning self’ (ibid., p. 2) 
works to obtain. For this reason she recognises that the place of learning, the physical 
environment and the movement of bodies in the space, are essential constituents of the 
empirical experience. She suggests pedagogy therefore ‘as the impetus behind the 
particular movements, sensations, and affects of bodies/mind/brains in the midst of 
learning’ (ibid.).  
In this spirit of thinking experimentally about learning, she actually conceptualises 
pedagogy itself as a particular ecological phenomenon. In accordance with her theory, 
knowledge is perceived as a good created not individually, but spatially, interwoven 
with ‘a complex moving web of interrelationalities’ (ibid., p. 24). The co-
dependencies of body and mind, of reason and emotion, embody the experiences of 
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learning as being ‘radically in relation to one’s self, to others, and to the world’ (ibid., 
p. 2). Correlating this ecological context of learning with the participants’ remarks on 
the use of space and the movement of bodies, it is obvious that they became 
empirically aware of this concept of inter-relationality. As noted by Nicholson (2011), 
inter-relationality is an idea that ‘is particularly pertinent to theatre education’ (p. 9). 
“Developing group spirit” 
Given the finding in section 6.3.1.5 that the participants identify the courses’ 
teaching/learning space as dialogical and interpersonal, this ecological condition is 
proven as one of the most important causes of the development of cooperation and 
interactivity among the courses’ students. So, their following perspectives outline 
some specific social states that reinforced the growth of these two internal goods.  
We succeeded in developing group spirit, for we used to work with 
different students in the activities (Maria-Eva, 2nd Interview, 26.1.2013).  
 
The various strategies of grouping helped me work with my twenty-three 
fellow students and have personal moments with everyone (Philia, 2nd 
Interview, 30.1.2013).   
 
Drama is collective. Because, nobody did something alone, this made us 
not to be shy to perform publicly. … The most beautiful result of our 
collective spirit was that we could cooperate with any of our fellow 
students, presenting good work. Cooperation helped us be more creative 
(Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
 
When I realised that all my fellow students were working and were 
improving, I thought: “It’s time to go with the current of the class”. From 
then, I used to do my best (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013).  
 
Significantly, the strong feeling of interactive and cooperative relationships developed 
in the courses, as corroborated by the participants, demonstrates Lefebvre’s (1991) 
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notion of spatial practice. Central to his thesis is that spatial practices are socially 
constructed and represent societal patterns and everyday life structures. On these 
terms, spatial practices are recognised as social spaces that ensure ‘continuity and 
some degree of cohesion’ (ibid., p. 33). In view of this idea, the drama/theatre 
education courses can be regarded as spatial practices, or otherwise, as relational 
spaces (Winston et al., 2010) that include ‘pathways, routes and networks of 
interaction that bind people together’ (Nicholson, 2011, p. 12).  
What is more, the ‘sense of belonging, of group identity’ (Winston & Tandy, 2001, p. 
87), as mostly evidenced by Stefanos and Constantinos, might be characterised, at the 
same time, as a vital source of promoting the students’ confidence, safety, spontaneity 
and creativity. Notably, the case of Constantinos obviously validates the way in which 
the collective identity can release a student from their apprehensions, ‘accepting 
unfamiliar roles and taking new risks’ (Nicholson, 2002, p. 90). 
“We built and created something that was ours” 
Imagination and creativity were concepts with a high frequency in the participants’ 
narrations, used as interdependent terms. One representative example is Maria’s 
opinion: “imagination was the basis for any activity. Employing our imagination, we 
built and created something that was ours” (2nd Interview, 25.1.2013). “To imagine”, 
as Philia explains, means to “work with the world of my ideas to decide something” 
(2nd Interview, 30.1.2013), and “to create”, in Stefanos’ view, is “the making of 
something new, by which one can express himself/herself” (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
Philia gives a philosophical exegesis of imagination relatively close to the capacity ‘to 
think of lots of possibilities’ (White, 1990, p. 85), while Stefanos’ description tends 
towards the definition of creativity as ‘the ability to produce work that is novel (i.e. 
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original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e. useful, adaptive concerning task 
constraints)’ (Stenberg & Lubart, 1999, p. 3). The fusion of both drives to the Kantian 
definition that “imagination is a powerful agent for creating as it were a second nature 
out of the material supplied to it by actual nature” (Kant cited in Egan 1992, p. 22). 
Figures 6.20 and 6.21 show two simple examples of the students’ imaginative/poetical 
use of space, body and objects.  
Figure 6.21: The imaginative transfiguration of space and body 	  
Figure 6.20: The symbolic use of space and objects 	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The Courses’ Methodological Space 
“Learning by doing”: “I put my soul”  
Effectiveness and non-fleetingness are two internal goods that, as argued by the 
participants, resulted chiefly from the use of three methodological approaches. 
Specifically, these are: 
• The rich collection of activities, conventions and theatrical games; 
• Microteaching; and  
• The reflective diary. 
Speaking of the great diversity of drama/theatre conventions/techniques and theatrical 
games that they applied during the sessions, the participants explicated its positive 
implications in the activation of their involvement and attentiveness. Some 
representative opinions are the following:  
We always were there. We always had different things to do and this was 
the substance. This something different and new made us very concentrated 
(Maria, 2nd Interview, 26.1.2013).  
 
The first time you asked us to create frozen images for the end of ugly 
duckling, I found it quite indifferent. But, later, when I could receive so 
many different messages, from my side, as spectator, I was enthusiastic 
(Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
 
I realised that conventions were a reflection of drama pedagogy. Preparing 
for the test, I studied my notes of workshops and I could link everything 
with theory (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
 
The major contribution of the conventions to the understanding of the pedagogy of 
drama/theatre education is one of the first issues raised here, by which Heathcote’s 
(1982) views come into sight. As she notes, the participants within the field ‘become 
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absorbed in and committed to’ the teaching/learning process, because ‘[t]he 
conventions all slow down time and enable classes to get a grip on decisions and 
their own thinking about matters’ (p. 28, italics original).  
On the other hand, the nexus between the pedagogy of drama conventions and the 
boost of memory is a second critical theme, connoted mostly by Philia, which can be 
interpreted by Bower’s theory (2014). He has argued that the human memory is a 
cognitive tool that can be supported considerably by emotions. Considering that the 
application of conventions enliven life experiences along with emotions, these 
emotional experiences in turn appear to ‘serve largely as “commentators” reacting to 
the present situation, evaluating the execution of plans and their outcomes” (ibid., p. 
28). In so doing, the emotion is activated ‘to encode and index the unusual event in 
memory, and promotes persisting rehearsal of the new, more adaptive action’ (ibid.).  
Microteaching – the design and instruction of a short drama/theatre education lesson – 
was one of the courses’ assessment criteria, and all of the participants underlined its 
beneficial influence on their professional preparation. In the next excerpt, 
Constantinos highlights some advantages of the process of microteaching.  
We were learning by doing. … For me, it was very helpful that we made 
lesson plans and taught them in drama workshops. The teaching of other 
students helped me a lot, giving me ideas of how to structure a drama 
lesson, how to hierarchise the episodes and activities and how to begin and 
finish the lesson. … Also, they helped me understand which convention is 
appropriate in each case (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013).  
 
Dewey’s (1938) belief that ‘all genuine education comes about through experience’ 
(p. 25) is evidenced to be central in Constantinos’ case. Several studies have shown 
that microteaching is a laboratory strategy that may aid student teachers in developing 
their teaching competences (Gage, 1978; Wagner, 1973; Zeichner, 2000). Notably, in 
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drama/theatre education, Kempe and Nicholson (2001) elaborate the benefits of 
microteaching, pointing out that it can help the students recognise ‘the complexity of 
teaching by making crucial links between teaching and learning rather than simply 
dreaming up wacky activities to fill lesson plans’ (p. 65). Constantinos’ case seems to 
support this primary objective of microteaching, as he reflects on a set of 
technical/artistic elements by which drama might result in effective learning. 
A second criterion assessment that was characterised by the participants as useful and 
constructive was the reflective diary. This functioned as a medium of reflection and 
criticism of the courses’ work, in which the participants had the opportunity to 
comment on any theme they judged as critical. Some brief and noteworthy phrases 
from their diaries are:  
Simply, I would prefer not to sit on the floor (Constantinos, 1st Reflective 
diary, 5.10.12).  
  
Today, in theoretical part, we were grave and had an active involvement. 
My fellow students had so many questions, as if we had nuclear physics 
(Stefanos, 6th Reflective diary, 13.11.12). 
 
For me, it was very positive that you answered to our diaries with notes. It 
meant you had read them. … I put my soul into its writing. For drama, the 
reflective diary is very necessary” (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
 
The value of the participants’ reflective diaries, which can be further ascertained 
throughout this chapter, lies on the fact that they gather meaningful aspects of the 
history of their learning within the courses. Thus, they served as a means both of their 
self-knowledge and professional learning (Korthagen, 2001).  
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The Courses’ Emotional Space  
“This was the strange thing! … So much energy … hand in hand with harmony”  
The emotional ethos of the courses is one theme that has already been emphatically 
illustrated by the participants of Theatre Education and Theatrical Play in section 
6.3.1.4. This discussion, however, is an expansion of all the participants’ sentimental 
journeys. So, our interest within the next six excerpts is shifted to their experiences of 
enjoyment, pleasure, enthusiasm and excitement. The participants appear to give 
‘emotional culmination to thoughts, feelings and actions’ (Denzin, 1984, p. 89) and 
therefore, their emotions per se are proven as ‘contagious’ (Nicholson, 2013, p. 20). 
 
      
“This was the strange thing! 
We could do whatever we 
decided and everybody was 
involved in such an 
enthusiastic manner … one 
might say that we used to get 
away from our real task. But, 
this wasn’t true … one might 
say that the respect was 
absent, but it was the 
opposite … we were real, 
spontaneous. Here, I dance 
with my soul … I still try to 
understand how so much 
energy could go hand in 
hand with harmony” 
(Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 
30.1.2013). 
   Figure 6.22: “Energy hand in hand with harmony”	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“We found the bottle in the class and spontaneously thought, it could be a sign, with 
which, Skroutz might look like a drunk. We put also, two little houses, the scene of 
Skroutz’s neighbourhood. … When I came out of my house I started dancing and 
calling everyone. I 
wanted to share money 
with them: “Take the 
money, before I change 
my mind”. (Laughing) 
Yes! Oh my God! … The 
girls of my team wanted 
so much our scenario to 
be enjoyable. And they 
were requesting me to 
do my best!” (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
“It was a pleasant course. Every Wednesday morning, I used to go to school, and 
afterwards, at 3.00 p.m., I had another course. It was so boring … Then, at 6.00-9.00 
p.m., I had drama … no headache, no tiredness, … we had so much fun … pleasure. 
It was the course that made me 
feel a child ... ten years old. I felt 
and experienced things I didn’t 
experience as a pupil. It was the 
time to gain what I had lost!” 
(Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 
29.1.2013). 
Figure 6.23: “Take the money, before I change my mind” 
 
Figure 6.24: “It was the time to gain what I 
had lost!” 
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Manifestly, these participants’ affective experiences display the idea of learning by 
beauty. The “spontaneous” and “enthusiastic” engagement in role-playing, the lively 
dances and the collective involvement in a captivating pleasure are actual signs that 
lead to what Winston (2009) describes as ‘a kind of semi-anarchic, ideal classroom, a 
place where beauty and laughter are recognised as valuable and fostered as virtues’ (p. 
45). This spectrum of their artistic/poetic experiences conceptualises learning as 
beauty, where the ethical is interwoven with the aesthetic. ‘Goodness and beauty’, as 
Murdoch (1970) reminds us, ‘are not to be contrasted but are largely part of the same 
structure’, for ‘aesthetic situations are not so much analogies of … [ethics] as cases of 
… [ethics]’ (p. 40). Therefore, when locating learning within the philosophical 
scheme of beauty, a necessary prerequisite is its association with the learners’ inner 
selves and the practice of certain dispositions/virtues.  
“Harmony” – the sense of balance (Winston, 2010) – as Stefanos accurately states, is 
the intrinsic feature of beauty. In Platonic thought, goodness and harmony are 
inseparable. Here, the participants’ narrations compose a lively depiction of this 
twofold presence. Evidently, their harmonic experiences of beauty are mirrored in 
their cooperation and “respect”, unified with great enjoyment in the inspiration of an 
original scenario and the care of creating a mood of amusement. Furthermore, in the 
attempt at living the happiness of a “lost” childishness, the group are guided by a 
conscious participation. Platonically speaking, all these different aspects of beauty 
signify learning as a space of ‘joy, hope and fulfilment, as motivating a quest for 
understanding based upon our deepest desires’ (ibid., p. 18). In other words, using 
Aristotle’s highest concept of ethics – eudaimonia – the learning space gains a 
potentially eudaimonistic character.  
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Playful laughter is also revealed to be another emotional code of the courses’ ecology, 
but this is a theme that will be examined later, in respect to the following narrations. 
“This course could express my childishness. ... It was beautiful that we could escape 
from our routine. … Sometimes, our everyday life problems are so hard. Within the 
activities and games of the course, I could feel a greater optimism and less stress. …  
When I was a child I used to play a similar game – dog and handkerchief. … I wasn’t 
shy of doing the dog because of the 
liveliness and the laughter of my 
fellow students. … The fun was a way 
of learning. … The knowledge is more 
permanent, when it is based on fun 
and humour” (Maria, 2nd Interview, 
25.1.2013).    
 
“It was a very enjoyable course. The music we had as background, while we were 
working was inspiring. … Many times, we were working with no sense of time. Once, 
we went for a break nearly at 11.00 a.m. and then, we realised that the time was over.         
Here ... one thing I liked, it was the various 
ways with which we used the fur, I have on my 
neck. ... We were laughing a lot that day ... we 
came so close and felt the whole task easier 
than we had initially supposed” (Maria-Eva, 
2nd Interview 26.1.2013).   
Figure 6.26: “Working with no 
sense of time” 
 
Figure 6.25: “Fun as a way of learning” 
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“For me, it was exciting and so beautiful … a lot of laughter, energy and vividness. 
The climate was different in relation 
with the other courses. If we had a 
photograph … we could see absent-
minded students doing other things … 
but, in this course, we were very much 
concentrated” (Odysseas, 2nd 
Interview, 29.1.2013).    
 
It is so apparent that playful laughter had an intense presence in both of the courses’ 
ecologies. Learning by laughter, as signified by the participants’ experiences, was a 
condition with a twofold aesthetics: on the one hand, it was an escape from boredom 
and absent-mindedness, fatigue and routine, shyness, stress and the sense of time, 
while facilitating an exciting journey to childhood; on the other hand, it signified a 
strong urge for artistic experimentation, “liveliness”, “vividness” and “optimism”, 
“fun” and “humour”. These awakening dimensions of laughter open up a dialogue 
regarding its inter-relationality with play and beauty. The rhetoric oxymoronic phrase 
of Oakeshott (1991), ‘the playfulness is serious and the seriousness is only play’ (p. 
493), takes us back to the classic play theory of Schiller (1967).    
For Schiller, play is the practice that can reconcile the two basic and functionally 
contradictory drives of human nature: sense and reason. In the play experience this 
‘dual nature is harmonized and humanized’ (Hein, 1968, p. 67), indicating that play 
‘has the potential to keep both reason and sense in their rightful place’ (Winston, 
2010, p. 74). In this regard, Schiller’s principal interest in the phenomenon of play is 
its contribution to the ethical development of human beings and society. Referring to 
 
Figure 6.27: “Laughter, energy and 
vividness” 
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the significance of Schiller’s theory, Hein (1968) notes that play ‘turns out to be a 
kind of apprenticeship to the aesthetic appreciation of beautiful, which, in turn, is a 
stepping stone to … [ethics]’ (p. 67). Hein’s commentary, therefore, reveals Schiller’s 
central idea that beauty is the biggest internal good of play. The beauty within play is 
achieved empirically by means of the quality of “aesthetic necessity”, which, for 
Schiller, as Winston (2010) explains, does not represent the ‘harmony and order that 
should characterise the good and happy society’, but ‘it is what allows us, as sensuous 
beings, to apprehend what it actually feels like’ (p. 74). This interpretation guides to 
the conclusion that aesthetic necessity is driven by our feelings, shaping our decisions 
and actions (Damasio, 2005) for what is good. 
In light of this theoretical background of play, playful laughter may be decoded as just 
such an aesthetic necessity. Taking into consideration the two above nexuses of the 
participants’ aesthetic experiences of laughter, they are obviously live expressions of 
beauty, driven by feelings that permit them to harmonise their learning with ‘what it 
might be to live the [good and] happy life’ (Armstrong, 2005, p. 83). In so doing, it 
becomes clear that the aesthetics of playful laughter within the courses is evident as a 
means of liberation from unhealthy learning dispositions and, furthermore, as a 
stimulating energy towards attentive and conscious learning. Moreover, it is attested 
as a sign of unselfishness, having the capacity, in Murdoch’s (1970) words, ‘to clear 
our minds of selfish care’ and excite a ‘self-forgetful pleasure’ (pp. 84-85).  
“Authenticity … real self” 
This is the last internal good associated with the courses’ emotional space. It is a 
theme discussed by the participants with different thoughts/experiences, as follows: 
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Within the theatrical activities and games, one can improvise ideas and 
movements, by which, he/she can express thoughts and feelings that reflect 
his/her real self (Maria, Midterm examination paper, 12.12.2012).  
 
Because of the nature of the work, we can externalise our character and 
who we are; besides, we show how we think and feel within our roles 
(Odysseas, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
 
I always had an answer in my mind, before you would approach me. But, 
just as you touched me, I was forgetting my first idea. And finally, I used to 
say something I could think that moment. … I think this shows what it 
means to track the authentic thinking. The spontaneous thought was the 
authentic one. … What I understand is what is drama; it is the authenticity 
(Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
 
Essentially, the participants demonstrate two different notions of authenticity. The 
first connects authenticity to the self – a perspective displayed in the literature of 
drama/theatre education as a controversial theme. The interest in authentic self is 
echoed by the pioneers of the field, first by Slade (1954) and, later, by both Bolton 
(1979) and Heathcote (1982). For Slade, role-playing is a means that can develop 
children’s sincerity, whereas for Bolton and Heathcote it can expose the truthful 
behaviour and feelings that lead to the hidden self and the authentic “real me”.  
However, later practitioners like Hornbrook (1989) and Nicholson (1993, 1996) 
appear to mistrust this concept of authentic self, given the belief that the self’s 
performed actions are “restored behaviors” (Schechner, 2006, p. 28), interdependent 
with the customs, rituals and routines of a concrete tradition and culture. In 
Nicholson’s (1996) view, ‘a self authored entirely by culture (or ideology) indicates a 
world without the possibility of individual agency’ (p. 82). Besides, to quote 
Hornbrook’s (1989) position, the self’s subjectivity is authorised by ideological 
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communities, such as ‘our social class, our ethnic group, our trade union or our 
church’, that reflect our everyday discourse (p. 126).   
Alternatively, Philia exhibits a second view of authenticity. Her case seems to be a 
typical one of spontaneity, reminiscent of the work of Keith Johnstone as it is 
presented in his book, Impro: Improvisation and Theatre (2007). Speaking of 
originality as a good characteristic of spontaneity, Johnstone asserts that ‘[a]n artist 
who is inspired is being obvious. He’s not making any decisions, he’s not weighing 
one idea against another. He’s accepting his first thoughts’ (p. 88, italics original). 
This notion of originality might be, then, an aspect of Philia’s line of thinking, if we 
trust her understanding: “The spontaneous thought was the authentic one”.  
Nonetheless, in attempting to appreciate the “authentic thinking” of these participants, 
what might be detected is that they express a feeling of reaching some sense of inner 
authenticity which, however we define it, is often experienced by those who are 
absorbed and lost in the flow of drama/theatre education. Thus, the flow theory of 
Csikszentmihalyi (1996) might be an appropriate approach to the dialectic of the 
participants’ inner authenticity in combination with their emotional engagement. 
‘Flow’ is defined as ‘the experience of complete absorption in the present moment’, 
when one meets challenges of high level and has ‘clear proximal goals and immediate 
feedback about the progress being made’ (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009, p. 
195). According to research results, the evidence that one enters a subjective state of 
flow is the following: 
• Strong and focused concentration;  
• Integration of action and awareness;  
• Loss of reflective self-awareness;  
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• A feeling that one can control own actions; 
• A sense that time passes faster than normal; and 
• An awareness of the activity as inherently rewarding (ibid., pp. 195-196).  
Considering these characteristics in respect to the emotional activation of Maria, 
Odysseas and Philia, there exist powerful indications that they worked in the logic of 
flow. If we also turn our attention to some of their prior expressions, following the 
same sequence, then these statements – “It was beautiful that we could escape from 
our routine. … I wasn’t shy of doing the dog because of the liveliness and the 
laughter”, “we were very much concentrated” and “I started dancing and calling 
everyone. … The girls … wanted so much our scenario to be enjoyable” – are obvious 
clues of their flow. Given that similar flow experiences have also been described by 
the rest of the participants, this is an added remark that permits the assertion that flow 
is a representative quality of the participants’ emotional work.  
6.3.2.3 The internal goods associated with the final work of the courses 
This analysis of the second category of goods rests upon a fresh set of six qualities. 
From the data in Figure 6.19 (p. 160), it can be seen that recreation, good energy 
levels, joyfulness, vitality, surprise and the underpinning philosophy cover the 
spectrum of this discussion. They are all internal goods focused on what I am calling 
‘self-building’; a concept that brings personal and professional development together. 
“This work was recreation; it could teach our soul” 
The connection of drama to recreation orients our thinking beyond what we ordinarily 
understand as enjoyment or amusement. According to Philia, the work of drama is 
recreational, in the sense it can directly educate the soul. As she argues: 
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We lived this course … I lived it! We had fun; we became children, friends 
and teachers through this course, we laughed a lot and were touched a lot. I 
think we experienced a huge spectrum of human emotions. This work was 
recreation; it could teach our soul (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
 
Philia’s conceptualisation of recreation links us with the platonic exegesis of the 
notion. Its Greek equivalent word is ψυχαγωγία, which means the guidance or 
education of the soul. We can meet the term ψυχαγωγία in Phaedrus, where Plato 
defines rhetoric as ‘ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων’ (261a); that is to say, rhetoric is the 
“leading of the soul through words” (Werner, 2010, p. 24). We understand that Plato’s 
logic attributes to ψυχαγωγία actions that convey an intellectual and ethical gravity. 
Indeed, ψυχαγωγία appears to be a eudaimonistic process.  
This ethical dimension of recreation is not, of course, one so closely attached to the 
way we typically approach its value. In contemporary perception, as noted by 
Winston (2010), the idea of recreation is connected to ‘pleasurable activities that both 
relax and refresh us’ (p. 103). However, comprehending recreation as “leisure 
activity” is, according to Pope’s (2005) investigation, a ‘weak sense’ of the term (p. 
8). Its stronger one, as he suggests, becomes perceptible if we consider the term as 
‘re-creation’, which then signifies the meaning of “re-making” (ibid.).  
In drawing upon this broader and more original sense of the term, what is potentially 
beneficial is the urge of finding refreshing and revitalising ways of seeing and making 
things; a process that leaves room for an ethical response (Winston, 2010). However, 
this line of deliberation can bridge our understanding of recreation with the platonic 
originality of the term. As a result of this interconnection, recreation might be defined 
as a process of “re-making” our souls, or in simpler terms, a ‘self-building’ process, 
whose essential activation drives to eudaimonia.      
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In this theoretical context recreation becomes an umbrella idea, on the basis of which, 
the remaining five courses’ internal goods can be interpreted. Thus, the nexus of the 
participants’ views that follow reveal the ways in which they experienced the 
recreational power of good energy, joyfulness and vitality through the courses.   
When I was leaving the sessions, I was feeling a sense of security and was 
full of good energy (Odysseas, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013).  
 
I was joyful, because I could see myself improving in the practical work 
(Maria, 2nd Interview, 25.1.2013). 
 
Drama was so revitalising. I had appetite to work after the course, despite 
my busy day (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013).  
 
Drama was my best course … was the course that was helping me forget 
my bad feelings; there was a thing that was making my soul filled with 
rejoicing (Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
 
The emotion of surprise is correlated by both Constantinos and Maria with the taking 
of initiatives and risks that, as they initially believed, they would not be able to 
perform. In the next two excerpts, they describe their personal experiences of surprise.   
“The difficult for me was to do something 
that was not me and to play roles. At the 
beginning, I didn’t know that I could do it. 
But, later, I dared a lot of things. I had the 
courage to play various roles. … Here, 
(smiling) I was the wicked fairy and tried to 
steal the beautiful princess. … When I 
realised that in drama we had freedom to act, 
Figure 6.29: The wicked fairy	  	  
Figure 6.28: The wicked fairy 
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as we liked, then, I changed. But, I have changed as a person. The course was the best 
surprise, in the four years of my studies” (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
Yes, I was surprised with myself; I had the impression that I knew myself, 
but finally, there is also another Maria in my inner world. This course 
helped me understand better myself (Maria, 2nd Interview, 25.1.2013).  
 
Interestingly, the participants’ sense of “the best surprise” is unfolded as a kind of 
intrapersonal dialogue: the self undergoes an internal awakening and the belief-
holding self goes through a change. Greene (1995) discusses this phenomenon of self 
in the following way: 
To be yourself is to be in the process of creating a self, an identity. If it 
were not a process, there would be no surprise. The surprise comes along 
with becoming different – consciously different as one finds ways of acting 
on envisaged possibility (p. 20).  
 
The expansion of philosophical spirit as a further aspect of the recreational nature of 
drama is an issue chiefly suggested by Philia. Following her thoughts, it is clear that 
drama is substantiated as ‘a medium for developing inquiring minds’ (Juliebo et al., 
1991, p. 8) that may make ‘our encounters with the world become newly informed’ 
(Greene, 1995, p. 17). As she speculates: 
Drama was the only course that made me ask myself questions. … It was 
right we worked with some stories that we knew, like The Ugly Duckling 
and Odyssey. It was a way to see the same things anew new. … For me, 
this philosophical search was not simply a convention of drama work, but a 
conscious process of thinking that I adopted in my personal life (2nd 
Interview, 30.1.2013).  
 
6.3.2.4 The internal goods associated with the pedagogy of the courses’ 
teacher 
It was 8.00 o’ clock. … “Coming to class, I met a very small, but brave 
animal. What’s its name?” … The first answers: “rabbit”, “pig” and 
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“chicken”. Then, I gave them 1 clue: “It can be hidden in the circle of the 
pad we use to sit on the floor”. … “Yes, it was a jaunty snail! I stopped to 
observe its life for some moments. I love and admire nature!” This was the 
opening of my teaching, today (2nd Teacher’s diary, 9.10.2012 – Edus 325). 
 
… The students were cooperative with the instructions and very friendly 
among them. … They really enjoyed the time machine! The atmosphere 
that was created by the white cloths, the low light and the loud count was 
so magic! The moment, where the students in pairs sat on the floor, under 
the cloths, was a mysterious one. … They freed themselves from any other 
thought and became voyagers like children. … I am looking forward to 
reading their diaries (5th Teacher’s diary, 31.10.2012 – Edus 326). 
 
The above two excerpts introduce us to a third nexus of internal goods: the pedagogy 
of the courses’ teacher. The qualities that the participants ascribed to her pedagogy are 
set out in Figure 6.19 (p. 160), which are: civility, alertness, playfulness, 
supportiveness, creativity and organisation. One central issue jointly underpinned by 
all of the participants is the belief that the courses’ teacher was one of the most 
influential factors in their love for the drama/theatre education courses. 
The next dialogue offers a taste of how Constantinos sees his drama teacher. 
C: Yes, I liked drama, for the teacher was 
you. You know how to come close to the 
students. You aren’t a typical teacher … 
you become one with us.  
A: You mean I came close to you, during the 
sessions? 
C: Eh, no. Not only in the class, but also, out 
of the class. We feel you more as a fellow 
student of us than as a teacher. 
 
Figure 6.29: The teacher as a 
“fellow student” 
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A: (Smiling) Really? I can regard it as a compliment! You are right, Constantinos, I 
am a student too  (2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
Similarly, Stefanos and Maria describe the significant role played by the teacher’s 
civility, alertness and playfulness, in obtaining an eager stance towards their 
drama/theatre education.  
It was your manner. Yes, I loved your style of teaching; you are a real 
person and you are civil. I think your civility made all of us calm down and 
cooperate. It was a prerequisite for the beauty of the course. … I am sure. I 
am sure if I did the same course with another teacher I might not like drama 
(Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
 
She was active and alert. In this way, we learnt to be attentive and focused 
on work. … She was fun and her playful manner made us cheerful and 
prepared to work without feeling uncomfortable. Her civil and emotional 
behaviour won us over. This was a reason to love theatre education. … In 
teaching she was her real self. Angela was the same in and out of the class. 
She had a balanced personality as a person and as a teacher. It is important 
for the teacher to be a good person (Maria, E-mail interview, 11.6.2013). 
 
These views, taken together, indicate three crucial and interrelated issues regarding 
the courses’ teacher that have been examined in Chapters 2 and 3. First, the teacher’s 
virtues of the beautiful – civility, cheerfulness and good-heartedness – function as an 
integral component of her conduct and teaching style (Fenstermacher, 2001; 
Neelands, 2004; Winston, 2010). Second, the ethics of the teacher is a major source of 
the courses’ ecological climate (Sockett, 2012). Third, the teacher’s self is observed 
and defined by the participants on the basis of both the personal and professional self 
(Kristjánsson, 2011; Sockett, 2012).  
Additionally, according to some of the other participants, the teacher’s ethics were 
characterised by her supportiveness towards the students. Their comments, below, 
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show analytically which special dispositions of the teacher, embodied within her 
pedagogy, were encouraging and inspiring.  
She had a positive energy that could transmit to us. This energy helped me 
be more creative and flexible. She reinforced each student separately with 
civility. She was a warm supporter and wanted us to do good work 
(Odysseas, E-mail Interview, 15.6.2013). 
 
Always, you used to show us that you are in a good mood and never 
conveyed something negative to us. Albeit one day, you were sick, you 
came to class smiling and said to us: “I am sorry, I am not very well today, 
but we can work properly”. This is what we should learn: to enter the class 
and to give this pleasing aura (Maria-Eva, 2nd Interview, 26.1.2013).  
 
When we had our microteaching, your instructions were very supportive: 
“Guys, we have a lot of work, tonight. I know you are tired, but, I please 
you to give your best self in all your fellow students’ teaching”. … You 
were caring about 1-2 students, who were shy. Your manner was something 
like, “Show your work as best you can. This is the important thing”. And 
the students did their best. … The reflective discussions were very 
constructive. … Also, for me, it was very positive the fact that you weren’t 
used to wear a watch on your hand (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
 
Beyond all these considerations, what is primarily evidenced is the teacher’s ethics of 
care. Her subjectivities and pedagogical actions created ‘a caring environment’, 
which, according to Nicholson (2002), is tantamount to ‘a robust environment’ (p. 90) 
of learning experiences rested on willingness rather 
on enforcement and obedience.  
Finally, all of the participants extolled both the 
teacher’s creative and organisational capacities. 
Using Philia’s words, these intellectual qualities are 
proven as ethical qualities: “Mastery, passion and 
love of what she was doing were behind her good 
Figure 6.30: The teacher’s 
“mastery, passion and love” 
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organisation and creative ideas” (E-mail Interview, 20.6.2013). In this way, it is 
attested once again that the nexus between the teacher’s ethos and intellect is 
inevitably embedded in the teaching/learning process.  
6.3.2.5 Concluding remarks 
Defining both the courses’ ecologies by means of their internal goods is a key step in 
a holistic understanding of those conditions that might urge the participants’ aretaic 
development. In particular, as shown in Figure 6.31, the analysis of the courses’ 
ecology demonstrates both the co-existence and synergy of five inherently intra-
spaces – epistemological, methodological, emotional, recreational and pedagogical – 
that would serve as a platform for the promotion of virtues.  
This possibility, for instance, is verified to a great extent within the courses’ 
epistemological space. The cooperative and trustful relationships that are found 
among all the participants – students and teacher – constitute a fundamental 
prerequisite for the fostering of the social/interpersonal virtues of  the ensemble-based   
 
Figure 6.31: The intra-spaces of the courses’ ecology 
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model of teaching/learning. On the other hand, as evidenced, this intense ecological 
sociability facilitated high levels of willing work, emotional energy and playfulness, 
conditions that harmonised the aesthetics with ethics. Such a context of work could 
support in greater depth the virtues of the ensemble, as well as those virtues closely 
associated with the participants’ ethos. An additional eventuality could be the 
expansion of the participants’ pedagogical/technical knowledge, since there are clear 
indications that the courses provided a number of challenges in applying the theory of 
drama/theatre education to practical, teaching circumstances.  
Thus, the way in which these ecological conditions factually contributed to the 
participants’ ‘self-building’ drives us to the analysis of the next research question. 
Considering that it is a broad-spectrum question, it will be examined in two separate 
subchapters. The first will focus on the personal virtues that the participants 
developed within the context of the courses, while the second subchapter will 
concentrates on the professional virtues they applied in their teaching practices of 
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6.4 DEFINING THE PARTICIPANTS’ ARETAIC DEVELOPMENT 
In analysing the central sub-question of the study – what are the kinds of virtues that 
might be developed in the framework of the courses – the attention turns to sources of 
evidence such as thoughts, perceptions, estimations and patterns of behaviour, 
through which the participants display signs of self-transformation. In this way, the 
objective is the gathering of indications of alterations in the participants’ dispositions 
in relation to their personal aretaic development. Accordingly, the focal interest of this 
question lies in the growth of the participants’ intellectual and ethical virtues as a 
consequence of their participation in the specific courses’ ecology. 
Given this research perspective, the analysis of data indicates four categories of virtue 
ethics that the participants developed: dialogue, the beautiful, will and consciousness. 
Subsequently, each of these virtues will be discussed separately.  
6.4.1 Virtue Ethics of Dialogue  
This consists of two sets of virtues: the social and the democratic. Examining first the 
social virtues, the discourse includes sympathy and empathy, respect and friendship.   
6.4.1.1 Social virtues 
Sympathy and empathy: “I felt Odysseus” and “I lived its position for a while”   
The participants understood this concept duo as energies that may heal apathy. In this 
sense, their perceptions point to the ancient Greek word πάθος (passion), that may be 
described as the essential psychic movement by which ‘we are touched, affected, 
stimulated, surprised and to some extent violated’ (Waldenfels, 2007, p. 74). The 
participants became aware of sympathy ‘not as touchy-feely love but just the 
disposition to turn outward’ (Sennett, 2009, p. 222), in order to feel the others. 
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Empathy was understood as ‘imagining oneself as another, in all his or her difference’ 
(ibid., p. 92).  
Beginning with a representative case of sympathy, Philia’s reflective diaries prove 
critical. What follows is the analysis of one such diary.  
The passage begins with an empirical assumption: “If dramatisation could make us 
feel the heroes, consequently, we can feel the other people too. What is needed is to 
live their stories”. Discussing, afterwards, Odysseus’ story, she highlights that before 
the concrete workshop she simply knew ten classic characterisations of him – “genius, 
resourceful, inventive, brave, strong, courageous, valiant, protected by Goddess 
Athena, perspicacious, supernatural”. However, “in drama”, as she continues to 
comment, “it was the first time, I felt Odysseus as a king, a spouse, a father, and a 
man”. This is the crucial point at which Philia reveals her sympathetic response to 
Odysseus, implied by a new web of sensibilities and feelings. Her ‘own ego’ (Sennett, 
2012, p. 21) is activated towards Odysseus. Her sympathy here appears precisely as   
an embrace (ibid.). Closing her diary, she concludes, “I feel lucky, for I attend this 
course. I have understood the way, by which, one can feel the others; in so doing, I 
could help my future pupils learn the same thing” (5th Reflective diary, 11.11.2012). 
Concerning empathy, role-playing is disclosed as a potent practice for the 
appreciation of its social value. In the four excerpts that follow, we can ascertain how 
the participants attempt to empathise with their imaginative selves. The significant 
issue evidenced in the last two cases is the synergy that exists between empathy, self-
critique and self-knowledge. 
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I tried my appearance to show a woman older than I am. I had to behave as 
a mother, who had a family and worries about her children. This made my 
mood to be serious and quite thoughtful (Maria, 2nd Interview, 25.1.2013). 
 
In my role as “Tarantula”, I felt aggrieved, ugly, scary and crazy. I felt that 
I had the right to know the truth, to get back my child and my husband, 
whom I loved and adored. Out of the role of “Tarantula”, I felt compassion 
for this “wicked” fairy; I wanted to help her and put myself in the process 
of talking to her. When we feel aggrieved, the worst way to be vindicated is 
to go against the law (e.g., by stealing the child) or to fume. Perhaps, 
dialogue is the best solution (Philia, Midterm examination paper, 
28.11.2012).  
 
One role that I lived that honestly, I would never want to live again is ugly 
duckling. I didn’t like at all the way, by which, I behaved to it. I lived its 
position for a while and didn’t feel well. Then, I transferred its story in our 
real life and thought of cases in my life that I treated others so badly. I 
regretted it a thousand times. The specific story is very good for it has so 
many meanings that one can’t understand simply by reading it. Drama can 
do this thing (Constantinos, Midterm examination paper, 28.11.2012). 
 
The first key issue highlighted within the participants’ experiences is that, similar to 
sympathy, empathy depends on the activation of imagination, facilitating the 
Figure 6.32: “The good wolf” 
“Yes, I was the wolf, the good wolf 
without friends. In my attempt at 
persuading the other animals to 
open the door, I told them that I 
wanted to invite them to play. At 
last, when they opened the door, I 
said to them that I didn’t have any 
sly purpose, but I just wanted to 
become friends and play football 
together” (Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 
30.1.2013).      
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conception of ‘what ourselves should feel in a like situation’ (Smith, 1979, p. 9). As 
Saxton and Miller (2013) corroborate, ‘[i]t is through the embodied metaphoric acts 
of the imagination in drama and theatre that we create internal models that result in 
increased social and empathetic awareness’ (p. 115). In empathetic responses, as these 
cases of the participants indicate, the power of social imagination urges oneself to get 
out of his/her ego and to enter consciously into the affective situation of the other self. 
Thus, an emotional and loving encounter is built (Sennett, 2012; Hoffman, 2000).  
What is also noticeable here is the inner dialogue both of Philia and Constantinos. 
They are reminiscent of Courtney’s (1980) words: ‘the more I can “put myself in your 
place”, the more successful my guesses will be’; and still, ‘the more ‘I can identify 
with you (try to think and feel as you do) the more likely I am to impersonate you “in 
my mind’s eyes”’ (p. 1). In particular, these two participants witness a kind of 
“estrangement” from their selves; Philia activates her “compassion” and Constantinos 
puts his contrition in praxis. In this light, empathy is displayed as a spiritual 
encounter: it allows one ‘to feel “with” rather than “for” the other, producing an 
engagement that is simultaneously affective and intellectual’ (Kuftinec, 2007 cited in 
Solga, 2008, p. 158). Interestingly Philia, in an akin spirit, deduces that “empathy 
indeed is a big virtue, as one can see the other in eyes, using the other’s eyes” (6th 
Reflective diary, 18.11.2012). 
Respect: “You learn to respect your fellow students, as if they were yourself” 
According to the participants, respect for another person is defined as an esoteric 
linking procedure between “ego” and “alterity”. They understand it as an 
interpersonal virtue that has the potential for building togetherness, cooperation, trust, 
empathy, reciprocity and autonomy. In this light, respect is understood not as a 
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deontological principle, but as a virtue of character that may contribute to the 
tightening of human relationships. This conceptual frame of respect is clearly being 
demonstrated within the next six excerpts.   
In drama, the way of teaching has taught me the emotion of respect in an 
excessive degree. I think that all the students, we have learnt to behave 
respectfully (Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
  
In drama, respect can be cultivated, because it is what makes you listen to 
the opinions of others. You learn to respect not only their views, but also, 
the persons themselves. You put your ego in a critique and reflect on your 
thoughts whether they are right. Respect can make you agree with others 
and adopt their opinions (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
 
We used to discuss our opinions, share ideas and combine them. We learnt 
to respect the others and for this reason, I think we had a very good 
cooperation and collectivity (Maria-Eva, 2nd Interview, 26.1.2013).   
 
Learning to respect, you don’t insult your fellow students and value the 
diversity. You learn to treat everyone well. You learn to respect your fellow 
students, as if they were yourself (Constantinos, Midterm examination 
paper, 28.11.2012). 
 
There existed respect. There wasn’t any case, where someone would laugh 
at somebody or would comment on something with a negative mood. We 
always used to respect each other. We neither used to get something wrong 
nor think something bad about the others (Odysseas, 2nd Interview, 
29.1.2013).  
 
Respect can make the learning of symbiosis apt to be finding solutions for 
potential problems that may emerge within it” (Stefanos, Midterm 
examination paper, 28.11.2012).  
 
Given these participants’ beliefs in respect, three key issues arise, mainly concerned 
with its ontology, how it functions and its social merit. The participants make clear 
that respect as a virtue of ethos rests upon an inner openness of self towards others. 
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As they unambiguously underline, this process creates intimate associations with 
others, leaving behind any antisocial and unethical manners. Significantly, this 
concrete vision suggests that the self needs to reconcile its internal intentions and 
feelings with its external dispositions and actions. In his Respect In a World of 
Inequality (2003), Sennett writes: ‘treating people with respect cannot occur simply 
by commanding it should happen. Mutual recognition has to be negotiated’. Exactly, 
it is within this process of ‘negotiation … [that] the complexities of personal character 
as much as social structure’ become perceptible (p. 260).  
Recognising respect in this way it becomes obvious that it is radically distanced from 
Kantian thought, itself closely aligned with respect for the moral law and, 
accordingly, with reason. Kant’s deontology, as presented in Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1993), is principally based on the categorical imperative: ‘Act 
in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
another, always at the same times as an end and never simply as a means’ (p. 36). 
Although this belief shows Kant’s recognition of human dignity and equality, respect 
cannot exist if subordinated to an external obedience to a moral code. Its practice, as 
Harris (1997) affirms, requires a sympathetic emotional engagement: ‘as one acts 
sympathetically toward another, one treats another as an end and not merely as a 
means’ (p. 45).  
Therefore, looking for signs of sympathy expressed by the participants as signs of 
respect, we could pay attention to a rich set of active verbs that they used to describe 
their experiences. To name a few: “discuss”, “share”, “combine”, “listen”, “reflect 
on”, “value”, “don’t insult” and “[don’t] laugh at”. All these acts are respectful and 
connote Sennett’s (2003) idea of the negotiation required by the self with others. This 
is a process “from the inside out”, aiming at ‘creating symmetry’ (Lawrence-
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Lightfoot, 2000, p.1) in our relationships that can promote a form of mutual respect or 
reciprocity. As argued by Sennett (2003), ‘mutuality requires expressive work. It must 
be enacted, performed’ (p. 59).  
The worth of respect is even greater if we concentrate on the meaning of 
Constantinos’ phrase: “Learning to respect, you … value the diversity. You learn to 
treat everyone well”. His perspective connects respect to what Sennett (ibid.) calls 
‘the psychology of autonomy’ (p. 262). According to his definition: 
Autonomy is not simply an action; it requires also a relationship in which 
one party accepts that he or she cannot understand something about the 
other. The acceptance, that one cannot understand things about another, 
gives both standing and equality in the relationship. Autonomy supposes at 
once connection and strangeness, closeness and impersonality (ibid., p. 
177).  
 
A case of autonomy within the drama course is described below by the course’s 
teacher and, afterwards, is discussed in a dialogue between the teacher and Philia. In 
The Odyssey, as the teacher comments, her expectations differed from the ideas that 
the students performed. As she notes:  
… The episode of Odysseus’ return to Ithaki really surprised me. All 
groups with only one exception adapted their scenarios and role-playing in 
a contemporary context. I expected them to travel back to Odysseus’ 
history and culture, given that we had explored them. But, they didn’t! … 
Penelope was indifferent with Odysseus and he was annoyed with Penelope 
due to the wooers. … Again, when Odysseus met his son, some students in 
role of Tilemachos were playing a video game or were studying for a 
driving test. … They appeared to enjoy their performances! Are there any 
hidden meanings, here? (7th Teacher’s diary, 14.11.2012 – Edus 326). 
 
Thus, in her conversation with Philia, the teacher tried to perceive the real motivations 
behind the surprising sequence of the students’ decisions.  
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A: (Smiling) I didn’t believe that you 
were a heartless Penelope. 
P: (Laughing) No, no, I am sensitive. We 
knew the right way, but we wanted to 
play … we expressed our worries. … 
We surprised you. 
A: (Smiling) You tested me that night, 
you know! I was trying to understand 
… why nearly all the students took the 
same road. 
P: (Smiling) We felt your surprise. But, I liked your attitude. You showed respect for 
our work. I would like to copy … that respect for my students as a future teacher. 
… Because in teaching, things sometimes don’t come as we expect, I believe this 
attitude helps us be ready to build on the pupils’ ideas (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
In all teaching the psychology of autonomy proves to be significant, particularly in the 
teaching of drama/theatre education, since it is dependent on the poetic use of 
imagination and metaphor. In these terms, the students build ‘new modes of 
understanding often accompanied by special aesthetic pleasures’ (Gibbs, 2008, p. 5) 
that may potentially result in unforeseen performances; in this sense, they can both 
surprise and challenge. The aesthetics of the students’ performances in the above 




Figure 6.33: “The heartless Penelope” 
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Friendship: “We really used to work like siblings”   
There are convincing indications that the kind of friendship observed in the courses is 
suggestive of Aristotelian friendship, which, in its wholeness, is a virtue-driven 
relationship. The participants from each course discussed friendship on the basis of a 
different nexus of virtuous dispositions. In particular, the participants of Theatre 
Education and Theatrical Play established friendships that harmonised with 
enjoyment, pleasure, comfort, spontaneity and originality. In Drama Education, 
however, the friendly bonds were perceived as the synergy between willingness, 
mutuality, unselfishness, uncompetitiveness, responsibility, empathy and love.  
Beginning with an examining of the aesthetics of friendship in Theatre Education and 
Theatrical Play, Maria-Eva’s following account gives a representative picture. 
“When we all used to sit together in 
the circle, I was feeling that we were a 
party drinking our coffee (smiling). It 
was the same thing! There wasn’t the 
thought, “I won’t say this, because the 
others may misjudge it”. Exactly, this 
was the thing that made me feel   
nicely, in the course” (Maria-Eva, 2nd 
Interview, 26.1.2013). 
Decoding Maria-Eva’s words, it is evident that she describes her course as a friendly 
space tantamount to ‘a domestic and intimate stage’ (Winston, 2010, p. 131), 
displaying a double recreational character. She essentially links friendship, on the one 
hand, with enjoyment and pleasure and, on the other hand, with the dispositions of 
Figure 6.34: “We were a party drinking 
our coffee” 
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comfort, spontaneity and originality. According to a previous reference to Johnstone’s 
(2007) work, the last three dispositions are those that can make an inspired artist be 
obvious, and, in consequence, in an analogous way, they may make a friend disclose 
his/her best self.  
These dispositions have been commented on in section 6.3.1.4 as key characteristics 
of the identity of Theatre Education and Theatrical Play. However, through the 
following statements their instrumentality in creating friendly bonds becomes more 
tangible. Maria-Eva and Odysseas confirm this likelihood, as follows:  
In the morning, before the beginning of the session, we used to share our 
thoughts and worries. In the case, we didn’t feel very well, we would say it 
in order to feel better and connect to the teaching (Maria-Eva, 2nd 
Interview, 26.1.2013). 
 
I treated very differently the guys, with whom I attended the course. When 
I was seeing them in other courses, I was feeling differently, in comparison 
with other students. I was remembering all those moments and the things 
we shared. … Yes, eh, it’s so different. Eh, I could feel that they were very 
close to me (Odysseas, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
 
A supplementary case from the drama course that reinforces the above role of 
comfort, spontaneity and originality – this time within play – is Philia’s next romantic 
story. She narrates: 
“I was Tarantula, Eleni was the king. I was trying to enter the palace. I showed my 
invitation, a false one, and the fairies didn’t let me go in. So, I bewitched them. Then, 
the king appeared and we had a very strong chemistry that moment, we looked at 
each other. It was amazing; we both said the same phrase, without any previous 
rehearsal: “The love never dies!” We hugged very tightly. We were both truly moved. 
The next day, we commented  on  our  experience. I  attended  and other courses  with  
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Eleni, but we never had this contact. It was the first time we were bound together … 
The same thing happened with other students of drama” (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
The important theme within Philia’s experience is that comfort, spontaneity and 
originality, as inherent features of role-playing, may act as influential dispositions in 
an actual friendship. In this regard, Schiller’s (1967) idea of “aesthetic necessity” 
might propose these dispositions as aesthetic necessities of friendly play. By this 
correlation, it means that they are driven by feelings – in this case, by a memorable 
love – that are apt to regulate the reactions and decisions of a true friendly bond.  
Turning our attention now towards the participants of the drama course, the practice 
of group microteaching is evidenced as a major source of friendship. It is the practice 
that clearly establishes Aristotle’s philosophical thought, κοινωνία γάρ η φιλία; that is, 
friendship is essentially a partnership (NE, 1171b33-1171b34). Construing this idea, 
Halpin (2009) describes friendship as ‘a mutual act in which both partners recognise 
Figure 6.35: “The love never dies” 
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each other’s goodwill, seeking to do what is right, not for one’s own sake, but for 
theirs’ (p. 93). This mutuality is the theme of the three narrations that follow.   
“We really used to work like siblings, independently of the time. Honestly, Angela, 
after our microteaching, outside of the classroom, we used to thank the other students 
for their support. “Guys, we thank you that you were there, gave to our teaching and 
had the strength for this long session; we thank you very much!” There were 
occasions, where, our teaching practices had finished after 21.00, but we all were 
willing to give the best of ourselves” (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).       
“In our microteaching, we had some gaps. We should have prepared more. Some of 
the activities should be better structured. Because we didn’t have some answers that 
we expected, I think, later on, we lost our way, in a sense. This didn’t happen with the 
microteaching of other groups. … An excuse I can refer is that all the other lessons 
were adapted for the pre-primary age. Our lesson was the only one designed for 
children of 11-12 years old. The transition was sudden and abrupt. …  
 
But, I have to say this thing. I was seeing my fellow students to try to help our 
teaching. … They didn’t see it competitively. In comparison with other courses, some 
students weren’t at all competitive. I mean, in other courses, they showed a very 
Figure 6.36: “We had some gaps” 
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competitive self. They cared only for themselves. In drama, they were forgetting this 
behaviour, their selfishness” (Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
“The big fault of our microteaching was plainly mine. In my attempt to have a good 
outcome as a team, I involved in the activity of my fellow student. In this way, the fault 
I did seemed to be Stefanos’ fault. I am particularly glad that I have the opportunity 
within my reflective diary to take the responsibility for this fault and please my 
teacher to reduce only my grade and not the grade of my fellow student. I also want to 
thank my fellow students, because I saw them to worry about our lesson, as if it was 
theirs” (Philia, 9th Reflective diary, 2.1.2013). 
Behind Philia’s and Stefanos’ syllogisms, we can straightforwardly get an insight into 
the “character-friendship” (Cooper, 1999, p. 321) developed in the drama course. This 
interconnection of friendship to ethos is the ground theory of Aristotelian friendship. 
According to Armstrong’s (2003) belief, this kind of friendship ‘entails a significant 
shift in the ordinary pattern of motivation’ (p. 109), creating a fresh vision of 
relationships beyond self-interest. In the case of the participants, this original sense of 
friendship is attested by the students’ other-regarding dispositions within a framework 
of partnership. Willingness, mutuality, unselfishness, uncompetitiveness 
responsibility and empathy are the dispositions that weave their friendship.  
Interestingly, speaking of friendship, Aristotle makes a nexus between φιλία 
(friendship) and love. Two of his typical phrases – ‘ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν [φιλία]’ 
(friendship is based on character) (ΝE, 1164a13) and ‘φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος’ (he was 
loved for his character) (ΝE, 1165b8) – confirm this tautology. However, φιλία, as the 
Greek equivalent word of friendship, is etymologically produced by the ancient verb 
φιλώ, that today ‘is substantially identical with the meaning of the verb, “love”’ 
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(Leontsini, 2009, p. 103). In his Platonic Studies (1981), Vlastos points out that 
‘“[l]ove” is the only English word that is robust and versatile enough to cover φιλεῖν 
and φιλία’ (p. 4). Conceptualising ‘friendship as [a] special case of interpersonal love’ 
(ibid.), then, ‘φίλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούµενος’, which means: the friend is 
the person who loves and is loved in same way (Rhetoric, 1381a1). Ultimately, to be a 
good friend, as Stefanos and Philia connote in their comments, is to wish another to 
experience ‘what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and 
being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about’ (ibid., 1380b35-1381a). 
6.4.1.2 Democratic virtues 
“It is democratic”: “I used arguments beyond stereotypes” 
Both the participants’ experiences and personal views are a powerful testimony to the 
development of the democratic virtues of isonomia, isegoria, isopsephia, parrhesia 
and autonomia (Neelands, 2009a). Regarding the virtue of parrhesia, the participants 
correlated it with the dispositions of freedom of expression and confidence, courage 
and decisiveness. Given that a basic prerequisite for the development of democratic 
virtues is the systematic participation in collective actions, it is therefore evidenced 
that the participants’ involvement in the dialogic practices of dialectic and rhetoric 
had a contributory role to this result. Critically, within the context of these two 
practices, the participants exercised a set of intellectual capacities and virtues, such as: 
synesis and gnōme, phronēsis and open-mindedness.  
In the following three excerpts, Philia and Maria-Eva denote the inherent dispositions 
of παρρησία (parrhesia) – the ethical obligation to speak your mind (ibid.) – and also, 
amplify its significance.   
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Παρρησία (I say my opinion with no fear or hesitation) is one of the 
greatest pedagogical virtues that drama can offer (Philia, Midterm 
examination paper, 28.11.2012). 
 
In Theatre Education and Theatrical Play the participants develop παρρησία 
and, at the same time, cooperation. Παρρησία is, namely, to be able to say 
your opinion freely, without scruples. Παρρησία can be developed because 
theatrical play is continually based on our thoughts and ideas (Maria-Eva, 
Midterm examination paper, 11.12.2012). 
 
It is very important for the pupils to be able to answer to a question not 
simply by “yes” or “no” but to explain their thoughts in depth. … 
Conscience alley is a convention that can assist pupils to develop their 
capacity of argumentation … they learn so to take their decisions and have 
the courage to say their opinion (Maria-Eva, 2nd Interview, 26.1.2013). 
 
It becomes easily perceptible that Philia and Maria define parrhesia as a “speech 
activity” (Foucault, 2001, p. 13) associated with the dispositions of freedom of 
expression and confidence, courage and decisiveness. This net of dispositions seems 
to be embedded in Foucault’s definition of parrhesia, since it is described as 
“frankness in speaking the truth” (ibid., p. 7). By defining parrhesia in this way, 
however, Foucault proves the influence of the initial semantics of the notion, as 
developed in Classical Greek philosophy. He is particularly inspired by Socrates, of 
whom he writes: he is the ‘parrhesiastic figure’ that ‘discloses the truth in speaking, is 
courageous in his life and in his speech, and confronts his listener’s opinion in a 
critical manner’ (ibid., p. 101).  
The group practical work, as a dynamic process of fostering the democratic virtues, is 
found to be intrinsically dependent on the methods of dialectic and rhetoric. This key 
remark is demonstrated in the next narration. 
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“The workshop The Wolf made me feel that behind the wolf’s character, our selves 
are hidden. … In one episode, I can say that my group spent a lot of time, discussing 
various ideas. We couldn’t decide whether our wolf would be good or bad. We were 5 
students and had this dilemma that basically is a dilemma of our everyday life. 
Personally, I had the opinion to make our wolf be good. But, I should persuade the 
others for this idea. It was difficult, due to the data we had. 
The wolf bit Red Riding Hood; there wasn’t 
any good sign. But, I wanted to give it a 
second chance. So I used arguments beyond 
stereotypes. For example, the wolf promised 
that he would change his lifestyle. … I 
remember we had a good discussion. We 
examined a lot of possible ideas. … Most of 
us were seeing the wolf as bad. Finally, we 
decided that our wolf could be good” (Philia, 
2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).   
The aesthetics of this deliberative conversation incite the discussion of two themes. 
Initially, despite the fact that parrhesia and autonomia – ‘the right to self-
determination’ (Neelands, 2009a, p. 183) – are more emphatic, the other three 
democratic virtues can also be observed to function in praxis. Seeing as the discussion 
is substantially a dialectic – a philosophical effort towards truth, resting on reasoning 
(Topics, 100a25-101a4) – the antilogies (disagreements and contradictions) noticed 
are a key sign of the activation of all the democratic virtues that are being examined. 
That is to say, this dilemmatic, long negotiation could not be feasible if the students 
 
Figure 6.37: Is it “good or bad”? 
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did not practise isonomia – ‘equality in respect of the law’ – isegoria – ‘the right to 
speak’ – and isopsephia – ‘equal representation’ (Neelands, 2009a, p. 183).  
Furthermore, in this dialogical discussion, the existence of conflicting logoi (reasons) 
is even more vital, as it is the base for the development of the art of rhetoric. As 
argued by Aristotle: ‘Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic’ (Rhetoric, 1354a1), 
where ‘[t]he modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of … [this] art’ (ibid., 
1354a5). Philia’s phrases, “I should persuade the others”, “It was difficult to do it” 
and “I used arguments beyond stereotypes”, exactly attest the mediation of dialectic in 
the exercise of the intellectual faculty of persuasion. In these terms, the wolf’s 
“character” might be defined as a rhetorical subject that requires, as Coelho (2013) 
claims, ‘the exercising of logos in the context of acting, in which a decision is 
required among possibilities’ (p. 93, italics original).   
In addition, according to the participants’ testimony, some of the theatrical techniques 
– such as conscience monologues, conscience alley and hot seating – proved 
instrumental in the strengthening of democratic virtues. In the next three narrations, it 
is evident that each convention helps the students learn to participate in a democratic 
dialogue.   
“Talking with its conscience, the self seems 
like it has two selves. You hear two voices and 
should take a decision. This is what happens 
in our daily life. Continually, we have 
dilemmas … and we speak to our 
consciousness until to conclude to a decision: 
“Is it right or false?”, “If I would do this, how 
  
Figure 6.38: Conscience 
monologues 	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things would  come?”, “Is  there  any other solution?” Before any final decision, you 
have the opportunity to see spherically the diverse thoughts, namely, the arguments 
you hear from others. In reality, it is difficult to take a definite decision. The technique 
is really very good, for, you feel that you have the freedom to decide. Also, it 
reinforces our critical thinking” (Maria, 2nd Interview, 25.1.2013).   
“It is democratic. … In conscience 
alley, we openly try to “push” the 
person, who walks through his/her 
conscience, using a lot of diverse 
arguments. We try to present 
polarised ideas. We all have the 
chance to say our opinion” 
(Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 
29.1.2013). 
 
“In hot seating, you have to decide your position, before the meeting. You mustn’t be 
very obvious about what you believe. Your answer is expressed with ambiguity. Every 
time you are asked, you may answer with conflicting views. … In this way, we provoke 
a strong discussion. And at the end, you don’t make so obvious your intentions” 





Figure 6.39: Conscience alley 
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One common feature of these theatrical conventions that boosts the cultivation of 
democratic virtues is the employment of public deliberation. Every participant is 
engaged in an energetic “speech activity”, by displaying his/her personal opinion, 
listening to others’ voices, imagining and exchanging possibilities, as well as taking 
decisions. The entirety of these energies suggests a democratic space, wherein ‘the 
political realm rises directly out of acting together’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 198). 
Given that central to these techniques is the practice of rhetoric, rested on a powerful 
brainstorm of arguments, a poetic decision-making process is created that allows the 
participants to exercise their intellectual capacities of synesis (understanding) and 
gnōme (good sense). According to Aristotelian ethics, synesis assists the self in 
making good judgments in unclear situations (NE, 1134a7-1134a9), while gnōme 
encourages the forgiveness of others and facilitates fair judgment (NE, 1134a19-
1134a24). The synergy of both assists the participants, helping to set in action the 
right decisions or establish the most convincing/tempting arguments. A consequence 
Figure 6.40: Hot seating 
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of this process is the enhancement of phronēsis, the intellectual virtue that indicates 
‘the outcome of good deliberation and the principle of virtuous behaviour’ (Coelho, 
2013, p. 100).  
Also important in this discussion about the potential of rhetoric is Constantinos’ 
notion that phronēsis can be cultivated along with open-mindedness. As he contends, 
this may happen because:  
Drama cultivates imagination. It helps you see a plurality of situations and 
to criticise them. You learn to take decisions of how to confront these 
situations. Then, you transfer this way of thinking in your personal life. 
Indeed, in our daily life, we face situations, for which, we are not ready to 
cope with. We learn to be open-minded (2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
 
In Sockett’s (2012) view, open-mindedness is an essential disposition for the handling 
of our beliefs, thoughts and decisions. Gadamer (1989) makes coherent its role, as he 
observes that a genuine dialogue ‘has little to do with a mere explication and assertion 
of our prejudices’, but rather ‘it risks our prejudices–it exposes oneself to one’s own 
doubt as well as to the rejoinder of the other’ (p. 26). So, his thesis shows that if we 
want to become open-minded, we must also be willing to risk displaying our closed-
mindedness.  
It follows that by acting together within a dialogic decision-making process, open-
mindedness comprises part of the formation of phronēsis, distancing us from ‘the lure 
of absolutism’ (Davies, 2006, p.18). ‘The attempt to do away plurality’, as Arendt 
(1958) asserts, ‘is always tantamount to the abolition of the public realm itself’ (p. 
220). In conclusion, participatory democracy, through the networks of giving and 
receiving that it constructs, encourages the development of civic virtues and habits, by  
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which one might resist the intellectual narrowness and the implicit risk of 
complacency (MacIntyre, 1999).  
6.4.2 Virtue Ethics of The Beautiful   
The scope of this category refers to the virtues of “soft beauty” (see Figure 3.2, p. 80), 
as articulated by Winston (2006a), which derive from the aesthetics of ‘charm, 
sentiment and comfort’ (p. 289). Among them, civility and playful laughter are the 
two virtues that gather strong clues for their development.  
6.4.2.1 Civility 
“It is the link” with dialogic virtues and also, “a sweet touch” 
The following analysis of civility is based on the insights of both Stefanos and Philia. 
Following Stefanos’ model of civility, we may conclude that it has the potential to 
pervade our social relationships with cooperation, trust, respect and democracy. From 
a different perspective, Philia exposes the “female face” of civility, indicating that it 
goes hand in hand with joy, good-heartedness and compassion. In both cases, it is 
suggested that the aesthetics of civility is a vital element of the good life of 
teaching/learning. 
The very specific model of civility created by Stefanos (see Figures 6.41a and 6.41b) 
can be characterised by the term eco-civility. In his Civility: A Cultural History 
(2009), Davetian uses eco-civility to determine the process of the interrelationship 
between civility and ethics that ‘posits no contradiction between loyalty to the well-
being of the self and loyalty to the well-being of other selves’ (p. 8). In the case of 
Stefanos, civility is connected to virtue ethics. An integrated overview of his model is 
exhibited in the following narration.   
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“I believe that all virtues converge towards one. Eh, this is civility. I think that when 
the teacher can promote civility and the children learn to be civil, the rest of the 
virtues may easier be developed. Namely, if there is civility in classroom, then, 
respect and trust can be also fostered. … Civility is not only observed verbally, but 
also through acts. Both can signify civility. That is to say, the way, with which 
children move in the space, the manners, with which they behave towards their 
classmates… eh, civility has a big spectrum…  
 
Civility creates a chain. I mean it is the link with other virtues. ... Civility is the link 
that can unite all virtues. … If you are civil, it means that you can cooperate with 
others. … To be civil, it means you are democratic, respectful and cooperative… 
 
Figure 6.41b: Stefanos’ model of civility in teaching/learning translated 
Figure 6.41a: Stefanos’ model of civility in teaching/learning 
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 It is within your course, I have understood civility in this way. It is the first time I am 
drawing these ideas. I could see that you teach by creating a civil climate. I think this 
is one reason that makes my fellow students like drama” (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
The above account illuminates the nature of civility in two ways. As illustrated, 
civility is a communicative virtue showing its presence both by verbal ‘rituals of 
civility’ – that ‘put abstract notions of mutual respect into practice’ (Sennett, 2012, p. 
5) – and acts of togetherness. Then, a civil presence has the ethical energy to create a 
dialogic space that brings cooperation, trust, respect and democracy together. This 
idea invites key views of the recent literature on civility. Shapin, in his A Social 
History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (1994), writes:  
Trust is, quite literally, the great civility. … A world-known-in-common is 
built up through acts of trust, and its properties are decided through the 
civil conversations of trusting individuals. The root of all civility and good 
manners is therefore the presumption of that basic perceptual competence 
and sincerity … The great civility, therefore, is granting the conditions 
which allow us to colonize our minds and expecting the conditions which 
allow us to colonize theirs (p. 36).  
 
In the above quote, it is evident that civility and trust are so closely interconnected 
that the first virtue may prepare those necessary situations for the establishment of the 
second. Likewise, the sociological theses of Sennett (2012) propound the intimate 
intertwining of civility with respect, as previously mentioned, as well as with 
cooperation. Given that his theory of civility is built on the rich and enlightening 
history of craftsmanship, he argues that it may open up new possibilities for active 
communication and pleasurable cooperation, because civility, as he suggests: 
made sense of how people in experiential, innovative workshops could best 
learn from one another, civility as an open, inquisitive discussion about 
problems, procedures and results ... Civility was the social frame our 
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Reformation ancestors put around lively communication. It remains a good 
frame (ibid., p. 127). 
 
Furthermore, by delineating the connection of civility to democracy, we are driven to 
an investigation of the etymology of civility, in parallel with that of its synonym: 
politeness. The roots of both words, as Davetian (2009) points out, show that civility 
and politeness ‘at their inception ... were used to signify good “citi-zenship”’ (p. 9). 
He elucidates that civility derives from the Latin civis (city) and politeness is 
originated from the Greek polis, also meaning “city” (ibid.). This sameness in origin 
helps us understand the classical meaning of civility and politeness, not only as:  
just acts of friendliness, but also [as] indications of how life is to be best 
lived in cities in which citizens are dependent on one another and the state 
for functional relations within complex social networks (ibid.).   
 
In School Literacy, Reasoning, and Civility: An Anthropologist’s Perspective (1984), 
Erickson maintains a similar position to Davetian’s interpretation. He defines civility 
as a ‘mutual commitment to participation in society, beyond the self’ (p. 534). 
Apparently, both hermeneutical perspectives may robustly support Stefanos’ idea that 
“[t]o be civil, it means to be democratic”. Civility therefore can serve democracy, 
framing the dialogical/social conditions of citizenship with respect and comfort. 
Comprehending the notion of eco-civility, we can therefore make certain of Stefanos’ 
key inference that the teacher’s civility is highly significant in teaching/learning. At 
this point, Philia’s thoughts come to further reinforce this assertion by highlighting 
that a civil atmosphere in the classroom is ‘an inherent dimension of learning tasks’ 
(ibid.). She illustrates: 
As I think, the sweetness that drama offered us, it affected us very much. ... 
l can speak of that sweet touch of the teacher, during the technique of 
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thought tracking. This touch shows the teacher’s attitude towards the 
students. That softness looked like, “Tell me your thoughts” (2nd Interview, 
30.1.2013). 
                            
In the breaks of the sessions, when we were going for a drink, we used to 
discuss this thing. We were saying that drama made us more sweet in our 
manners ... in the way, we were speaking and in the way, we were 
behaving. ... I remember in our microteaching, we forgot to bring coloured 
pencils and I was impressed by the students of another group, who gave us 
theirs, with all the joy of their soul. Truly, I feel that we have changed as 
human beings within drama (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).                              
  
Philia’s statements are, at first, remarkable due to the affective concepts she uses, 
such as “sweetness”, “softness” and “joy of … soul”, to show the 
communication/cooperation of the drama students. All of these feelings lead to a real 
sense of civility’s aesthetics. As Scarry (2001) affirms, ‘the sublime is male and the 
beautiful is female. … the beautiful is lively gaiety and cheer … compassionate and 
good hearted’ (pp. 83-84).  
The importance of Philia’s views stems from her clear perception that, in drama, both 
the application of conventions by the teacher and the practical/artistic work of the 
students are spaces wherein civility may be an internal good. In this way, the teacher 
is demonstrated to hold a decisive role in the creation of a civil, educational 
atmosphere and, as clearly witnessed by Philia, his/her civility per se may possibly 
turn out to be a contagious state. 
6.4.2.2 Playful laughter  
“It was a natural need” and “helped us be connected” 
As discussed in section 6.3.2.2, playful laughter was a key characteristic of the 
emotional space in the courses’ ecology. For the participants, it was a means that had 
the potential to help them overcome:  
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• Tiredness and academic routine; 
• Learning indifference and inattentiveness; 
• Stress and shyness; and 
• The sense of time.  
In view of this range of potentials, playful laughter could be described as an essential 
source of the participants’: 
• Cheerfulness and gaiety;  
• Humour and optimism; 
• Artistic experimentation; and 
• Concentration and memory boosting. 
These recreational dimensions of playful laughter give obvious evidence of its 
intimacy with the ethics of the beautiful, and therefore reasonably render it as a virtue. 
Manifestly, this outlook contradicts the ‘misguided belief’ that ‘laughter is not a 
serious activity’ (Gordon, 2014, p. 2). Writing in the 1980s, humour theorist Morreall 
(1983) commented that ‘until a few years ago, the study of laughter was treated in 
academic circles as frivolous’ (p. 9).  
In the context of this analysis, given the participants’ experiences, playful laughter is 
introduced by a new spectrum of particularities that basically substantiate its social 
outcomes. Thus, the major finding here chimes with Hertzler’s (1970) central thesis 
that laughter ‘is a social phenomenon. It is social in its origin, in its processual 
occurrence, in its functions, and in its effects’ (p. 28). This social theory of laughter is 
apparent in all of the participants’ opinions that follow. 
Laughter was making us feel psychologically better and was helping us 
relax. ... Our laughter was showing that we all were living the same thing. 
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In our performances we used to put humour and create a pleasant climate. 
... It is part of the magic of the course (Stefanos, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
       
If students weren’t laughing, this might signify that they weren’t enjoying 
their work or something else was going wrong. It might signify that they 
were absent. Also, the teacher could be responsible for the absence of 
laughter. Definitely, many things might be at fault. Both the role of the 
teacher and the mood of the student are very crucial factors. ... Of course, if 
there wasn’t laughter in drama, the course would tend to be the same with 
the other courses. The laughter was a significant reason that made us want 
to repeat the course (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013).  
 
The laughter of my fellow students was a good response to our 
performances. When I was seeing them laugh, then, I was truly feeling that 
“I have succeeded, I have done it and we laugh”. Our laughter was 
spontaneous. It was a natural need. It helped us create close relationships 
both with you and our fellow students (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
 
Laughter had value, since it made the sessions not tiring. It helped us be 
present. ... When we were laughing, we were feeling closer to each other. 
We were feeling bonded. This meant that we could understand each other 
(Maria-Eva, 2nd Interview, 26.1.2013).  
 
The atmosphere seemed very playful because of laughter. It was an 
encouragement and also, an incentive for work. ... Laughter creates a 
climate of pleasure. ... It is helpful, for it makes you feel more comfortable 
with the others. You don’t feel pressure and it offers you the good mood. ... 
Personally, I feel well, when I am with persons, who are cheerful and 
jocund (Maria, 2nd Interview, 25.1.2013). 
 
It was making us feel comfort and the freedom to dare to do things. ... 
Moreover, laughter helped us be connected. ... It is very important for the 
teacher to achieve this association among the pupils. I think, no other 
course could develop these attitudes to a greater extent than Theatre 
Education and Theatrical Play (Odysseas, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013).  
 
In these quotes, playful laughter is clearly being exposed as a powerful ally of 
dialogic pedagogy, since its psychological liveliness significantly promotes the 
dispositions/virtues of the ensemble: togetherness, cooperation, trust and friendship. 
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Its key aesthetic dispositions, as they emerge from the participants’ experiences, are: 
spontaneity, naturality, comfort, companionship and pleasure. In his Humor and 
Laughter: An Anthropological Approach (1985), Apte corroborates that ‘laughter 
occurs when people are comfortable with one another, when they feel open and free. 
And the more laughter, the more bonding within the group’ (p. 53).  
This social contribution of playful laughter can be further underpinned by empirical 
studies that have investigated the social interactions of laughter (Chapman, 1983; 
Chapman & Foot, 1995; Gordon, 2014; Provine, 1992; Provine & Fischer, 1989). As 
argued by Provine (1992), while laughter is predominantly a social behaviour that 
ordinarily occurs in social situations, it can ‘support the ecological validity of the 
laugh-evoked-laughter effect’ (p. 3). He also underscores that laughter is a contagious 
phenomenon that ‘among friends may enhance social cohesion and “in group” 
feeling’ (ibid.). A resonant position is supported by Gordon (2014), who infers: ‘the 
point is simply that humor and laughter can help facilitate the development of 
intimacy in friendships and other close relationships’ (p. 67, italics original). 
Regarding the pleasure that stems from playful laughter, Winston (2013) argues that it 
is an emotional dynamic, observable in the drama classroom, when the participants 
cooperate with respect and reciprocity, building a feeling of harmony. In this light, he 
indicates pleasure as an inherent value of the ensemble that is ‘part of a social ideal of 
beauty’ (p. 138). On the other hand, the same assertion formulated both by 
Constantinos and Odysseas that the teacher is responsible for creating a playful 
laughter-based classroom environment is also amplified by Winston (2009), who 
advocates:  
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[A]s drama educators in our attempts to inquire with our students into how 
the world is and in our imagining with them how it ought to be … laughter 
can help with this task, and it can do so at all levels of schooling (p. 41).  
 
A last significant observation about the participants’ playful laughter arises from their 
comments on the Laban Movement Workshop. In brief, this workshop was 
constructed upon Laban’s approaches, wherein the students had the opportunity to 
explore how to use the space and their body under given social circumstances, both 
individually and collectively (see Figure 6.42). Although they found the activities 
“motivating”, “intelligent” and “inspiring”, nevertheless they highlighted the absence 
of laughter as an essential difference in relation to their courses’ culture. Two such 
typical views are these: 
The workshop we had … offered us new knowledge and experiences. I 
understood that the work of an actor … is not so simple … needs a lot of 
practice. I also liked that we were asked to use our own experiences. … 
This lesson was beautiful too, but we didn’t have a lot of humour and 
laughter (Constantinos, 10th Reflective diary, 20.12.2012).  
 
I felt like an actress in that workshop. I discussed it with a friend, who 
attends theatre studies … I can remember some of those techniques. Of 
course, some of them are variations of drama techniques. It was enjoyable, 
although we didn’t have fun, as we usually did (Philia, 2nd Interview, 
30.1.2013). 
 
Figure 6.42: Laban Movement Workshop 
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“[F]un”, “humour” and “laughter” were the elements that were missing from the 
workshop, as Constantinos and Philia declare. This allegation permits us to defend 
playful laughter as ‘a reliable, potent, and entertaining classroom demonstration’ 
(Provine, 1992, p. 3). So, playful laughter with its charming liveliness is not easy to 
be ignored by those who empirically know its social beauty in teaching/learning. 
6.4.3 Virtue Ethics of Will  
Persistence and courage are at the crux of this discussion. In Chapter 2 (see Figure 
2.1, p. 45), these virtues have been explored as the potential learning outcomes of an 
epistemological approach to teaching. As they both belong to the ethics of will, their 
development results from the practice of commitment (Sockett, 2012). 
Their analysis rests upon two criteria, the first of which is their operation as 
“corrective” virtues (Roberts, 1984; Steutel, 2005). Although persistence and courage 
are intellectual virtues (Roberts & Wood, 2007), according to Foot’s (1978) 
Aristotelian thesis, they can be evaluated in a similar way to the ethical virtues, 
because as ‘corrective, each one stands at a point at which there is some temptation to 
be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good’ (p. 8, italics original). 
Likewise, Steutel (2005) contends that the virtues of will ‘[w]ithout exception … can 
be regarded as corrective of contrary inclinations’ (p. 131).  
The second criterion is the motivation by which they are practised. Roberts (1984) 
appraises this factor as foremost for the growth of the virtues of will. For this reason, 
he describes them as ‘substantive and motivational’ (p. 228). Explicating the logic of 
the use of these characterisations, he highlights that the virtues of will are ‘the 
psychological embodiment of ethical rules–the substance of ethical patterns of 
behavior and judgment and emotion’ (p. 229). 
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6.4.3.1 Persistence 
“The “want” is above the “must” … I love what I do and I want to do it”  
As a distinctive virtue of will, persistence is devoted to endeavour, determination and 
undertaking, with a view to fulfilling an ethical aim. Its key attribute, as Sockett 
(1988) affirms, ‘is the notion of effort as striving’ (p. 195) that ‘carries with it the 
assumption of a context of difficulty–under some description’ (p. 199). In answer to 
question of what motivates people to exercise their persistence, Roberts and Wood 
(2007) identify four basic reasons: attraction, desire, concern and attachment.  
Taking into account both this theory and the above two criteria of the virtues of will, 
three participants can be seen as obvious cases of persistence. In the first instance, 
Constantinos’ persistence can be depicted as a bridge between his conscious work and 
progress. His willingness to persist in becoming better emerges from his obviously 
positive attitude towards drama. As is clear in the following two indicative excerpts, 
his persistence functioned in a twofold way: it helped him realise his capabilities and 
develop his self-knowledge.      
In drama, I see a new side of myself that I didn’t know. I thank you for this 
opportunity. I like how we explore Odysseus’ life. The most interesting 
activity for me was the dramatisation of Odysseus’ dreams. Possibly, I was 
not as good as I would like to be, but I can say that I tried and this is the 
most important for me (It’s not only the destination the most important 
thing, but the journey towards it ) (6th Reflective diary, 12.11.2012).   
 
I have also said it at the beginning. This is the only course that motivated 
my interest and I liked it. … Drama is not easy, but the students can learn 
through it. When somebody works, he/she slowly-slowly can improve. … 
We used to work as we could and as much as we could (2nd Interview, 
29.1.2013). 
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Maria is the second case of persistence. In the dialogue that follows, it is evident that 
she recognises persistence as an instrumental virtue (Hare, 1981) that reinforced her 
“self-confidence” and “optimism”. At the end of the course, her persistence also 
offered her “joy” and a feeling of “repose”. Her attachment to the course is 
demonstrated as her biggest motivation. However, a more detailed picture of her 
motivations is illustrated within the dialogue, below.   
A: You said that in the sessions you were alert. Can you explain a little more? 
M: Yes, Theatre education does not leave you to get away. You are there. It is like 
somebody whispers: “Do it, try it and something good will result”. … You enter in 
this process; you try, endeavour and then, perform your work in front of the others. 
A: How did you find yourself at the beginning and at the end of the sessions? 
M: At first, I thought: “I am Maria and will try to improve myself. There is no reason 
to feel stressed”. But, at the end of the course, I felt joy, I was too much joyful. 
(Smiling) I felt optimism and repose. 
A: Which things made you feel like this? 
M: I realised that I learnt a lot of things that I used in our final work and the result 
was good. I was persisting with myself. I said: “I will do it and will succeed”. … 
All these have elevated my self-confidence. … I was spellbound by the course (2nd 
Interview, 25.1.2013).  
In addition, Maria’s views give us food for further consideration of alertness in 
correlation with persistence. This is denoted as an auxiliary quality of persistence, as 
it can keep someone intellectually active. In these terms, persistence and alertness 
undergo a close interrelationship, which means that both might be outlined as virtues 
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of the will. Such a perspective is argued by Sockett’s analysis in Education and Will: 
Aspects of Personal Capability (1988), as follows:  
I am categorizing qualities of will as qualities of endeavor, heed, and 
control. Determination and such other qualities as persistence, 
perseverance, and doggedness seem characteristic qualities of endeavor. 
Carefulness, concentration, conscientiousness, and other qualities, such as 
vigilance and deliberation, I regard as qualities of heed (p. 199). 
 
Given this taxonomy, alertness can be encompassed in the family virtues of heed that 
apparently belongs in the virtue ethics of will. Alertness and persistence can 
accordingly be regarded as sister virtues of the will.   
Studying the third case – that of Stefanos – his thoughts come to confirm some of the 
aspects of persistence that have been previously highlighted, while also introducing 
some new aspects focused on the idea of pleasure. In the next three excerpts, not only 
is his personal persistence noticeable, so too is that of his fellow drama students.         
From session to session, I see both my fellow students and myself to think 
with more nimbleness and greater felicity (4th Reflective diary, 
30.10.2012). 
 
Drama keeps all the guys vigilant. This helps them … they aren’t shy and 
they enjoy what they do (10th Reflective diary, 18.12.2012). 
  
We liked doing funny and subversive performances. … Drama makes you 
work, not because you have to, but because you want to work. It gives the 
students many opportunities and the students are strengthened, so that, the 
“must” is absent. The “want” is above the “must” … I love what I do and I 
want to do it. As I told you previously, I believe that in drama, nobody was 
working simply to take a good mark. We showed that we wanted to 
discuss, to be protagonists, to try new things. All these meant, “want”. … 
All my fellow students used to be cheerful and endeavour continually. … I 
can say for myself that in some other courses, I don’t work with my soul. I 
just try to take a mark and that’s all. By contrast, in drama, I didn’t work 
having in my mind the marks. … I believe that for this subject, your own 
stance was decisive. You weren’t showing us that you were thinking about 
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marks. … You weren’t stressing us. Basically, it is important to live drama 
(2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
 
Two critical themes are central to Stefanos’ observations. First, the notions of 
“nimbleness”, “felicity” and “vigilance”, attribute to persistence an added intellectual 
power. In drawing upon the previous reference to Sockett’s (ibid.) theory of the 
virtues of will, they are qualities that disclose both a high level of concentration and 
an intense conscientiousness. It might then be inferred, once again, that persistence 
cooperates closely and coherently with heed in the process of teaching/learning.  
The second issue addresses the intriguing philosophical spirit of Stefanos through 
which he speaks of persistence. The main idea he elaborates is a non-utilitarian 
persistence, tantamount to an eagerness for learning and a passionate commitment. 
Tracing both his analytical thinking and sentimental expressions leads to a tacit 
assertion that learning through drama equates with pleasure. As he reflects on the 
motivations of his fellow students’ persistence, it is unambiguous that he gives no 
significance to external awards such as marks or grades. Instead, he focuses solely on 
strong emotions of willpower: “The “want” is above the “must” … I love what I do 
and I want to do it”. The nature of his willpower actually appears as desire and love, 
both traits of beauty (Winston, 2013). His case proves that ‘learning to love can 
stimulate a desire to know and a passion to learn’ (ibid., p. 137). In this way, the 
deontological is transformed into the ethical and ‘pleasure’ becomes ‘opposed to 
duty’ (Winston, 2011, p. 584).  
The idea of connecting persistence to desire, love and inner gratification – “I … work 
with my soul” – prompts the Aristotelian ideal of emotional pleasure through virtues. 
The following quotation is an example of this ethics: 
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And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling 
of pleasure is an experience of the soul, and a thing gives a man pleasure in 
regard to which he is described as “fond of” so-and-so: for instance a horse 
gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theatre, and 
similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice, and acts 
conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue (NE, 1099a8-
1099a12). 
 
Pleasure, in this sense and within such contexts, can be seen as an inseparable quality 
of aretaic life. As Aristotle’s logic is typically perspicacious, it sustains that ‘the man 
who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not a good man at all’ (NE, 1099a17-
1099a18).  
6.4.3.2 Courage 
“If I was alone, I couldn’t dare” 
Yes, eh, the student decides in agreement with his/her group. I regard, the 
self-confidence that the student obtains through this process is very 
important. Eh, certainly, self-confidence can be obtained, when the other is 
free to be his/her self and act as himself/herself, without having someone to 
imply what is right or wrong. At the end, the only thing that he/she has is a 
big applause... So, he/she doesn’t hesitate what to do and how to do it. 
He/she freely presents his/her self, puts his/her imagination and does 
his/her performance (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
 
Beyond a few key epistemological and methodological elements of the drama/theatre 
education courses, this introductory paragraph presents two concepts closely bound 
up with the virtue of courage: freedom and self-confidence. Both, as argued by 
Sockett (2012) in Chapter 2, are indispensable preconditions for the enhancement of 
courage. Based on Nussbaum’s (1997) thesis that real courage demands freedom, he 
suggests that a courageous act is a manifestation of intellectual freedom. However, 
self-confidence is exposed as a result of personal endeavour, since courage 
presupposes taking risks with ideas, challenges and commitments.  
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Among the participants, Constantinos and Maria are, once again, typical cases of 
courage. We might first track their courage through the indications presented both in 
section 6.3.2.3 of the previous subchapter and the analysis of persistence. Recalling 
some of their characteristic statements from section 6.3.2.3, respectively they point 
out: “I didn’t know that I could do it. But, later, I dared a lot of things. I had the 
courage to play various roles” (p. 179) and “I could see myself improving in the 
practical work. Yes, I was surprised with myself” (pp. 179-180). Their next views 
chiefly disclose two aspects of their courage: its nature and the motivations needed for 
its exercise.    
The jocundity and cooperation helped me overcome myself and become 
better. If I was alone, I couldn’t dare. If I didn’t feel comfortable with the 
guys, definitely, I couldn’t dare to get out of myself. Yes, group work and 
persistence helped me a lot (Maria, 2nd Interview, 25.1.2013).   
 
I think, in this session, I was better. I wasn’t so shy as the previous two 
sessions. … The cooperation … and the fact that the students take the role 
of the teacher are reinforcing factors for the student (Constantinos, 3rd 
Reflective diary, 21.10.12).  
 
I observe that I can be like my fellow students and not be shy for what I 
perform. When I was a pupil, I didn’t like taking part in the ceremonies; I 
was crying; I was too shy (Constantinos, 4th Reflective diary, 28.10.12).  
 
I could teach drama. I think I can manage to do a good lesson, not a perfect 
one, but I could do it! (Constantinos, 11th Reflective diary, 21.12.2012).  
 
Both participants attest that the process of becoming courageous assists in going 
against the grain. Their cases chime directly with Sockett’s (1993) description of 
courage as a virtue that indicates how a person, ‘often selflessly, behaves in difficult 
and adverse circumstances that demand the use of practical reason and judgment in 
pursuit of long-term commitments that are … [ethically] desirable’ (p. 74). 
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Both the feeling of shyness and the challenges of the course’s practical work were the 
prime causes of these two participants’ personal fears, and it was these that they found 
the courage to confront. These fears are included in Robert and Wood’s (2007) list of 
potential fears that a person might face up to through courage. Accordingly: 
We sometimes fear knowledge–for example, self-knowledge, knowledge of 
criticism … of our own works, and knowledge of facts that are painful to 
us. We fear others disagreeing with us; we fear challenges to our views; we 
fear looking bad in front of our colleagues and students (p. 219). 
 
Summing up their motivations, then, – “group work”, “cooperation” and “jocundity” 
as well as the “persistence” and commitment of “driving” the lesson – are the major 
reasons for their engagement in courageous energies. This motivation-based context 
basically reiterates the ethical value of the ‘ensemble-building experience’ (Neelands 
& Nelson, 2013, p. 27) model of teaching/learning. It is this approach that can 
develop those ensemble-building dispositions/virtues vital for courage, such as 
togetherness, trust, safety, responsibility and autonomia. However, the instrumentality 
of these dispositions/virtues is even more powerful in the case of courage, because 
they can transform it from an intellectual virtue into an ethical one. As elucidated by 
Sockett (2012), when courage develops into a ‘stable virtue’, it becomes ‘part of the 
individual’s character’ (p. 137).  
6.4.4 Virtue Ethics of Consciousness  
6.4.4.1 Self-knowledge 
“Drama cultivates emotion, ethos and aesthetics” 
This phrase of Philia’s (7th Reflective diary, 17.11.2012) is strong evidence of the 
impact of drama work on consciousness. Greene (1978) makes clear that acts of 
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consciousness, like ‘imagining, intuiting, remembering, believing, judging, 
conceiving, and (focally) perceiving’ (p. 14), are the ones that connect our self with 
the world. Central to the ethics of consciousness is self-knowledge, the virtue that 
gathers the understanding of “who we are” and, therefore, determines self-identity. 
Some of the necessary dispositions for the expansion of self-knowledge are self-
critique, truthfulness and impartiality (Sockett, 2012).  
Self-knowledge, as a self-consciousness-driven process, can at the same time be 
identified as a willpower-driven process, inasmuch as self-criticism requires 
determination, vigilance and courage. Sockett (ibid.) justifies this intimacy of 
consciousness and will by pointing out that ‘the virtue of self-knowledge is critical’ if 
we ‘develop the will to pursue those desires and values’ by committing ourselves 
suitably to our beliefs and to our actions (p. 140).  
The participants’ self-knowledge is displayed as an important virtue of their aretaic 
development within the courses. Its examination has been conducted on the basis of a 
common scope and, for this reason, will be discussed in two clusters. The first brings 
together the self-knowledge of the female participants that is featured as a 
“corrective” virtue of ethos. The second cluster assembles the self-knowledge of the 
male participants that primarily emerges as a “self-building” virtue related to their 
professional development. The next three narrations represent the first case of self-
knowledge.    
… Self-knowledge, on the other hand, is one additional element of drama. 
It helps the students shape their character and personality through a positive 
way. … I can confess that drama not simply made me understand its 
importance in teaching, but also, it helped me change my character. The 
truth is that, in many times, in front of my life dilemmas I used theatrical 
techniques, in order to take a decision. Hot seating is one of the techniques 
that helped me face various questions that troubled me. 
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Moreover, I have changed my stance to others. Before, I used to hurry to 
decide, whether I agree or disagree with my interlocutor and I was absolute 
with my theories. The sessions of drama have taught me the virtues of 
patience and perseverance. Within group work and also, as a spectator of 
the other groups’ work, I understood that the message that somebody wants 
to transmit, ultimately, might possibly appear at the end-end of his/her 
performance; I owe it to wait and give my attention until the end, because, 
there were many cases, where my fellow students created a new sense, a 
new perception and a new outlook on things, just the moments before the 
end (Philia, Midterm examination paper, 28.11.2012).  
 
… I feel that the experiences that I have obtained within theatre education 
have influenced my life. Now, I can say that I think differently; I believe 
that I can face things with a greater maturity. The emotions that I have 
lived through in the course and the whole work, generally, made me more 
positive for life (Maria, Midterm examination paper, 11.12.2012).  
 
… Theatre education helped me become more open. Because the theatrical 
play depends on spontaneous thoughts and ideas, I have learnt to be alert 
and more self-confident to participate. Generally, now, I am a more social 
person than before (Maria-Eva, Midterm examination paper, 11.12.2012). 
 
While the female participants indicate self-knowledge as an access to their ethical 
correctness, this could therefore be described as an inner process that attains to adjust 
bad habits to a new aesthetics of dispositions. Within the context of the courses’ 
ecology, as attested, Philia learnt to face her egocentric stances with more respect for 
others; Maria became aware of her immature way of thinking about life, transforming 
it into a more “positive” one; and Maria-Eva changed her social attitudes, becoming 
more sociable and friendly. It is evident that in this process of transformation, the 
self’s beliefs alter (Sockett, 2012). Thus, self-knowledge equates to self-discovery.  
Such a vision exhibits self as learning (ibid.), denoting that the history of self is a 
continuous process of constituting. It ‘can never be exhausted for us by what we are’, 
as Taylor (1989) stresses, ‘because we are always also changing and becoming’ (p. 
47, italics original). Socrates’ wisdom echoes here, reminding us that ‘the unexamined 
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life is not worth living for a human being’ (Apology, 38a6 cited in West, 1979). As he 
believes, the self experiences a degree of ignorance, the boundaries of which can be 
limited through self-knowledge (ibid.). As Smith (1976) argues: 
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form 
any judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, 
from our own natural station, and endeavor to view them as at a certain 
distance from us. But we can do this in no other way than endeavoring to 
view with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view 
them (p. 203). 
 
Interestingly, the last allegation in Smith’s quote agrees with MacIntyre’s (1999) 
thesis that self-knowledge is “a shared achievement” (p. 95). That is to say, it is a 
socially contextualised virtue. As he explains, ‘self-ascriptions of the identity’ (ibid., 
p. 94) are customarily affected by the social environment, given that: 
our self-knowledge too depends in key part upon what we learn about 
ourselves from others, and more than this, upon a confirmation of our own 
judgments about ourselves by others who know us well, a confirmation that 
only such others can provide (ibid., p. 94). 
 
Turning our attention to the second case of self-knowledge, the above theory is still 
observable. This is because the male participants’ opinions of their self are 
constructed within specific social circumstances that, subsequently, turn out to be an 
important origin of their pedagogical perspectives. Below, their narrations help us 
picture an integrated view of their process of self-knowledge. 
The pedagogical value of theatre education is proven to be great. It is the 
magic key to unlock the emotions of the inexpressive students and the 
talkativeness of the shy ones … The lonely student finds the feeling of 
collectiveness and can speak of his/her fears and worries with no hesitation.   
I can understand better the course, because it depends on live pictures. … I 
remember, when I was a little boy, I had all the fairytales in videos, for I 
did not like reading books. I used to see the pictures and narrate my stories. 
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 … I wasn’t a good pupil. I remember the diagrams of my mother to 
understand the Mathematics or History. … As I was the firstborn son of 
two doctors, I wasn’t the best example of my family. … The results of the 
diagnoses showed that I had not any pathological symptoms; I was just a 
lazy pupil.   
But, this assumption was the real truth or I needed a different kind of 
teaching? From my previous experiences in the school, I saw a lot of 
children like my case. … Now, I can understand that they are not “twits”, 
but they simply need something different in teaching that may attract them. 
… So, I believe that within theatre education these children can be 
advantaged. We as new teachers have to show the dynamics of this 
teaching tool (Odysseas, 4th Reflective diary, 22.10.2012). 
 
Within the first four sessions of drama, I have started understanding aspects 
of myself that I did not know. Now, I see that I can think more critically 
than before and cooperate with my fellow students in a good climate. I can 
improvise and play roles. I believe that until the end of the semester, I will 
become better and will not be shy; I will be in the position to give 100% of 
my potential. … 
I believe that I can use this knowledge to become better, both for myself 
and the children. I owe it to become better for the children whom I will 
have to teach. I would like to apply this teaching method, by which 
learning may be more interesting (Constantinos, 4th Reflective diary, 
28.10.2012).      
 
The joint and critical remark on these participants’ self-knowledge is that it is stated 
as a platform for their professional ethics. As they claim, their new sense of self, 
acquired through the given epistemology of the courses (e.g., improvisation, role-
playing and cooperation), considerably influenced their pedagogical theory of what 
makes good teaching. Specifically, recognising his personal history as a pupil, 
Odysseas came to the conclusion that theatre education can make a difference to the 
school life of the “inexpressive” and hesitant student. On the other hand, 
Constantinos’ awareness of the impact of drama on his ethos reinforced his perception 
that drama is a “method” that enables learning to “be more interesting”.  
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Furthermore, Constantinos’ central thesis, “I can use this knowledge to become 
better… I owe it to become better for the children”, brings to this discussion the 
subject of teacher-identity. Additionally, Odysseas’ words, “I saw a lot of children 
like my case. … Now, I can understand that they simply need something different in 
teaching”, also advocate the notion that teacher-identity is simultaneously a matter of 
self-identity (Higgins, 2011; Kristjánsson, 2011; Rodgers & Raider-Roth, 2006; 
Sockett, 2012). When the teachers’ self-knowledge is rooted in ‘conceptions of the 
good and the welfare of others’, as Hargreaves (1994) asserts, then ‘important … 
ethical benefits can be gained … [within] the micropolitical realities of the 
organizations in which they operate’ (p. 72).  
This theory of teacher-identity-construction, in essence, suggests that the self as a 
person and as a teacher has a unity. According to Sockett’s (2012) cohesive thesis, 
this view exists: 
Because it is the case that the “person” is ontologically prior to the “role”, 
and our virtues are rooted in each of us as persons, though they are 
manifest in the different roles we have in life–teacher, parent, spouse–but 
the different actions in each role stem from my self qua person (p. 156).  
 
In Kristjánsson’s (2011) view, such a theory appears ‘provocative, as it may seem in 
our fractured times’ (p. 122). Nevertheless, it does in fact concur with the Aristotelian 
regard, as formulated by Campbell (2003): ‘professional … ethics is nothing but the 
extension of everyday … ethics into the nuances of professional practice’ (p. 12). 
Manifestly, following this model of professionalism, teachers as ‘[ethical] agents are 
always acting: sometimes they act simply as persons, sometimes as persons in certain 
roles or capacities’ (Downie, 1971, p. 133).  
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6.4.5 Concluding Remarks 
This subchapter has described the participants’ personal aretaic development within 
the courses. The ecology of each course, as found, enabled them to exercise a 
diversity of interpersonal and intrapersonal virtues. From the data in Figure 6.43, we 
can see the four key types of virtue ethics that the participants developed in relation 
to: dialogue, the beautiful, will and consciousness. Each type of virtue ethics is 
framed by a nexus of virtuous dispositions and therefore, as evidenced, their 
functionality per se indicates a separate ecological entity. 
One first, simple example of the ecological continuity of each kind of virtue ethics is 
the dialogic ethical virtues of sympathy and empathy. As attested by the cases of the 
participants, the first virtue has been indicated as a necessary prerequisite for the 
creation of respectful bonds, whereas the second has been found to have an 
instrumental role in the building of friendship/love. A second indicative instance is 
the virtues of the beautiful – civility and playful laughter – whose practice is 
inextricably linked with the ensemble-building virtues of cooperation and trust. The 
idea of ecology exists even in the ethics of consciousness, although the emphasis is 
solely on the virtue of self-knowledge. Here, we can speak of an extrinsic ecological 
synergy. In this regard, the fostering of self-knowledge, as shown in Figure 6.43, 
depends significantly on the virtues of will.  
These inter-relationships among the different kinds of virtue ethics are, however, 
apparent in a few of other cases. Willingness and responsibility, as the characteristic 
preconditions of persistence and courage, are correspondingly both demonstrated as 
intimately correlated to the social virtue of friendship/love. Likewise freedom, as a 
fundamental  requirement for  the  exercise  of courage, is simultaneously essential for   
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Figure 6.43: The participants’ aretaic development 
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the activation of the democratic virtue of parrhesia. In addition, respect and 
togetherness, which belong to the ethical virtues of dialogue, are proven as integral to 
the virtues of the beautiful. One last instance is concentration that, as an intellectual 
virtue of will, is confirmed as necessarily energetic in the process of playful laughter. 
What can ultimately be perceived is that these networks of intra-relationships and 
inter-relationships of virtue types state the function of an ecosystem. This idea clearly 
denotes that the development of a virtue is not achieved in isolation from other 
dispositions/virtues, but each one turns out to be a scaffold for the others.  
Apart from the nature of the operation of virtues, a second critical theme arises from 
the preceding analysis concerning their epistemology. The supporting condition of the 
courses’ ecology that has been proven as a virtue-guided condition is: the 
practical/artistic work constructed both on epistemic and technical knowledge of 
drama/theatre education. The cultivation of virtues therefore presupposes, as Carr 
(2005) corroborates, the ‘practical experience’ that ‘is a key component of practical 
knowledge or wisdom … we learn to be honest or courageous much as a craftsman 
improves by practice’ (p. 152). In light of the courses’ practical work, the 
development of ethical and intellectual virtues becomes pragmatically feasible, 
because the teaching/learning space is inherently focused on three fundamentals: (1) 
the ‘control of potentially destructive selfish and anti-social tendencies’ (ibid.), 
through ensemble-based experiences that are conducive to the development of social 
harmony, pleasure and beauty, (2) the fostering of sensibilities for the feelings of 
others in and out of role-playing and (3) the promotion of artistic creativity and 
technical knowledge regarding the teaching of drama/theatre education. 
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6.5 DESCRIBING THE PARTICIPANTS’ ARETAIC PEDAGOGY 
Given that this analysis is mostly connected to the ‘practical’ phase of the study (see 
Figure 5.1, p. 113), the sub-question that holds a central place here is: To what extent 
did the participants apply a virtue-centred pedagogy in their teaching practices of 
drama/theatre education? This question essentially focuses on the pedagogical virtues 
– epistemic, technical and ethical – that the participants practised in their teaching as a 
consequence of their attendance on the drama/theatre education courses. Within this 
very specific scope, both the design phase and action phase of their teaching comprise 
the entire body of this analysis. Table 6.1 outlines the basic elements of each teaching, 
including: (1) the school, (2) the class and the number of pupils, (3) the time of 
teaching, (4) the subject area, (5) the theme and the story (6) the key learning 
objectives, (7) the theatrical techniques/games and (8) the resources.  
6.5.1 The Design Phase: An Aesthetics of Child-centred Dispositions 
As is typically the case in all teaching, at the crux of its pre-action phase is the 
preparation of the lesson plan. As defined by Stenberg and Horvath (1995), ‘the 
lesson plan or agenda’ is ‘[o]ne important form of schematically organized teaching 
knowledge’, integrating ‘knowledge of content to be taught with knowledge of 
teaching methods’ (p. 11). Focusing on the design of a drama/theatre education 
lesson, the pedagogical knowledge required is framed by the art form of theatre 
(Neelands, 1984, 2009b; O’Neill, 1995, 2006b). According to Bowell and Heap 
(2005), this planning phase goes along with a quadripartite thinking that responds to 
four interrelated roles: playwright, director, actor and teacher. This thought process 
also functions during the teaching of the field (Figure 3.1, p. 70). So, the design phase 
of the participants’ teaching will be analysed on the base of this scheme of roles. 
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6.5.1.1 Teacher/playwright 
“[In] a world of fantasy”, “you think of how your actors could respond better” 
Taking into account that the teacher/playwright needs to help the pupils ‘craft the 
narrative so the story unfolds in a way that carries within it the learning’ (ibid., p. 64), 
the participants gave special consideration to two components above all others: the 
adaption of story/theme in relation to pupils’ profile and the use of fantasy.   
In the next two narrations Constantinos and Philia explain the implications of the first 
element, while in the third Maria describes, why and how fantasy can facilitate the 
authorship of the enacted story by the pupils.   
When you think of a theme, you ponder if it will interest the pupils. The 
next step is to find the appropriate stimulus; it can be a story, a fairy tale or 
a reality that can match with the pupils’ idiosyncrasies. Thus, it is easier for 
the teacher to commit them in teaching. … I chose to explore a circus story, 
for the circus was one of my pupils’ beloved thematic units in Greek 
(Constantinos, 3rd Interview, 26.6.2013).  
 
You think of how your actors could respond better. Knowing what are the 
difficulties of your actors, you start thinking of how to “write” the story and 
what they can understand of the theme explored (Philia, 3rd Interview, 
8.7.2013). 
 
You need a lot of fantasy to construct the ideas of the lesson. … Children 
love fantasy stories very much. … I think it is the teacher who needs first to 
enter into a fantastic world in the teaching and this urges the children to do 
the same (Maria, 3rd Interview, 6.6.2013).    
 
Both views of Constantinos and Philia explicitly suggest that in drama/theatre 
education, the teacher has the possibility to design their teaching in harmony with the 
pupils’ potential and interests. In this light, drama/theatre education turns out to be a 
space of differentiated labour, creating the appropriate pedagogical conditions for 
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pupil-oriented learning. In her book The Differentiated Classroom: Responding to the 
Needs of All Learners (2014), Tomlinson argues that ‘the essential challenge of the 
teacher’ is to be able to ‘reach out effectively to students who span the spectrum of 
learning readiness, personal interests and culturally shaped ways of seeing and 
speaking about experiencing the world’ (p. 1).  
So, drama/theatre education pedagogy may significantly serve the pupils’ needs and 
apprehensions, for two main reasons. First, it ‘allows for the exploration of concepts, 
issues and problems central to the human condition’ (Clark et al., 1997, p. 23); 
second, it activates the pupils’ learning with different learning styles and intelligences 
(Kempe & Nicholson, 2001). Accordingly, the field per se offers the teacher the 
prospect to methodically design a lesson plan in accordance with the pupils’ 
capabilities and requirements, aiming each time to produce ‘personally relevant 
meanings’ (Neelands, 1984, p. 25, italics original) for them.  
Turning our focus to Maria’s opinion of fantasy, it is evident that she conceives it as a 
narrative trait that may attract the children’s concentration. Children’s love for fantasy 
is illustrated by Egan (1997), who mentions that they ‘delight in fantasy stories full of 
talking, clothed rabbits, bears, or other animals, also dislocated from anything familiar 
in their everyday waking experience’ (p. 45). Fantasy, ‘the product of a technique’ 
(ibid., p. 46), is evidenced by studies to have an instrumental role in the cognitive, 
emotional and ethical development of the child (Egan, 1997; Nielsen, 2004; Seja & 
Russ, 1999; Steiner, 1995; Taylor & Calson, 1997).  
Steiner (1995), as one leading philosopher of fantasy, asserts that ‘[t]he child has 
fantasy, and this fantasy is what we must engage. It is really a question of developing 
the concept of a kind of “milk of soul”’ (p. 14). Therefore, he believes that teaching 
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makes demands on the teacher’s fantasy and so he advises: ‘You, as teachers must 
also be able to develop this life of fantasy’ (ibid., p. 22). Fantasy, after all, is the 
artistic quality that can penetrate into reality, because it is rooted in it (ibid.). 
6.5.1.2 Teacher/director 
“[I]n drama, we want the pupils to give their best and gain the best” 
In the role of director, the teacher has to design the lesson in order to ‘steer the 
children to the learning within the narrative through the best dramatic performance 
structure’ (Bowell & Heap, 2005, p. 64). On the basis of this fundamental notion, the 
participants highlight that it is essential for the teacher/director to plan the teaching 
while taking into consideration a series of pedagogical dispositions and technical 
knowledge. The dispositions that they regard as necessary are: 
• The creation of a vivid and enjoyable atmosphere; 
• The development of pupils’ love for drama; 
• The urge for pupils’ dynamic presence/engagement; and 
• The promotion of cooperation/interaction among all participants. 
In addition to these, the specialised pedagogical knowledge that they recognise as 
indispensable is: 
• The device of an opening stimulating activity/game; 
• The cohesion of activities and interdependency of episodes; 
• The appropriate selection of drama conventions; and   
• The preparation and organisation of resources. 
The participants’ convictions for the importance of the above dispositions are 
included in the following excerpts. 
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I attempted to find ideas that the children would like. I wanted the children 
to have fun. My real intention was the children to have good time 
(Constantinos, 3rd Interview, 26.6.2013). 
 
I wanted my teaching to be enjoyable. Beyond the objectives of the lesson, 
my main purpose was to make the children love drama. This feeling was 
very strong, because I loved drama … So, I wanted the children to feel the 
same and not to be afraid to participate (Stefanos, 3rd Interview, 13.6.2013). 
 
Because theatre education is based on children, I wanted them to be the 
protagonists in my teaching. I tried their presence to be active (Odysseas, 
3rd Interview, 7.6.2013). 
 
The interaction is one thing that we have to care about. The activities must 
give opportunities for cooperation among the pupils and also, between 
teacher and pupils. This is the way for the achievement of the targets 
(Maria, 3rd Interview, 6.6.2013). 
 
All of the participants’ opinions can be summarised in one central question: what 
conditions would help pupils/actors work best? In O’Neill’s (2006a) view, this 
pedagogical concern is at the heart of the teacher/director’s role. As she suggests, the 
teacher is responsible for setting up the ‘kind of conditions in which students can 
encounter the art form directly and through which they can experience the search for 
and discovery of new ideas … and capacities’ (p. 122). However, in her A Director 
Prepares (2001), Bogart affirms that this same care is what actually mirrors the real 
scope of the director’s craft. As she explains:  
It is not the director’s responsibility to produce the results but, rather, to 
create the circumstances in which something might happen. … With one 
hand firmly on the specifics and one hand reaching to the unknown, you 
start to work (p. 124). 
 
For Bogart, one safe road to the creation of such propitious circumstances is the need 
for a clear vision of: ‘How do we approach one another in the arena of a rehearsal or 
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on a stage?’ (ibid.) To this essential question, the participants have replied, as their 
views show, with three factors: the activation, cooperation and pleasure of the 
pupils/actors. Pleasure is notably argued by Bogart as an inseparable condition of 
directing, and her approach to this might be seen as a response to Winston’s (2013) 
speculation upon ‘planning for the pleasures of surprise’ (p. 143). Consequently, 
Bogart (2001) suggests: 
Imagine planning a surprise birthday party for a friend. You make decisions 
about whom to invite and how to astonish and when to reveal, all with a 
sense of vicarious pleasure and excitement. You are structuring a journey 
for another person through direct empathy and feeling. The creative action 
and choices spring out from the gift-giving impetus (pp. 4-5). 
 
Examining now the participants’ views regarding the skillful processes required in the 
planning phase, the next three quotations representatively concentrate the most salient 
points. 
The beginning of a theatre education lesson is of decisive importance. … 
The teacher works like a director, while he/she builds the activities that 
should be associated among them. … Imagination is so essential (Maria, 3rd 
Interview, 6.6.2013). 
 
The episodes of drama must be characterised by continuity. Each episode 
needs to be connected with the next one, for we narrate a story. … We are 
interested in what techniques we can use. The decision depends on many 
factors, like the objectives and the pupils’ familiarity with drama 
(Constantinos, 3rd Interview, 26.6.2013). 
 
Because in drama we want the pupils to give their best and gain the best, 
for this reason, we have to think twice and three times the whole 
organisation of the lesson. … You have to organise the audio-visual aids. In 
drama we try to use ideas that will attract the pupils and so, we have to find 
aids that facilitate these ideas (Philia, 3rd Interview, 8.7.2013). 
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The essential idea that is being reinforced to a greater extent here is that the process of 
designing is saturated with the teacher/director’s imagination, creativity and artistry. 
Given that he/she works within a dialogue between pedagogy and theatre art, these 
qualities are of paramount importance. As O’Neill (2006b) makes clear: 
In structuring the process according to aesthetics principles, the teacher is 
likely to achieve both educational and artistic objectives. The pupils will be 
able to make sense of their experience in the world and organise their 
experience in the drama process into the unity, coherence and significance 
of art (p. 72). 
 
Moreover, as evidenced, the participants conceive this double role – teacher/director – 
as complex and challenging. Their opinions – “The decision depends on many 
factors” and “we have to think twice and three times the whole organisation of the 
lesson” – notably substantiate their comprehension of the role as multidimensional, 
‘cognitively sophisticated and demanding’ (ibid., p. 121). Also, Philia’s phrase, “in 
drama, we want the pupils to give their best and gain the best”, signifies that the ethics 
of care is firmly embedded in the role of teacher/director. Such regard may bring 
closer to reality Bogart’s inducement for “the gift-giving impetus”. 
6.5.1.3 Teacher/actor 
“I felt joy because you were Elmer”  
This role presupposes that the teacher prepares to give ‘a performance that engages 
and beguiles the children and supports and challenges them in the creation of their 
own roles’ (Bowell & Heap, 2005, p. 64). Therefore, the participants identify that the 
teacher/actor improvises and rehearses his/her performance guided by a constant dual 
concern: “what to say and how to say it?” To this end, they determine four 
communication/aesthetic elements as absolutely important: 
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• Language (e.g., phraseology, vocabulary, articulation); 
• Paralinguistic characteristics (e.g., rhythm of speech, tone of voice, pause); 
• Body language and movement (e.g., facial expression, gesture, posture); and 
• Mood and feelings transmitted by the actor.  
It is noteworthy that the role of the teacher as actor has been remarked upon as a vital 
criterion of the quality of teaching/learning both by the participants and the pupils. 
From the perspective of the participants, a key example is the case of Philia. As she 
believes, her cognitive and emotional preparation for the theme of her teaching was 
reflected in one particular point of her storytelling (see video The Little Prince 6 at 
7’25’’). In the following extract, she describes how in her effort to ‘create life-giving 
energy’ (Alfreds, 1979, p. 5), her actions went beyond what she had designed to 
perform.   
Yes, I can suppose at which point you moved. … When I bent and kissed 
my flower. I didn’t prepare this scene to be like this, but I felt I would like 
to kiss it and did it. … It is meant that I rehearsed the words, my 
expressiveness, the movements of body, the paralinguistic elements, the 
tone and pitch of voice; this kiss was authentic. It was a proof for myself I 
felt my narrative. … all my preparation was there (3rd Interview, 8.7.2013). 
 
Philia’s case demonstrates that the teacher/actor possesses a poetical-political power, 
by which he/she may intensify the emotional and ethical awakening of the 
pupils/spectators. As underlined by O’Neill (2006c), the primary aim of a vivid 
performance is to ‘excite the kind of attention from the participants that will cause 
them to search for clues about the features of the fictional world being created’ (p. 
84). But certainly, beyond the fictional journey, as Neelands (1984) stresses, the 
teacher/actor aestheticises a role to ‘illuminate/define real experience’ (p. 26). 
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The performance of the teacher/actor from the perspective of the pupils has been 
discussed in regard to Maria’s teaching. Her pupils’ estimations were displayed 
during her final reflective discussion with the class (see video Elmer 110 at 1’20’’). 
When Maria asked the pupils to describe some of their emotions through their work, a 
boy answered: “I felt joy because you were Elmer”. Immediately afterwards, the next 
spontaneous comment expressed by a girl was: “You are a very good actress”. The 
implications of the teacher in role are critical for the pedagogy of drama/theatre 
education and will be discussed again, more analytically, in section 6.5.3.2. 
6.5.1.4 Participants/teachers 
“To teach drama it means you love it” 
Two further issues are discussed by the participants as essential prerequisites for a 
good preparation. These are:  
• The reinforcement of pupils’ willing participation; and  
• The teacher’s love for teaching drama/theatre education.  
These perspectives are representatively articulated in the next three excerpts.   
You have to be very well prepared, to remember the sequence of episodes 
… this is stressful. But drama is fun and to teach it, it means you like it 
(Constantinos, 3rd Interview, 26.6.2013). 
 
It needs unbelievable preparation, when you are inexperienced. … To teach 
drama it means you love it. The preparation demanded for Mathematics or 
Greek is very different. … The close interplay between teacher and pupil is 
difficult to be achieved. … In drama the teacher is not imposed on pupils, 
but he/she has to “win” them. This is a big difference (Stefanos, 3rd 
Interview, 13.6.2013). 
 
	  	   241	  
It is not at all easy to prepare a drama lesson. In order to give pupils the 
opportunity to be authentic, it needs more work than to teach in ways that 
you know what to expect (Philia, 3rd Interview, 8.7.2013). 
 
According to the participants’ views, central to the complexity of the design of drama 
is the teacher’s responsibility to find ways to emancipate the pupils’ willingness and 
authenticity in the process of teaching/learning. Stefanos explicates that a 
fundamental precondition for the building of an interactive relationship between 
teacher and pupils is the avoidance of authoritative behaviour by the teacher towards 
the pupils. Neelands (1984) emphasises this theme, recommending the following: 
Successful drama does not stem from silent obedience to a teacher’s 
authority and status. (… unless a child willingly enters the drama on her 
own terms, nothing will happen.) Drama requires forms of negotiation that 
allow for some bargaining between the teacher and the group, as to the 
nature and the content of the work (p. 27, italics original). 
 
An added substantial conclusion of the participants enclosed in the repeated phrase, 
“To teach drama it means you like it”, suggests the significance of the teacher’s 
motivations. For the participants, it seems imperative that the teacher who instructs 
drama is distinguished by their love for it. Indeed, their awareness of the intricacy of 
drama teaching lends weight to their notion that a love of drama can function as a 
promising energy when dealing with the idiosyncrasies of the medium. Neelands’ 
(ibid.) following perspective might justify the truthfulness of this conviction: 
[L]earning through drama depends upon a form of teacher intervention 
which aims to bring new shapes and fresh ways of knowing to children’s 
existing experience of play and other forms of interactivity and imitative 
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6.5.2 The Action Phase: A Journey of Transformations  
Similarly, the analysis of the implementation stage of the participants’ teaching 
focuses on four qualities: (1) use of space, (2) use of negotiation, (3) use of role and 
(4) use of flow. These themes, in their wholeness, revolve around the 
epistemology/pedagogy of drama/theatre education and the presence of both teacher 
and pupils in the teaching/learning process. 
6.5.2.1 Use of space: A language of the ensemble   
“I was with the pupils and we all traveled together” 
Space, as one important semiotic source of multi-interpretations within drama/theatre 
education, can be determined in the participants’ teaching sessions both as a value of 
the ensemble-based pedagogy and as a transformative sign of unexpectedness. The 
first reading of space is demonstrated in Figure 6.44, showing the total topography of 
classroom space as exploited in the teaching practices of the participants. The 
schemata a, b and g are the ones mostly used during the introductory activities, as 
they were either narration or discussion (a and b), or even storytelling (b) or game (g).  
Figure 6.44: The topography of the classroom space in the participants’ teaching 
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The rest (c, d, e, f and h) present the space as it was transfigured during the course of 
their teaching, specifically in the application of teamwork (e and f) and drama 
conventions, such as hot seating (c) and performance (d).  
What may significantly be inferred by the aesthetics of these eight dissimilar spatial 
schemata, which pose the teacher (T) with and among the pupils, is the function of a 
teaching/learning pattern solely dependent on interactivity, togetherness and 
cooperation among all the participants. That is, the continuous transformations of the 
space indicate the pedagogy of the ensemble. In this sense, space is being witnessed 
as an inherent epistemological parameter of this pedagogy. Crucially, such a view 
becomes intelligible in The Play of Space (2002), where Rehm sees space as ‘a proper 
value of theatre, part and parcel of what it is and how it works’ (p. 1). 
Central to the second interpretation of the use of space is the metamorphosis of real 
space into a dramatic, fictional space. Given that this kind of spatial transformation is 
the key element that makes dramatic work feasible, it is one that has been observed in 
all of the teaching sessions. However, what attracts special interest in the teaching of 
Odysseas and Philia is the emphasis placed on the building of this process, which 
substantially proves the dynamics of the ensemble. While in both cases the space was 
transformed into a travel to planets, this was actualised by the close interplay between 
teacher and pupils and the use of visual and acoustic signs.  
Specifically, in The Planet of Solitariness, using a mysterious musical background, 
Odysseas – in role of an astronaut – invites the pupils to board the planet bus (see 
videos 26 at 1’30’’ and 28) and guides them to lie down in rows (see Figure 6.44, 
schema h). He explains to them that the signal of their arrival will be his touch to the 
pupil on his left and, subsequently, each pupil must touch another until they are all are 
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standing up. Odysseas’ opinion of this specific activity is indicated in the next 
dialogue.  
A: Odysseas, can you describe a good activity of your teaching? 
O: When we should embark in the planet bus. The sound and the fact that the children 
lied down on the carpet created an atmosphere of intensity.  
A: What were the reactions of the pupils? 
O: (Watching on videos The Planet of Solitariness 26 and 28) Suspense. The children 
are restless, they move… Eh, they raise their heads, they are looking forward to 
seeing what it may happen. They found this activity very unexpected. 
A: How did you feel? 
O: I was a little bit anxious, but I liked very much I was with the children on the floor. 
A: Why? 
O: I think if the pupils were alone without me in this travel, it couldn’t have the same 
result. I was with the pupils and we all traveled together (3rd Interview, 7.6.2013).  
Likewise, in The Little Prince, before telling her story (see videos 5 and 6), Philia sits 
in the circle with the pupils (see Figure 6.44, schema a), shows the group a roll of 
fabric and asks them: “What is this I hold?” After a number of guesses, she illustrates 
how this roll should be unfolded. Once the pupils understand the procedure of 
unfolding the cloth, music begins to play in the background and Philia starts narrating: 
“This shape is not a simple circle. It is a whole planet, in which we are going to 
travel”. Immediately, she leaves the circle and begins putting on her jacket and scarf 
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to assume the role of the Little Prince. Meanwhile the pupils, with eyes fixed upon 
her, await the unknown continuation of the tale.  
Philia’s reflections upon this episode are exhibited in the following brief exchange. 
A: How you see the pupils’ responses in the creation of the planet? 
P: (Watching on videos The Little Prince 5 and 6) They attended me. … The cloth was 
very helpful. I gained their attention and also, they were enthusiastic. In this way, 
they became part of my storytelling. This assisted me in having a good 
communication with them. I could involve them in my narration by asking them 
questions and dilemmas… (3rd Interview, 8.7.2013).   
The pivotal issue that arises from these two approaches to spatial transformation is the 
facilitation of the pupils’ feelings of unexpectedness and wonder. This spatial 
condition, as evidenced, had a vivid impact on the quality of the pupils’ 
concentration/attention and, therefore, can be discussed from the two infused 
perspectives of drama/theatre education – the artistic and the pedagogical. According 
to Bogart (2001), in theatre, the stimulation of the feeling of the unknown is an 
imperative capacity of the director. As she suggests:  
Directing is about feeling … It is about having a feel for time and space … 
[and] being able to plunge and encourage a plunge into the unknown at the 
right moment (ibid., p. 85).  
 
On the other hand, understanding the educational value of the unexpected in 
teaching/learning is a way to appreciate the implications of a pedagogy of imagination 
(Egan, 1992; Greene, 1995; Nielsen, 2004, 2006; Steiner, 1995). As Greene (1995) 
contends, ‘[i]n many respects, teaching and learning are matters of breaking through 
barriers–of expectation, of boredom, of predefinition’ (p. 14). Similar to Bogart’s 
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(2001) above view is Greene’s next assertion that ‘the difficult task for the teacher is 
to devise situations in which the young will move from the habitual and the ordinary 
and consciously undertake a search’ (ibid., p. 24). In these two episodes, as 
evidenced, the imaginative use of space is proven as an exciting stimulus for the 
activation of the pupils’ surprise and curiosity, feelings that enliven the mind to ‘look 
at things as if they could be otherwise’ (ibid., p. 19). Thus, we may stress the 
importance of the integration of imagination and emotions, using Nielsen’s (2006) 
thesis that the ‘“feeling” realm’ is the ‘essential link between the child’s intellect and 
body’ (p. 252).  
6.5.2.2 Use of negotiation: A talk by virtuous signs 
“It was a warm meeting” and “I took more than I gave” 
The operation of laboratory work, as ensemble-based work may be termed, depends 
largely upon the teacher’s role as negotiator with the pupils, his/her ‘fellow-
negotiator[s]’ (Neelands, 1984, p. 27). As described by the participants, negotiation, 
albeit is a multimodal process, may build up “safety”, “trust” and “respect” in the 
teaching/learning space. Specifically, they define it as a practice that demands the 
embodiment of three qualities: insight into the pupils’ thinking, emotional/ethical 
expression/response and bodily talk.  
More analytically, they understand negotiation as a dialogical practice that aims at 
encouraging the pupils to take initiatives and free themselves from any hesitation or 
fear. Significantly, this pursuit may be effective only if the teacher shows respect for 
the pupils’ ideas and, simultaneously, approaches the pupils themselves in a friendly 
manner. For this reason, they believe that the vivid aesthetic/bodily communications 
of the teacher, beyond verbal language, are a key characteristic of the friendship/love 
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he/she shows to the pupils. The virtuous bodily signs of the teacher are therefore 
visible through their hands, facial expressions and posture, denotable by terms such as 
touch, look, smile, laugh and sitting by pupils. 
This web of notions regarding negotiation is demonstrated in the following three 
dialogues, in which the participants comment upon the logic of their own practice. 
Beginning with the case of Maria, she illustrates her negotiating approach to the group 
work. 
M: (Watching on video Elmer 97) I was passing from each group and was trying to 
help them express their views and decide what they could do. There are children 
who are shy and the teacher needs to support them unfold what they think.  
A: Maria, can you describe little more your manners in this process?  
M: I was touching them on back or shoulder carefully. 
A: What were your feelings while you were touching them? 
M: I was feeling safety; I think the pupils had the same feeling: “Now, our teacher is 
with us, will help us”. It was a warm meeting with them. I showed trust and respect 
for what they said. I didn’t do any negative grimace  (3rd Interview, 6.6.2013). 
Turning to Odysseas’ negotiation, he initially explains his conduct when in discussion 
with the whole class, before expounding upon the same theme when applied to group 
work.   
O: (Watching on video The Planet of Solitariness 26) Here, I am cool with the pupils. 
… I smile, move my hands and, at some times, laugh. … I am not cold. I am also a 
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friend. I am not just the teacher who asks and that’s it. In teaching, it is not always 
teacher-pupil. 
O: (Watching on videos The Planet of Solitariness 24 and 35) I like that I am with the 
children.  
A: How do you behave as you come up to each group? 
O: I have a small dialogue with the pupils. … I become part of the group and we 
discuss their queries … I like this picture, where the children are in groups. They 
prepare, organise their ideas, speak and laugh. This is a beautiful thing. … I think 
it’s good to leave the children alone to work for a while. … I think I had a good 
contact with the pupils. … (Smiling) I loved the children and they loved me too (3rd 
Interview, 7.6.2013).   
Finally, Stefanos’ views focus primarily on the teacher’s posture and smile required 
during negotiation.  
 S: (Watching on videos The Magic Pillows 49 and 54) I wanted to sit on the same 
level with the pupils. In drama, because the pupils sit on the floor, then stand up, 
you have to do the same movements. It is a way that makes the pupils feel nicely 
and makes the teacher become one with them. 
A: You smile and laugh, at some occasions.  
S: This smile is not a smile, because I have to do so as a teacher. I was enthusiastic 
with the children. … It was one of my first teaching in schools … I didn’t expect 
that they would help me so much. I took more than I gave (3rd Interview, 
13.6.2013). 
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The participants’ perceptions here are a strong documentation not only of the ethical 
substance of the practice of negotiation, but also of the impact of the aesthetic 
participation of the teacher’s body on such an insight. Critically, this synergy between 
the bodily understanding and the ethical awareness of the teacher’s/negotiator’s 
presence suggests the political/pedagogical role of the teacher’s body in teaching. 
Such an argument can be underpinned by the phenomenological theory, which 
considers the body as a holistic entity in relation to the manner of experiencing 
knowledge, discarding therefore the body-mind split of Cartesian dualism (Estola & 
Elbaz-Luwisch, 2003). Todres (2007) defines this phenomenon of embodied knowing 
as follows: 
The lived body thus grounds understanding by intimately participating in a 
world that can show new horizons and meanings. It is this participative and 
aesthetic dimension that the lived body gives to understanding. As such the 
lived body also gives to understanding the textures and aliveness of a 
‘fleshly’ world that is relevant to persons (p. 2). 
 
Literature on the teacher’s body proves inescapably essential the connection of the 
teacher’s ethics with the embodied/aesthetic nature of his/her teaching energies 
(Cooks, 2007; Estola & Elbaz-Luwisch, 2003; Uitto & Syrjälä, 2008; Vick & 
Martinez, 2011). In particular, according to Cooks’ (2007) perspective, a pedagogy of 
the teacher’s body needs to be built on the question: ‘what do our bodies teach us and 
what do we know in and through our bodies?’ (p. 309). A result of this key question is 
the suggestion that the pedagogy of the teacher’s body is a “politics of becoming in 
place”, aiming at ‘an ethical intervention into meaning-making with regard to 
recognition, authenticity, and assumptions regarding choice, control and competence’ 
(ibid.). While the teacher’s body is privileged to ‘initiate a discussion of bodies in 
performance, … in the here and now’, as Cooks (ibid., italics original) points out, it 
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entails that it has the competence of answerability But, as she clarifies this 
‘answerability of the body is not immediately ethical or competent’ (ibid., p. 310); it 
turns out to be as such only ‘when both the body and its sense are united in action 
dialogically’ (Fenske, 2004, p. 12). 
If we assume this state of answerability on the part of the participants’ bodies, there 
exists obvious evidence of an ethical response through their virtue-centred 
embodiment of negotiation. The nexus of their bodily acts – look, touch, smile, laugh, 
posture – strongly demonstrates negotiation as a practice embedded both in the social 
virtues of respect, togetherness, cooperation, trust and friendship/love and the ethics 
of the beautiful expressed by the feelings of joy, good-heartedness and comfort. In 
light of this embodied understanding of negotiation, the participants substantiate 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) thesis that ‘structures are lived rather than known and 
therefore can never be apprehended passively; but only by living them, assuming 
them and discovering their immanent significance’ (p. 258). Critically, for the 
participants, what ultimately seems immanent in the role of the teacher-negotiator, as 
strongly supported by their embodied understanding, is the role of the teacher-friend. 
6.5.2.3 Use of role: A rhetoric play 
“I can’t carry my whole planet on my back”  
In some of the teaching, the play of roles was designed as a rhetorical dialogic play 
enacted in partnership between the teacher and the pupils. The participants/teachers 
focused on questioning, in an attempt to provoke an intense discussion by critical 
arguments. For this purpose, they made use of open-ended questions and also tried to 
give answers and information that could further challenge the pupils’ thinking. The 
participants appreciated that the success of this play presupposes: a clear vision of its 
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aim, a careful preparation of the structure both of the process of questioning and 
argumentation and vivid body language.  
One of the three cases that employed this kind of play is Maria. What follows is a 
quotation of her role-playing, integrated within the convention of circular drama (see 
video Elmer 102). 
When Maria wore the mask of Elmer in front of the students, she bent to the floor, 
walked like an elephant, and then approached the first group of pupils. 
Maria: (With husky voice) Hi little elephants! 
Girl 1: If you think that the proper elephants are patchwork, you are wrong. …  
Boy 1: You think that you have worth like an elephant? 
Maria: Why not? (Bending her head) I am so sad! 
Girl 2: (Laughing and pointing to her) Ha, ha and ha, ha. … 
Girl 1: You mustn’t be patchwork. 
Maria: I have born like this. You don’t want me? 
Girl 2: If you think you have a nice colour, you are wrong. We don’t want you in our 
company.  
Maria: Oh … I am so sad, so much! (Pause and then approaching the second group) 
Hi my friends, would you like to play football with me? … 
Maria’s estimations of her role-playing and, more generally, of the idea of the teacher 
as actor, are collected in the following excerpt.  
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I had a very good interaction with the pupils. … They said interesting 
arguments. All of them had the chance to speak. … This double role, to be 
teacher and actor together is not easy. … I had my doubts if I could do 
both. … Finally, I liked it very much and the pupils also enjoyed it. I felt 
that my role made them see me not like a teacher but rather like a friend 
who plays with them (3rd Interview, 6.6.2013).  
 
The second case is Constantinos in role as the chained elephant. One part of his 
discussion with the pupils through hot seating is the next extract (see video The 
Chained Elephant 140). 
Constantinos placed a chair in front of the semicircle of the class and put on a white 
elephant mask. At first, he was starring at the pupils, since their first reaction was to 
laugh loudly; a moment later, he greeted them. 
Constantinos: Good evening, children! I am very glad I am with you. You see, it has 
been long time to meet someone outside the circus. ... Your teacher told me that 
you want to make me some questions. Now, I am here. 
Girl 1: Why you didn’t escape from the circus all these years? 
Constantinos: Em, what to say. It’s difficult. From the time I remember myself ... 
When I was a child I was trying, was trying and finally, I didn’t manage to do it. 
Girl 1: You mean, you gave up. … 
Boy 2: How did you come here? 
Constantinos: The guard is outside and is waiting for me. 
Boy 2: Tell the guard that you will buy him kebab (the pupils laugh). …  
Girl 3: You have so many kilos … you could escape … 
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Constantinos: You mean I have changed? But, I know myself to be the same as before. 
I have really changed? … 
Girl 1: ... As we grow up, we have more potentials… 
Constantinos: What do you advice me? … 
Boy 1: You have to throw down the walls and trample one, two people... 
According to Constantinos this activity brought him very close to the pupils, for the 
reasons he explains below. 
… I tried to show them the power of habit. … I was cooler as an actor than 
as a teacher. … I prepared very well. I knew the arguments with which I 
could face the pupils’ ideas. I didn’t worry for this activity, because I was 
sure that the pupils would like it. … Of course, my body language and the 
paralinguistic characteristics I used were not rich. This thing requires a 
great effort (3rd Interview, 26.6.2013).  
 
Philia’s storytelling is a third example, where both her dilemmatic questions and 
persuasive arguments provoke a brainstorm of ideas/suggestions. As in the previous 
cases, the following dialogue is a part of this play (see video The Little Prince 6 at 
3’40’’).  
 Philia: (Stopped walking and sat in the circle) Recently, I have a thought that I want 
to share it with my flower. But, I don’t want to hurt my unique friend … What to 
do? Do you know what is my dilemma? Can you suppose? … 
Philia: (Walking in the circle-planet) Yes really, I want to travel to other places, to 
see other people. … How shall I tell my flower my decision? To stay?… To leave?... 
Tell me your opinions. 
Girl 1: You can take it with you. 
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Philia: To uproot it? … it will die ... On the other hand, I can’t carry my whole planet 
on my back… 
Boy 1: To promise it that you will return. 
Philia: … If something goes wrong and I can’t come back? To give it untrue 
promises? 
Girl 2: To send it a memento. 
Philia: But, this means that I will never return. 
Boy 3: To put it in a pot.  
Philia: So, what do you suggest me? … To leave and simply protect my rose or to stay   
and forget the journeys? ... 
The next excerpt sums up Philia’s points of view about this argumentative play.    
The things were very clear in my mind during my storytelling. … I didn’t 
feel that it’s difficult to be in a double role. … When you are well prepared, 
there is no problem, I think. … Definitely, I couldn’t have these results in 
the discussion if I wasn’t Little Prince. … The pupils got in the process of 
inquiry, they thought hard, said their arguments and so I gained more their 
interest. … They had to think (3rd Interview, 8.7.2013).  
 
The pedagogy of the teacher in role, in combination with language/rhetorical play, is 
the key subject in the above cases. Role taking, as O’Toole and Stinson (2013) note, is 
a way of ‘modelling and experimentation with language’ (p. 175). So, understanding 
the language/intellectual value of this convention allows both teacher and the pupils to 
exercise their oral speech by questioning, answering and arguing within a purposeful 
context. This pattern of interactive talk between teacher and pupils is an enjoyable 
commitment to a process of speculation, social imagination and, at times – as mainly 
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evidenced in Constantinos’ case – of humorous/comical sense. Language play, 
according to Cook’s (2000) theory, is central to creativity and intellectual 
development. Fiction/imagination is the key quality embodied in this language play 
and may serve creativity, since ‘it refreshes, rearranges, and provides the free play of 
ideas on which innovative thinking depends’ (ibid., p. 42). On the other hand, 
deliberative play depends on critical thinking that ‘takes the form of an ongoing 
criticism of causes and effects’ (Errington, 1992, p. 44).  
What also makes the practice of teacher in role of crucial importance is its agency to 
regenerate the human relationships in the class. Maria’s notion, “I felt that my role 
made them see me not like a teacher but rather like a friend who plays with them”, is 
critical in this perspective. According to literature, this convention may alter the 
model of authority, diminishing the power of the teacher (Heathcote cited in Wagner, 
1976; Neelands, 1984; O’Toole & Stinson, 2013) and thus enhancing the climate of 
comfort, intimacy and togetherness between teacher and pupils. By playing a role, the 
teacher goes beyond his/her typical roles as ‘instructor, model and resource’ (Kao & 
O’Neill, 1998, p. 2), helping the pupils to see him/her as energised in the same 
fictional world that they are being asked to enter. This new treaty encourages the 
pupils’ own expressiveness either verbal or kinesthetic, or both, in a meaningful 
context of pleasurable learning. 
6.5.2.4 Use of flow: A step in beauty   
“This girl is rehearsing her dance and song”; “They like this freedom”  
In the participants’ teaching sessions, a nexus of qualitative remarks on the 
attentiveness of their pupils provide clues that they experienced a state of flow. In 
essence, they functioned ‘at full capacity’ (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009, p. 
	  	   256	  
196), signifying their deep absorption, especially in some of the performative 
activities. The signs of this conclusion are summarised by the following four features:   
• Positive and vivid activation in the rehearsals of their performances; 
• Good cooperation between partners who were not friends; 
• Active participation by shy pupils and pupils with special needs; and 
• The expression of feelings of joy, enthusiasm and pleasure.  
The contributory factors to this outcome, according to the participants, were primarily 
the space for freedom offered in drama/theatre education, as well as the facilitation of 
experimentation through new challenges, such as masks and gymnastic instruments. 
In the following two quotations, the participants emphasise the implications of the 
activities/plays, which stimulated their pupils’ flow and, in consequence, their 
creativity. 
(Watching on videos The Little Prince 17 and 19) When the fox and Little 
Prince had to improvise a play to show their domestication, the pupils had 
their best energy. … The most impressive thing is that albeit some couple 
of pupils weren’t friends or had special relationships, nevertheless, they 
worked wonderful. Like Eleni and Marinos whose performance was so 
well-done; George and Andreas who performed the wagon of terror …  
I think the comfort and the freedom that the pupils have in drama 
encourage their creativity. … I didn’t have any complaints like in other 
lessons: “I don’t know what to do”. … I see them concentrated and glad for 
what they do. It was my target to be alert and have energy, however, the 
pupils’ work made me want to give more (Philia, 3rd Interview, 8.7.2013). 
 
(Watching on video The Selfish Giant 87) Yes, here, they prepare their gifts 
for the birthday of Giant. … I think the freedom we give the pupils make 
them responsible. They take initiatives and try to organise their decisions. 
… This girl is rehearsing her dance and song. … She is very devoted to 
what she is doing (Maria-Eva, 3rd Interview, 25.6.2013). 
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The use of masks and gymnastic instruments by the pupils, as Maria and Constantinos 
argue below, were also effective resources for creativity. In this framework, they 
stress that the shy pupils and those with special needs had an impressive involvement.    
(Watching on video Elmer 108) The masks attracted their attention. They 
gave them energy; pupils are very enthusiastic. … Some pupils who were 
shy, here, they participate and look they enjoy it. … The pupils were 
disciplined and I think the freedom is not a condition that makes them get 
away. In other lessons, some pupils are usually absent-minded (Maria, 3rd 
Interview, 6.6.2013).   
 
(Watching on videos The Chained Elephant 127, 128 and 138) They did 
very good still images and performances with the use of gymnastic 
instruments. They used their imagination and created their own circus 
scenarios. ... For example, they used the cones like hats, borderline between 
the stage and wings, the hula hoops as the elephant’s cage... also the masks 
helped them be better in the role of elephant. ... Yes, Yiannis usually works 
by the assistance of a guard in the classroom ... but, his participation in 
drama was amazing... no difference at all from the other pupils. He was so 
absorbed in the work and was very happy. ... Because in most lessons, they 
are behind a desk. Here they are happy; they like this freedom 
(Constantinos, 3rd Interview, 26.6.2013). 
 
Focusing on the fact that the participants designed activities/plays/techniques that 
promoted the pupils’ flow shows evidence that they conceive the importance of the 
artistic perspective of drama/theatre education. One of the teacher’s/director’s 
essential pursuits, as discussed in section 6.5.1.2, is to combine skilfully the 
educational and artistic objectives of the teaching/learning process. As Neelands 
(2009b) reminds us, ‘every drama “lesson” should be an artistic as well as an 
educational journey’ (p. 14).  
Artistry in teaching, according to Eisner (2003), ‘depends on sensibility, it uses 
imagination, it employs technique, it takes pride in its craft’ (p. 654). Given this 
description, the artistry of the participants’ teaching is indicated by the 
challenging/imaginative activities they planned, which resulted in an enrichment of 
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the process of dramatic inquiry aesthetically/technically/emotionally. The use of 
masks was a particularly significant semiotic sign in their teaching, as it offered the 
pupils greater safety in which to explore/improvise with the stories heroes. In 
addition, Constantinos’ risky but simultaneously inventive idea to give the pupils the 
potential to embody the gymnastic instruments, in two drama conventions, was 
eventually proven as a strong suggestion of ‘motivation and action’ (Somers, 2008, p. 
68). The pupils transformed the space of the classroom into a circus, making use of 
the instruments in a number of imaginative/symbolic ways. As Dickinson and 
Neelands (2006) point out, ‘[o]bjects, or props have a special value’ in drama/theatre 
education, since ‘[t]hey are read as having a symbolic importance’ (p. 69).  
In consequence, considering this kind of work as closely connected to the pupils’ 
development of bodily/aesthetic/creative skills, Winston (2013) might observe that it 
goes hand in hand with beauty, since it ‘values the body and what the body can feel 
and do’ (p. 137). Such a case of beauty, though, presupposes that the pupils’ 
consciousness undergoes a state of balance (Winston, 2010). One key clue of the 
validity of this presupposition is the participants’ comments on the pupils’ cognitive 
and emotional absorption. Likewise, as Greene (1995) argues, ‘[t]he aesthetic 
experiences require conscious participation’ (p. 125), which excite a serious dialogue 
of thoughtfulness of “what we are doing”. Warnock (1976), on the other hand, 
contends that given that the practice of imagination is connected with emotions, the 
synergy of both is necessary ‘for the application of thoughts or concepts to things’ (p. 
202). These perspectives guide us to the conclusion that artistic/aesthetic experiences 
can educate holistically and, in doing so potentially bring together both flow and 
beauty. Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2009) verify the practicability of this 
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educational outcome, as they underline that, by experiencing flow, ‘[t]houghts, 
feelings, wishes, and action are in harmony’ (p. 197).   
6.5.3 Concluding Remarks 
In summary, both phases of the participants’ teaching practices – the planning and 
implementation – are proven to be useful for a holistic and in depth comprehension of 
their aretaic pedagogy. An integrated depiction of their virtue-centred pedagogy is 
demonstrated in Figure 6.45, from the data of which it is evident that the participants 
practised a network of epistemic, technical and ethical virtues. Specifically, in the 
design of their teaching, it is indicated that the teacher’s quadripartite presence is 
needed for the teaching of drama/theatre education. Within each different 
pedagogical/artistic role, the participants applied the following preparatory processes: 
• As teachers/playwrights, they placed emphasis on the adaption of the 
story/theme of their teaching on the basis of fantasy and the pupils’ profile. 
• As teachers/directors, they designed those necessary educational and artistic 
conditions that could activate the pupils’ learning through cooperation, 
interaction, pleasure and love for drama/theatre education. 
• As teachers/actors, they paid much attention to language/bodily/aesthetic 
skills embodied with an affective expressiveness.  
• As student teachers, they prepared their work having given their personal 
love for drama/theatre education and in pursuit of the pupils’ willingness in 
the co-authorship of dramatic work. 
In addition, on the basis of the implementation of the participants’ teaching, there 
exist in aggregate six virtue-driven fundamentals:  
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Figure 6.45: The participants’ aretaic pedagogy 
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• The use of the ensemble-based model of teaching/learning that, as attested, 
promotes interactivity, togetherness and cooperation among all participants; 
• The use of sentimental education with priority to the emotions of 
unexpectedness, wonder, surprise, curiosity, comfort and pleasure;  
• The use both of the virtue ethics of dialogue – with special focus on 
friendship/love – and the beautiful, in the practice of negotiation; 
• The use of language/intellectual/rhetorical capacities;  
• The use of flow, creativity and beauty; and 
• The use of virtuous bodily/aesthetic signs by hands, face and posture.  
Crucially, the findings of this analysis support the idea that the participants applied 
drama/theatre education more as an ethical practice rather than merely as a technical 
one (Winston, 2013), in an attempt to harmonise the liveliness of their intellect, body 
and ethos with the fostering of their pupils’ virtues. This substantial remark permits us 
to allege that the participants, through their teaching, became conscious of what might 
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6.6 EPILOGUE: THE PARTICIPANTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF TEACHING 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR EDUCATION PROGRAMME 
With respect to the research results of the three preceding questions, it seems fairly 
certain that within the context of the participants’ education programme, the courses – 
Drama Education and Theatre Education and Theatrical Play – made a significant 
contribution to the enhancement of their comprehension of teaching as an ethical 
practice, inherently dependent on teaching/teacher’s virtues. Both the personal aretaic 
development of the participants through the courses (see Figure 6.43, p. 229) and the 
application of the model of their aretaic pedagogy (see Figure 6.45, p. 260) are 
powerful evidence of this conclusion. An added documentation of this position, 
however, is provided by an examination of the last sub-question of the study: What 
learning experiences from the framework of their teacher education programme were 
critical in shaping their perception of teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice? 
Therefore, what is observable is a firm consensus among the participants that the 
drama/theatre education courses were among the few on their programme that enabled 
them to see teaching as a primarily ethical practice. In delineating the teaching on 
other courses, they presented important information making clear the employment of 
a pedagogical model of teaching predominantly concentrated on epistemic/technical 
knowledge (Shulman, 1987). Yet, even on the courses in which ethical/philosophical 
speculation was at the heart of their practice, the association with the 
ethics/philosophy of both the teacher and teaching remained on a generally 
theoretical/epistemic level.  
These perceptions are emphasised in the following four representative excerpts, in 
which the participants illustrate their learning experiences within different courses. 
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Most of the courses at university are teacher-centred. … Lectures, theory 
and presentations by the students are the ways of teaching. … Philosophy 
of education was indeed an interesting course, but too much theoretical. … 
In Music and The Art in Primary School we did creative activities and got 
good ideas to apply them in class (Maria-Eva, 2nd Interview, 26.1.2013). 
  
Those courses that have workshops are the most effective. We have learnt 
how to use the nature/environment as part of the process of teaching, how 
to separate the pupils in groups, how to design a lesson plan … all these are 
useful. … But, all the courses, except from drama and the courses of 
School Experience, offered us this kind of practical work, only in 2-3 
sessions (Constantinos, 2nd Interview, 29.1.2013).  
 
Psychology was very good course. I liked it because I could think of 
myself. … The lectures were of university level, that’s it. … Drama was the 
only course directly connected to cooperation, parrhesia, laugh … self-
knowledge. (Philia, 2nd Interview, 30.1.2013).  
 
In Ethics we discussed about the soul, the death, about issues that seem 
inconceivable … they help you see life. … In theatre education, we learnt 
how to devise games or transform them into new ones. … In the sessions 
we were feeling like a company (Maria, 2nd Interview, 25.1.2013). 
 
The participants’ views are, accordingly, a live affirmation of the typical 
contemporary tendency of teacher education that is exclusively focused on theoretical 
knowledge and the technical competence of how to teach (Campbell, 2011; Dunne, 
2011; Sockett, 2012). The logic of this educational system mostly stems from the 
phenomenon described by Biesta (2010) as learnification. In his Good Education in 
an Age of Measurement: Ethics, Politics and Democracy (2010), he contends that the 
discourses and practices of learning/teaching have come to govern our theory of 
education as one that needs to be systematised and regulated by a sequence of matters 
related to quantifiable learning outcomes. What is really absent, as he argues, is a 
vision of teaching beyond its serviceability in quantitative learning. In his own words, 
there is ‘very little explicit discussion … about what constitutes good education … 
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and [w]hy might this be so?’ (Biesta, 2009, p. 36 italics original). Also, as Higgins 
(2011) maintains the same position with Biesta, interestingly he comments that ‘[t]he 
idea that one can talk about educational goals apart from visions of the good is a 
modern development’ (p. 147). 
Furthermore, speaking allegorically of this system of teacher education, Zeichner 
(2009) highlights its dangers by pointing out that it can merely help us lose ‘sight of 
the forest in the midst of the trees’ (p. 12). As he estimates, what is lost is the ethical 
entity of teaching and ‘the need to constantly step back from the daily grid of 
implementation to ask hard questions about what is being accomplished and for 
whose benefit’ (ibid.). 
However, the participants’ above remarks can be seen as momentous, not only 
because they give evidence of the question of this discussion per se, but perhaps, more 
importantly, they compose a recapitulation of those fruitful ecological conditions of a 
course that might promote teaching as a virtue-driven practice, similar to those 
discussed in section 6.3.2 (see Figure 6.31, p. 184). Therefore, according to the tacit 
connotations inhered within them, the essential ecological fundamentals that the 
participants propose as necessary for a virtue-driven teaching model are the 
following: 
• Balanced theory-oriented and practice-oriented teaching methodology; 
• Learner-centred teaching approaches; 
• Teaching space as a geography of stimulating emotions of learning; 
• Teaching/learning process as a socialising, ensemble-building culture; and 
• Teaching/learning towards metacognition and creativity. 
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The identification of these educational conditions required both for an aretaic 
pedagogy and aretaic development unfolds a fresh discussion directly related to the 
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Chapter 7 
 ARETAIC PEDAGOGY: BEAUTY, PRACTICE AND ARISTRY 
Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself, to see and to 
respond to the real world in the light of a virtuous consciousness. This is 
the non-metaphysical meaning of the idea of transcendence to which 
philosophers have so constantly resorted in their explanations of goodness. 
‘Good is a transcendent reality’ means that virtue is the attempt to pierce 
the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is (Murdoch, 




7.1 INTRODUCTION: FROM FINDINGS TO THEORY 
This last but one chapter of the study seeks to articulate a theory of both processes of 
the participants’ aretaic development and aretaic pedagogy within the context of 
drama/theatre education. This theoretical discussion therefore chimes with the 
research findings, as demonstrated in the analysis preceded. It is also correlated with 
the research methodology of the study that addresses to a qualitative 
phenomenographic case study.   
At the heart of this dialogue with the findings lies one pivotal question: How the 
drama/theatre education courses promoted these particular students to develop the 
spectrum of virtues – ethical, intellectual and pedagogical – that has already been 
examined? Thus, the process of elaborating upon this critical issue is separated into 
two parts. Firstly, an attempt will be made at an interpretation of the contribution of 
the courses’ ecological conditions – epistemological, methodological, emotional, 
recreational and pedagogical – to the promotion of the participants’ ethical/intellectual 
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virtues. In this part, the discussion draws attention to the inner view of the 
participants’ aretaic development that, as Murdoch (ibid.) keenly points out in the 
above quote, tends to be a process of deliverance of the self from “selfish 
consciousness” towards the configuration of a “virtuous consciousness”. In the second 
part, the theorising of the participants’ aretaic pedagogy concentrates on its 
fundamentals, which in their wholeness disclose a set of characteristics of the artistry 
they embedded within it. Finally, in the epilogue, the nexus between the participants’ 
aretaic development within the courses and the pedagogical dispositions/virtues that 
are integrated in their teaching practices will be indicated and explored.  
   
7.2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS’ ARETAIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
One first essential prerequisite for the interpretation of the flourish of the participants’ 
virtue ethics – dialogue, the beautiful, will and consciousness – within the courses, is 
to reinvigorate our memory with the virtue epistemology, as portrayed in Chapter 1. 
This approach will enable us to perceive some key concepts related to the formation 
of virtues, which are inherently intertwined with the appearance of the esoteric 
receptivity of the participants’ self to the embodiment of the above four kinds of 
virtue ethics. The second key presupposition refers to the research methodology of the 
study. Given that its methodological design falls within the parameters both of case 
study and phenomenography, the process of theorising does not turn to the 
generalisation of findings, but instead to the apposition of the particularities of the 
phenomenon of aretaic development in regard to the qualitatively diverse ways the 
participants experienced it. It is also a phenomenon that can be decoded, exclusively 
within the determinate courses’ ecology, in which it has been examined and analysed. 
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7.2.1 Dispositions: The Guiding Premise 
According to Aristotelian ethics, the process of learning an ethical virtue is bound up 
with the practical method of habituation, which is both cognitive and emotional. In 
this particular process, as shown in Figure 1.1 (p. 19), there exists a constituent that 
has the regulative role and this is – dispositions. They derive from our actions and are 
shaped by our emotions; based on this refined form, dispositions represent the 
outcome of our actions. In consequence, the stable recurrence of virtuous dispositions 
from specific actions conduces to their transformation into virtues of character.  
It is therefore manifest that dispositions are not synonymous with virtues, but they 
might be seen as the active vehicle for virtues. This serviceability of dispositions is 
also emphatic in Aristotle’s following definition: 
[Ethical] virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the 
choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of 
the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the 
prudent man would determine it (NE, 1107a-1107a2). 
 
The decisive role of dispositions in the configuration of virtues becomes even more 
perceptible if we pay attention to their intrinsic features. Describing the notion of 
disposition, Katz (1993) points out four basic characteristics. As he indicates: ‘A 
disposition is a tendency to exhibit frequently, consciously, and voluntarily a pattern 
of behavior that is directed to a broad goal’ (p. 2). Similarly, Sockett (2009) identifies 
that dispositions result from ‘the individual’s initiative, in the face of obstacles, and 
are intrinsically motivated’ (p. 291). This concrete functionality of dispositions allows 
us to recognise the process of forming an ethical virtue as an inner dialogue of 
consciousness, wherein emotions purify the motivations of actions and unlock the 
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energy of virtuous dispositions. Sockett (2012) alludes to the implications of this 
necessary self-dialogue, by noting:  
Dispositions are open to moral appraisal–to praise and blame. Virtues are 
thus acquired by spending thought, time, and work on their development, 
because one’s virtues address one’s contrary inclinations (p. 173).  
 
The development of intellectual virtues, which is attained by systematic teaching 
(MacIntyre, 1981), is also a product of virtuous dispositions. For instance, as 
discussed in section 6.4.3, the intellectual virtues of will, such as persistence and 
courage, are studied on the basis of both their motivations (Foot, 1978; Steutel, 2005) 
and the contingent therapeutic influence (Roberts, 1984) of their practice. On this 
view, what matters in the growth of intellectual virtues is the existence of ethical 
intentions, within which dispositions are being embedded. In The Primacy of 
Dispositions (2006), Bernard Williams contends that any attempt at changing the 
ethical life we have is not a cognitive matter, but a challenge to amend our personal 
dispositions. According to his argument: 
Indeed, only a disposition view, it seems to me, can give a socially and 
psychologically realistic account of ethical criticism and its effects, an 
account that gives enough weight to the fact that we can actually explain 
and understand the occurrence of ethical attitudes that we find variously 
prejudiced, limited, confused, barbarous and so on (p. 75). 
 
Considering this disposition theory, we can now see how the participants formed their 
personal virtuous dispositions within the drama/theatre education courses by focusing 
primarily on two factors: their practical work and their emotional activation. From 
the data in Figure 6.31 (p. 184), one epistemological element that significantly 
influenced their practical work is group identity. On the other hand, beauty, laughter 
and authenticity are the main aspects of their emotional engagement. In light of this 
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ecological landscape, the process of the participants’ aretaic development (see Figure 
7.1) can be understood in terms of the synergy between the intimate interdependency 
and the simultaneous co-function of the following three conditions: 
• Beauty in relation to artistic work is the key source that forms the participants’ 
virtuous dispositions;  
• Playfulness is one fundamental virtuous disposition generated by 
dramatic/theatrical play that promotes virtues; and 
• Ensemble-based artistic work is both the basis of the participants’ ensemble- 
building dispositions and, even more importantly, the indispensable space 
wherein the virtuous dispositions are transformed into virtues. 
 
7.2.2 Beauty: The Source of Virtuous Dispositions 
In this course, we experienced love; that is why, I linked it with the sun. It 
gave light to our life (Maria-Eva, p. 156).  
[T]his course eventually is the only one I have loved so much! … It was the 
time to gain what I had lost! (Constantinos, p. 159, p. 170).  
[E]verybody was involved in such an enthusiastic manner… Here, I dance 
with my soul… The “want” is above the “must” … I love what I do and I 
want to do it (Stefanos, p. 169, p. 218).  
Figure 7.1: The constitution of the participants’ aretaic development  
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Indicatively, these empirical views belong to those characteristics that display the core 
of the affective power the participants embodied in the learning space of the courses. 
They suggest a set of passionate emotions, like love, joy and hope, enthusiasm, desire 
and euphoria that, as discussed in section 6.3.2.2, are a boisterous manifestation of 
beauty. The ‘sheer physical enjoyment and energy’, as Thompson (2006) has argued, 
is the ‘enactment of beauty–a performance of beauty’ (p. 56, italics original), which 
‘makes the heart beat faster … [and] life more vivid, animated living, worth living’ 
(Scarry, 2013, pp. 24-25). The role of beauty in the awakening of virtuous 
dispositions, through these good-energy-driven emotions, is a theme rooted in 
Platonic philosophy and, for this reason, Plato would invite us to ponder them as 
erotic emotions.     
In his Symposium, Plato conceives eros as a desire that earnestly seeks out beauty, 
extending beyond physical beauty and exciting the lover to give birth ‘to many 
gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom’ (210d). 
Interpreting this philosophical dimension of beauty, Winston (2010) indicates that 
eros wants ‘to understand the nature of the beauty that has set our desire alight’ (p. 
14). Erotic love therefore may be addressed to persons, things, images, ideas and to 
life itself, as one passionate and spiritual process desiring to apprehend the beauty of 
their internal qualities.  
Likewise, Murdoch (1970) praises Platonic love as ‘the starting-point of the good life’ 
(p. 88). She recognises it as ‘the general name of the quality of attachment’ and, 
moreover, as ‘the energy and passion of the soul in its search for Good, the force that 
joins us to Good and joins us to the world through Good’ (ibid., p. 103). By this 
consideration, we can speculate upon beauty as the ‘genetic background of [good] 
action’ (ibid., p. 83, italics not original). As Murdoch believes, it is through the 
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aesthetic experience of creating and enjoying art that we can find this kind of love. 
For Murdoch, art is not simply a serviceable approach to ethics but, as Lin (2012) puts 
it, ‘is a spiritual exercise in purifying our psychic energy by redirecting our attention 
in the search for good’ (p. 316). Art, then, is a rich form of ethical activity, within 
which the self can find beauty and, hence, love and goodness. Thus, experiencing 
beauty is a stimulating process of virtuous dispositions, apt to provoke love for virtue. 
Identifying the ethos of beauty in correlation to art is a critical step in appreciating its 
impact on the quality of the dispositions that the participants acquired within the 
drama/theatre education courses. Above all, the participants expose beauty as a 
personal embodiment, concentrated on the affective dynamics of experiencing the art 
form of drama/theatre education and not merely on its intellectualisation into a set of 
technical qualities (Winston, 2013). Within this framework, we can see the 
participants to be attracted by artistic work and forming a close ‘attachment’ to it, 
through which they manifest a conscious quest for its pedagogical/humanistic 
character. In this way, they develop ‘a judicious respectful responsibility’ (Murdoch, 
1970, p. 90) for artistic work, which for them is an entirely new 
knowledge/experience. Gradually, they unfold a very private conversation with their 
self, in an attempt to grasp what they do and why they do it. This specific approach 
helps them configure good motivations and ethical dispositions. It is this steady inner 
dialogue that, in one simple phrase, arouses their ‘feeling for [the good] life’ (Geertz, 
1983, p. 98), or as Murdoch (1970) might note, excites ‘a just mode of vision and a 
good quality of consciousness’ (p. 91). As proven, for the participants, beauty is 
transformed into a personal journey of exploration of self and what exists beyond it.   
It is also true that the participants experience beauty as an ‘element of mystery’ 
(Winston, 2013, p. 136). One obvious clue for this fact is Stefanos’ distinctive voice: 
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“This was the strange thing! … I still try to understand how so much energy could go 
hand in hand with harmony” (p. 167). However, a holistic comprehension of how the 
participants formed virtuous dispositions through beauty presupposes a more detailed 
description of its inherent qualities. Accordingly, we must talk about its three central 
attributes: togetherness, pleasure and willingness.  
As argued by Winston (2013), beauty is not only a personal experience that ‘we are 
able to feel … for ourselves’ (p. 137), it also functions as a relational experience. It 
always exists in relation to others, since it conduces, as Stefanos’ above statement 
attests, to the building of a harmonious relationship between the person who 
experiences it and that which is beheld – between the person/s and the artistic work. 
In other words, beauty stimulates the spirit of togetherness. As a result of this 
communicability, beauty may transform from a personal state to a public one; using 
Nicholson’s (2013) notion of emotions, it ‘inhabit[s] the intimate spaces of your 
body’ but moreover, it can ‘multiply … from one person to another’ (p. 20).  
On the other hand, Scarry (2013) repeatedly portrays beauty as a ‘pleasure-producing’ 
experience (p. 115). In drama/theatre education, beauty incites a ‘sociable pleasure: 
being with other people, focusing on and learning about them’ (Sennett, 2012, p. 23). 
Such an aesthetic pleasure is fundamental to the field, due to its epistemological 
framework that calls learners to ‘watch, listen, respect and praise one another’ 
(Winston, 2013, p. 138). Within the binary culture of creating and watching 
dramatic/theatrical work, pleasure is transfigured into an ethical component of the 
social space of work (ibid.). So, from this perspective, as Aristotle classically 
advocated, pleasure can ‘influence for virtue and ... [eudaimonia]’ (NE, 1172a23-
1172a24).  
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Willingness, as the third characteristic of beauty, is the one that denotes the activation 
of will in its enactment: “The “want” is above the “must””. The willing mood that the 
participants convey through the embodiment of beauty suggests an openness of self to 
new challenges/experiences. In this regard, it can be apprehended as a kind of 
determination to artistic experimentation and good work. As Scarry (2013) claims, 
‘[t]his willingness continually to revise one’s own location in order to place oneself in 
the path of beauty is the basic impulse underlying education’ (p. 7), which ultimately 
serves in ‘bringing new beauty’ (p. 117). 
From the above description of beauty’s qualities, we can effortlessly discern that 
togetherness, pleasure and willingness are, in fact, virtuous dispositions themselves.  
This assertion is strongly noticeable in Figure 6.43 (p. 229), while these dispositions 
are involved in all the different kinds of virtue ethics developed by the participants. 
Therefore, in this sense, we might envision beauty as one the foundational sources of 
virtues.  
More particularly, observing how the participants exercised persistence within the 
courses, it is evident that beauty is highly associated with it, given that its practice is 
both connected to willingness, pleasure, desire, love, optimism, joy and repose and 
also to dispositions of strong will, such as alertness and vigilance. Another key 
example stems from the ethics of the beautiful, where playful laughter can be seen a 
crystallising product of the participants’ energy of beauty, as it is bound up with its 
three firm dispositions: willingness, pleasure and togetherness. A third case is the 
expansion of the participants’ self-knowledge, which as a central virtue of 
consciousness is evidenced to rely significantly on the virtues of will, such as 
determination, vigilance and courage. This clear interdependency between 
consciousness and active will might be further interpreted as a strong indication of the 
	  	   275	  
involvement of beauty in the formation of their self-knowledge. One last occasion in 
which beauty is intertwined with the participants’ aretaic development could be 
inferred within the context of the virtue ethics of dialogue. As found, the broad 
spectrum of dialogic activities, group work, role-playing and microteaching practices 
within the courses’ learning space, encouraged the participants to become familiar 
with the kind of Aristotelian friendship/love which gathers together a number of 
virtuous dispositions, among which can be found those of beauty. 
7.2.3 Playfulness: The Alley of Beauty   
As discussed in section 6.3.2.2, beauty can both harmonise and humanise our 
contrasting drives for sensation and reason through play (Schiller, 1967), which is 
central to the pedagogy of drama/theatre education. The energising of beauty within 
play can therefore result in the acquirement of the virtuous disposition of playfulness, 
which has a substantial influence on the shaping of the virtues under consideration in 
this research project. Such an inference becomes visible through the observable 
attitudes/feelings that the participants obtain within the playful approaches/activities 
of drama/theatre education. The participants’ following views bare witness to this 
outcome.    
The first thing, for the students, is to live drama and later to learn its 
technical terms and the names of techniques. When I realised that … we 
had freedom to act, as we liked, then, I changed (Constantinos, p. 161, pp. 
179-180). 
The spontaneous thought was the authentic one. … What I understand is 
what is drama; it is the authenticity (Philia, p. 175).  
This course could express my childishness. ... It was beautiful that we could 
escape from our routine (Maria, p. 172).  
For me, it was exciting and so beautiful… a lot of laughter, energy and 
vividness. … we were very much concentrated (Odysseas, p. 173). 
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Given this range of perceptions of the nature of dramatic/theatrical work, it is evident 
which habits and patterns of behaviour the participants developed because of its 
playful character. As corroborated above, they became used to working in a manner 
that relied upon their “freedom” for action, “spontaneous thought”, “authentic” 
thought, “childishness”, “escape from … routine”, “laughter” and concentration. 
Using Pope’s (2005) phrase, all of these attitudes signify ‘a form of liberation and 
creative fulfilment’ (p. 119), which actually mirrors the essence of playfulness.  
According to Howard and McInnes (2013), playfulness is a ‘playful attitude or 
disposition’ ‘one of freedom’ that ‘affects the approach taken to an activity’ (pp. 41-
42). In addition, as they point out, playfulness ‘accords with the ‘flow state’ identified 
by Csikszentmihalyi … which is also characterised by internal affective qualities of 
pleasure, involvement and deep concentration’ (ibid.). However, the significance of 
this correlation of playfulness with flow theory is twofold; we can perceive, on the 
one hand, the role of beauty in play and, on the other hand, the implications of 
playfulness in the quality of the participants’ work within the courses.  
Significantly, playfulness, as a disposition that ‘can continue to influence our thinking 
and our behaviour throughout our lives’ (Parker-Rees, 1999, p. 61), is a key notion of 
Dewey’s progressive pedagogy and, in parallel, also reminds us of Platonic pedagogy. 
In How We Think (1910), Dewey expounds a theory according to which ‘playfulness 
is a more important consideration than play. The former is an attitude of mind; the 
latter is a passing outward manifestation of this attitude’ (p. 162, italics original). The 
most crucial aspect of this premise is that the ‘playful attitude … gradually pass[es] 
into a work attitude’ (ibid.). Also, in Republic, Plato contends an analogous ideology 
while he discusses which activities can be used to educate young people. As he 
writes: 
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[W]hen children in their earliest play are imbued with the spirit of law and 
order through their music, the opposite of the former supposition 
happens—this spirit waits upon them in all things and fosters their growth, 
and restores and sets up again whatever was overthrown in the other type of 
state (425a). 
 
For Plato, as affirmed within his words, play, music and the arts in general are means 
of recreation that enable children to acquire a good sense of laws – an embodied 
harmony of how to act well – that can have an impact on their spiritual progress both 
as persons and as citizens. Thus, Plato and Dewey demonstrate that the 
spirit/disposition of play may evolve into a life habit and, therefore, can constitute a 
major characteristic of our daily and professional work. On a practical level, this 
nexus between playfulness and work, as defined by Dewey (1910), is an ‘interest in 
the adequate embodiment of a meaning (a suggestion, purpose, aim) in objective form 
through the use of appropriate materials and appliances’ (p. 163, italics original).  
In light of this definition, we could then justify the correctness of Constantinos’ 
opinion that “[f]or students, the first thing is to live drama and later to learn its 
technical terms”. By asserting the primacy of the experiential/affective/playful aspect 
of drama, Constantinos makes clear his perception that it is through this that student 
teachers can both practically understand its pedagogy and obtain the work attitudes 
and dispositions necessary for its teaching. Consequently, the acquirement of its 
technical qualities is the kind of knowledge that can be more effectively achieved 
through the empirical dynamics both of beauty and playfulness.   
Determining the role of playfulness in the participants’ aretaic development means 
that its inherent qualities, like freedom, spontaneity, concentration and pleasure, are 
central to this attempt (see Figure 6.43, p. 229). Initially, playfulness seems to be 
closely correlated with the growth of their intellectual virtues of courage and 
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parrhesia, while both considerably depend on freedom/freedom of expression 
respectively. However, among the four sorts of virtue ethics developed by the 
participants, playfulness appears to hold a fundamental presence in the virtue ethics of 
the beautiful. One paradigmatic virtue is the participants’ playful laughter that, as 
evidenced, is built on their artistic experimentation, concentration and spontaneity, as 
well as on a series of other playful virtues they grew within the courses, such as: 
cheerfulness, gaiety and humour. Although pleasure and comfort are two added 
dispositions of playful laughter that can apparently be seen as an effect of the 
participants’ playfulness, nevertheless they also display the congruity that beauty and 
playfulness share. A second important case that also signifies an intimate binary 
relation with playfulness and beauty is the friendly/loving bonds that the participants 
created, which are discerned by the dispositions of enjoyment, pleasure, comfort, 
spontaneity and originality.  
7.2.4 Ensemble-based Artistic Work: The Open Space of the Formation of   
Virtues 
Both beauty and playfulness can be regarded as conduits of virtuous dispositions, 
which may ‘give a fairly clear sense to the idea of quality of experience and change of 
consciousness’ (Murdoch, 1970, p. 84). For these particular students, it is possible 
that such a notion might reveal the process of their aretaic development to be, in large 
part, a personal attainment. However, in order to attain a rounded view of this process, 
it is indispensable for us to understand that it is also a social process, a premise that 
connotes the instrumentality of the social conditions within which the courses were 
underpinned.    
Virtues, as previously emphasised by Sockett (2012) in section 7.2.1, are acquired ‘by 
spending thought, time, and work’ (p. 173) – all deeds that indicate a personal effort 
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on the part of the individual. Conversely, MacIntyre (1999) highlights the potential 
impact of the social environment on their construction:  
It is not for the achievement of our common good that we are dependent on 
the other members of our communities, but we depend too on some 
particular others to achieve most of our individual goods (p. 161). 
 
Accordingly, when we speak of the participants’ aretaic development, we refer to a 
phenomenon that results from the fusion of a personal and social endeavour. Focusing 
on the social space of their learning within the courses, as delineated in section 
6.3.2.2, it is characterised by the function of an ensemble-based ecology built on 
cooperation, trust and security. It is in this concrete context that they were 
encouraged, not only to develop ensemble-driven dispositions and, by extension, 
ensemble-driven virtues, but also, to awaken, to “live” and transform their personal 
virtuous dispositions of beauty and playfulness both into interpersonal and 
intrapersonal virtues. Based on this inference, we could reasonably recognise the 
courses’ ensemble-based artistic work as the most indispensable and decisive space of 
the participants’ aretaic development. Importantly, this postulation also connotes that 
a contingent lack of cooperative and trustful interplay among the courses’ participants 
might potentially give rise to a different result of aretaic development in regard to the 
one depicted in Figure 6.43 (p. 229).    
First and foremost, the courses’ ensemble approach and sociality encouraged the 
participants to value two relevant life conditions: co-existence and co-dependency. 
For this reason, they gained rich experiences of being/working/acting/playing/feeling 
together with others. The embodiment of this collective strength, in Bogart’s (2001) 
words, suggests that ‘[w]e put our heads together and push. The nature of our 
collaboration is expansive’ (p. 18). As proven, this collectivity within the courses 
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extended to ‘a model of democratic living’ (Neelands, 2009a, p. 173), wherein the 
participants were motivated to exercise those democratic virtues of becoming a good 
citizen: parrhesia, isonomia, isegoria, isopsephia and autonomia.  
In addition, the virtues that the participants developed, as a consequence both of the 
courses’ cooperative and democratic ethos, were respect and civility. Regarding 
civility, as deliberated by Stefanos and Philia, the presence of the courses’ teacher 
significantly affected its promotion. These epistemological conditions created an 
intimate and safe climate, within which the participants were enabled to practise the 
kind of “character” friendship/love (Cooper, 1999, p. 321) that, according to 
Aristotelian ethics, is substantially a practice of partnership (NE, 1171b33-1171b34). 
As previously discussed, its development was the product of a rich network of 
virtuous dispositions that the participants configured through beauty and playfulness, 
but it can moreover be understood as a result of the courses’ ensemble-driven learning 
space. Understanding that this kind of friendship/love presupposes a nexus of ethical 
dispositions, we could then infer that it is not solely a particular virtue, but is in fact 
the heart of the virtuous life, or as White (1999) puts it, ‘an apprenticeship in virtue’ 
(p. 79).  
However, to delve more deeply into those social and ensemble-driven dispositions 
that the participants constructed within the courses and which pragmatically 
influenced their aretaic development, given the data shown in Figure 6.43 (p. 229), we 
need to pay attention to: confidence/self-confidence, responsibility, unselfishness and 
self-critique. Neelands (2009a) has stressed that the reinforcement of confidence 
‘gives witness to the power of the ensemble as a way of working to push young 
people towards new levels of collective social and artistic excellence’ (p. 183). Self-
confidence can therefore be seen as one expectable and natural outcome of the 
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confidence underpinned by the ensemble. Indeed, as Wagner (1999) argues, it is 
enhanced, because ‘all ideas are accepted … and all honest effort valued’ (p. 137). 
Defining the contribution of both these dispositions to the formation of the 
participants’ virtues, confidence appears to have a noticeable impact on the boost of 
parrhesia, whereas self-confidence is linked with the expansion of the virtues of their 
will, persistence and courage.  
Moreover, responsibility is one additional disposition that the participants manifested 
due to the courses’ ensemble-building framework. As highlighted by Dunn and 
Anderson (2013), in ‘a community where risk-taking and playfulness’ are appreciated, 
we can behold an ‘empathic facilitation, a sense of shared responsibility across all 
participants’, through their ‘aesthetic management’ of the art form (pp. 297-298). The 
analysis of the participants’ aretaic development (see Figure 6.43, p. 229) allows us to 
see that their responsibility urged the flourishing of both courage and friendship/love.  
Concerning the enhancement of the disposition of unselfishness, this is essentially a 
subject that can be interpreted by Murdoch’s (1970) philosophical notion of the 
synergy between art and beauty, as stressed in section 7.2.2. According to her theory, 
‘[b]eauty is that which attracts this particular sort of unselfish attention’ (p. 65). As 
she claims, art is apt to reveal the reality of the human condition and, in turn, to 
improve our ethical perception of what is real and good. In this way, it awakens our 
disposition of loving attention to others and, in consequence, our ego undergoes an 
openness beyond its egocentrism/egoism. As she explicates:  
[I]n the enjoyment of art … we discover value in our ability to forget self, 
to be realistic, to perceive justly. We use our imagination not to escape the 
world but to join it, and this exhilarates us because of the distance between 
our ordinary dulled consciousness and apprehension of the real (ibid., p. 
90). 
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One critical and representative instance that documents Murdoch’s view is the case of 
Philia. If we bring her experiences of drama to this discussion once more, as exposed 
within the following excerpt, it is conspicuous how this assisted her in better 
understanding both her personal “ordinary” world and the “real” world of others. 
I can confess that drama … helped me change my character. The truth is 
that, in many times, in front of my life dilemmas I used theatrical 
techniques, in order to take a decision. Hot seating is one of the techniques 
that helped me face various questions that troubled me. 
Moreover, I have changed my stance to others. Before, I used to hurry to 
decide, whether I agree or disagree with my interlocutor and I was absolute 
with my theories. The sessions of drama have taught me the virtues of 
patience and perseverance. Within group work and also, as a spectator of 
the other groups’ work, I understood that the message that somebody wants 
to transmit, ultimately, might possibly appear at the end-end of his/her 
performance; I owe it to wait and give my attention until the end, because, 
there were many cases, where my fellow students created a new sense … a 
new outlook on things, just the moments before the end (pp. 223-224).  
 
Given Philia’s testimony, we can reasonably ascertain two key conclusions. First, 
within the context of the art of drama/theatre education, receptivity to alterity and the 
contraction of egocentrism/egoism can, as evidenced, both result from the ‘sociology 
of aesthetics’ (Gallagher, 2005, p. 82). As studied in Chapter 3, a sociological 
awareness of life’s realities can be achieved through the multimodality of the physical 
embodiment and the critical examination of the fictional characters and events. The 
participants’ experiences of drama/theatre education, as witnessed throughout the 
previous chapter, fall within this spectrum of aesthetics. On many occasions the 
participants corroborate that within the courses, both as actors and as audience, they 
had the potential to dialogue with their consciousness, making poetic use of their 
social imagination and inventing visions of possible, alternative truths. This dual 
participation, as Philia’s narration strongly underlines, helped them widen the horizon 
of their belief-holding selves, in relation to their self, to others and to the world.   
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Moving towards our second conclusion, this practice of detachment from ego and 
‘egoistic fantasy’ (Murdoch, 1992, p. 321), as clearly signified again within Philia’s 
words, is inherently led by self-critique. It has been noted by Oakeshott (1991) that in 
self-reflective thought there are two requirements: self-disclosure and self-enactment. 
In the process of self-disclosure, the attention is on my ethical self and how this 
defines my actions and intentions with reference to the practical interactions that I 
have with others. Self-enactment is a second type of self-conversation, centred on the 
values and commitments, the sentiments and virtues, ‘to which I aspire, which I enact, 
and which are at the core of my personal identity’ (Sockett, 2012, p. 154). This 
esoteric talk substantially aims at a deeper awareness of the ethos and identity of self.  
Apart from the agency of the artistic work within the participants’ practice of self-
critique, there is lucid evidence that the two methodological tools used within the 
courses – the reflective diary and microteaching – had an equally significant role in its 
development. In several cases, important data resulted from the participants’ reflective 
diaries, as exhibited in the previous chapter. Their diaries commonly seemed like an 
autobiographic journey, through which they stated their personal search for ‘who I 
am’, ‘what I can see of myself and others’ and ‘what is my real potential’ (see also 
Appendix A). Similarly, in the framework of their group microteaching practices, in 
open discussions they had the dual opportunity to critique their own teaching and 
share feedback with the rest of their fellow students and teacher. This specific self-
deliberative process was one of self-building, assisting them in understanding their 
self both on a personal and professional level.   
Ultimately, the energy of unselfishness in the participants’ aretaic development is 
intimately connected with their friendship/love, whereas self-critique is obviously 
central to the process of the formation of their self-knowledge. However, according to 
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the clean data in Figure 6.43 (p. 229), unselfishness is correlated with no other virtues, 
yet following the participants’ narrations in section 6.4.1.1, it inherently figures in the 
growth of their social virtues of sympathy and empathy. Likewise, in section 6.4.1.2, 
self-critique appears to function intrinsically in the exercise of their intellectual 
capacities of synesis and gnōme, as well as in the virtues of phronēsis and open-
mindedness.  
  
7.3 THE PARTICIPANTS’ ARETAIC PEDAGOGY: A MODEL OF 
ARTISTRY 
At the heart of this discussion is the essential question: What particular 
pedagogical/professional virtues did the participants develop through the courses 
which influenced the pedagogy they applied in their drama/theatre education teaching 
practices? This is a matter theoretically fastened to the notion argued at length in 
Chapter 2, section 2.3, that each person has one self and it is futile to study the 
teacher’s personal/ethical self in isolation from his/her professional/pedagogical self, 
and vice versa (Kristjánsson, 2011; Rodgers & Raider-Roth, 2006; Sockett, 2012). 
Accordingly, this reflective argument is chiefly based on the analysis of the 
participants’ pedagogy, as depicted in Figure 6.45 (p. 260).  
7.3.1 The Fundamentals of The Participants’ Pedagogy 
Considering the data of the participants’ model of teaching in relation to both phases – 
of design and implementation – three key interrelated inferences can be articulated. 
First, for the participants, the teaching of drama/theatre education seems to be a 
practice inescapably interwoven with the teacher’s embodiment of poetical, social and 
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ethical virtues. This finding substantially validates Neelands’ (2009b) pivotal thesis 
regarding the teacher’s presence that is encompassed in the following quote:   
In my experience ‘difference’ in drama is more usually at the level of what 
is in the hearts and minds of teachers using drama than in technical 
differences of content and traditions (p. 11).   
 
Second, the participants steadily indicate to have understood that, in drama/theatre 
education, the scope of the teacher’s role extends beyond the typical pedagogical 
knowledge (Shulman, 1987) that was studied in Chapter 2, in section 2.3.1. 
Alternatively, both the processes of planning and the application of their lessons 
demonstrate that the drama/theatre education teacher’s pedagogical knowledge – 
knowledge of how to teach – depends determinedly on the adoption of the theatrical 
roles of playwright, director and actor (Bowell & Heap, 2005; Wagner, 1999). In 
consequence, the practice of these four roles represents a major epistemological factor 
of their teaching, which can further be considered as a key prerequisite for the 
evolution of a teacher into a successful teacher-artist (Bowell & Heap, 2005). 
Third, as a direct extension of both previous premises, the participants shape the dual 
belief that the teaching of drama/theatre education is a difficult and intricate practice 
and, what is more, requires the teacher’s love for it to succeed. Notably this second 
conviction, beyond the assumption that it is a loud clue of their romanticism (Halpin, 
2009; Liston, 2000), proves their realisation that the teaching of the field requires 
from the teacher a genuine interest/confidence in its idiosyncratic epistemology.   
Overall, the above scheme of the participants’ perceptions of the teaching/teacher of 
drama/theatre education serves as obvious evidence of the artistry they embedded and 
embodied in their pedagogy. That is to say, their pedagogy and artistry becomes a 
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unified teaching practice (Neelands, 2009b; O’Neill, 2006b). So, outlined in general 
terms, the model of their teaching practice could be valued as one that integrates art 
into technical skills and virtue ethics into aesthetics (Carr, 2003; Winston, 2013). 
However, in order that we may more analytically identify the distinctive 
characteristics of the participants’ artistry, it is initially essential to investigate a 
description of the notion of artistry.   
7.3.2 Teacher Artistry: A Window on Virtues of Self 
In From Episteme to Phronesis to Artistry in the Study and Improvement of Teaching 
(2002), Eisner considers artistry in accord with Aristotle’s concept of poetry – a 
concept that has a vital place in his system of virtue ethics for, as noted in Chapter 1, 
section 1.3, it is related to the exercise of the virtue of technê. It is therefore a critical 
condition for excellent practice. Although phronēsis, as Eisner points out, ‘addresses 
the particularity of things and situations … so that someone could decide how to 
move in … an ethically framed direction’ (p. 381), nonetheless, in achieving 
excellence in teaching, phronēsis is not adequate. Good teaching, in his view, 
‘depends upon artistry and aesthetic considerations’ (p. 382).  
So, defining artistry in teaching, he indicates that it is the ingredient that ‘pertains to 
the crafting of action, to the rhetorical features of language, to the skill displayed in 
guiding directions, to the selection and description of an apt example’ (ibid., italics 
original). Primarily, this account makes apparent the gravity that artistry has within 
teaching as one of its internal goods; above all, it is connected with qualitative matters 
of the teaching/learning process. Hence, central to artistry is the concern: How can 
teaching succeed in qualitatively valued activities? As a response to this issue, Eisner 
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illustrates that artistry ‘requires sensibility, imagination, technique, and the ability to 
make judgments about the feel and significance of the particular’ (ibid.).  
Another theorist who can illuminate the notion of artistry is Sennett (2009), who 
deliberates it as ‘craftsmanship, the skill of making things well’ (p. 8). As he believes, 
it is a ‘basic human impulse … and desire to do a job well for its own sake’ (p. 9). 
More importantly, he regards that such a desire ‘is a personal litmus test’ (p. 97). This 
appreciation of Sennett denotes that, in doing good work, the craftsman – or in the 
case of teaching, the teacher – needs to energise his/her whole self. In other words, the 
craftsman/teacher is called to merge the virtues of ethos with the virtues of intellect 
and to implicate the ethical presence in the technical work (ibid.). One of the many 
arguments made by Sennett on this premise, cited below, affirms the role of the self’s 
motivations/dispositions in the process of craftsmanship. He writes: 
The pursuit of quality is also a matter of agency, the craftsman’s driving 
motive. But agency does not happen in a social or emotional vacuum, 
particularly good-quality work. … it is about you … actively pursuing good 
work and finding you can’t do it corrodes one’s sense of self (ibid., p. 97). 
 
In view of the above theses of Eisner (2002) and Sennett (2009), we could 
accordingly recognise the teacher’s artistry in drama/theatre education both as process 
and as product (Sinclair & Kelman, 2013). In terms of viewing the teacher’s artistry 
as a process, what is meant is that it shapes the ‘aesthetic elements [of] a purposeful 
manipulation of the symbolic languages’ of the field, informing both its ‘form and 
content’ (ibid., p. 34). On the other hand, the teacher’s artistry as a product can be 
perceptible in ‘the moment of performance’ (ibid.) of a particular action. 
Essentially, the prime purpose of the teacher’s engagement with artistry relates to the 
‘potential for powerful learning’ and the ‘deep immersion’ of the participants in the 
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dramatic fiction (ibid., p. 35). ‘Teacher-artists, working with artistry’, as stressed by 
Dunn and Stinson (2011), ‘manage form and content skilfully and purposefully to 
achieve heightened cognitive and affective responses simultaneously’ (p. 619). Thus, 
as attested in the context of this delineation, the teacher’s artistry has a deep-rooted 
pedagogical ethos and might justly be seen as the effect of the synergy of all his/her 
likely poetical and ethical virtues. This specific view subsequently supports the 
prospect from which the participants’ artistry is to be examined. 
7.3.3 The Participants’ Artistry: The Embodiment of Play-building 
In portraying the artistic/aesthetic space that the participants created within their 
teaching, it entails that our attention turns foremost to the question: How did they 
manipulate the artistry of dramatic/theatrical form? So, their artistry can be defined 
by the negotiation and re-negotiation of the elements of role, context, focus, tension, 
mood, symbol, place, time, space, language and movement (O’Toole, 1992). In this 
sense, the participants’ artistry turns out to be a matter of how they structured the 
play-building process of their teaching. Given the preceding analysis in section 6.5, I 
propose that their artistry (see Figure 7.2) is evidenced to be framed by three features:  
• Creation of a virtuous space-body dialogue; 
• Poetry of stimulating emotions/dispositions of beauty; and 




Figure 7.2: The characteristics of the participants’ artistry 
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7.3.3.1 Teacher as creator of a virtuous space-body dialogue 
Beyond the objectives of the lesson, my main purpose was to make the 
children love drama … because I loved drama … So, I wanted the children 
to feel the same and not to be afraid to participate. In drama, because the 
pupils sit on the floor, then stand up, you have to do the same movements. 
It is a way that makes the pupils feel nicely and makes the teacher become 
one with them (Stefanos, p. 236, p. 248).  
I think if the pupils were alone without me in this travel, it couldn’t have 
the same result. I was with the children on the floor … and we all traveled 
together. I am not cold. I am also a friend. I am not just the teacher who 
asks and that’s it. In teaching, it is not always teacher-pupil (Odysseas, p. 
244, pp. 247-248). 
 
In the participants’ teaching, the relationship of both the real and imaginative spaces 
within the teacher’s body, as indicatively suggested by these restated views, seems to 
be very intimate and to function as an inseparable element of his/her presence. The 
union of the two “symbolic languages” – space and body – shows that the participants 
– in and out of role – operated in a continuum with their pupils’ bodies/actions. This 
is surely one quality that, in comparison with the teaching of other curriculum areas, 
might be regarded as untypical, but beyond this remark, according to Eisner (2002), it 
corresponds to a potent notion of the teacher’s artistry. As he explains: 
There is another sense in which artistry is important in teaching and that 
sense has to do with the place of aesthetic experience in its pursuit. To 
understand what teachers do, one needs to understand where they receive 
their satisfactions, what gives them their highs in teaching. Teachers craft 
experience by shaping the environment that both students and teachers 
share. This environment, in turn, shapes how teachers and students interact. 
The quality of that interaction is influenced, in the main, by the moves the 
teacher makes, by the plans the teacher designs, and by matters of timing, 
manner, and tone (ibid., pp. 382-383). 
 
Therefore, according to the participants’ teaching experiences, it is evidenced that 
their body enacted its own pedagogy and political answerability (Cooks, 2007), as a 
consequence of the harmonised dialogue between their bodily/aesthetic energies and 
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virtuous dispositions (Fenske, 2004). The pedagogical/virtuous aesthetics of the 
participants’ space-body dialogue is mainly verified by two key observations. First, 
the exploitation of the space, as presented in Figure 6.44 (p. 242), is witness to a 
model of teaching based on ongoing interaction, togetherness, cooperation and 
playfulness between teacher and pupils. Second, the participants’ communicative 
behaviour as negotiators, in regard to the data in Figure 6.45 (p. 260), is escorted by 
the exercise of the social virtues of respect and trust, in a climate of comfort, joy and 
good-heartedness. But perhaps the greatest clue of their virtuous energy within the 
practice of negotiation is their embodied friendship/love. Their artistry, in this 
particular case, is palpable through the virtuous bodily signs by which they interacted 
with the pupils, including their physical touch, their focus, smiles, laughter and where 
they sat with them in the space. 
7.3.3.2 Teacher as poet of stimulating emotions/dispositions of beauty 
The second characteristic of the participants’ artistry stems from the combination of 
emotional aesthetics with the ‘sensuous internalisation of meaning’ (O’Toole, 1992, 
p. 98), within the process of devising the story-building. Notably, Philia’s vivid 
narration as the Little Prince in collaboration with her pupils as co-actors-spectators; 
Odysseas’ aesthetic selections – spatial, acoustic and visual – in the structural process 
of the journey to the planet of solitariness; also, Maria’s fantasy through her 
movement-voice transformation into the role of Elmer, walking on her four feet. 
These are some of the most representative cases in which the participants’ poetics 
engendered the pupils’ unexpectedness, curiosity and surprise. The implications of the 
creation of this unified aesthetic-teaching-learning space are significant, for it excited 
the pupils’ feelings of pleasure and admiration and, consequently, their performative 
imagination and conscious activation. As highlighted by Greene (1995), ‘imagination 
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… obviously deals in unpredictabilities, in the unexpected’ and ‘requires 
reflectiveness’ (pp. 124-125).  
Beyond the above instances in which the participants’ artistry is displayed both as 
process and as product, the case of Constantinos’ artistry could also be advocated as 
an example worthy of attention. At the core of his artistic energising lay his 
imaginative and daring decisions – specifically, how he chose to stimulate the pupils, 
encouraging them to explore meanings for the chained elephant’s life and for the 
circus animals’ ill-treatment in general. The aesthetic/spatial freedom he offered them 
to experiment, with the use of a variety of gymnastic instruments and elephant masks, 
resulted in the exercise of the pupils’ artistic/creative skills manifested within their 
physically/emotionally rich performances. In his class, as also occurred in the cases of 
Maria, Maria-Eva and Philia, the shy pupils and those with special needs entered into 
a state of flow and beauty. According to the participants’ commentaries, this was 
perceptible by their involvement in both the drama/theatre conventions and in 
rehearsals.  
7.3.3.3 Teacher as deviser of dialogical/rhetorical playing 
The use of language by the teacher, as emphasised in Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.2, is an 
important parameter of his/her ethical/intellectual presence and so, in this regard, can 
also be seen as a crucial aspect of his/her artistry. In drama/theatre education, given 
that language is one ‘essential and authentic method of communication’ and the 
teacher needs to harness a ‘target language’ purposefully embedded in a social context 
(Kao & O’Neill, 1998, p. 4), the teacher’s language artistry is justifiably seen as a 
salient aesthetic condition. The language plays that he/she devises to provoke the 
pupils’ thinking (Cook, 2000) significantly influence the quality of his/her 
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interaction/cooperation with the pupils and, furthermore, the creation of a pleasurable 
teaching/learning process.  
Indications of the participants’ artistry in the domain of language are mostly observed 
within their playful interactions with the pupils as teachers/actors. One good example 
of this is the practice of rhetorical statements, dilemmatic questions and persuasive 
arguments used by Philia in role as the Little Prince. Let us remember some of the 
elegant passages of her speech:  
“Recently, I have a thought that I want to share it with my flower. But, I don’t want to 
hurt my unique friend … What to do? Do you know what is my dilemma? Can you 
suppose? … How shall I tell my flower my decision? To stay?… To leave?... Tell me 
your opinions. … To uproot it? … it will die ... On the other hand, I can’t carry my 
whole planet on my back … If something goes wrong and I can’t come back? To give 
it untrue promises? … So, what do you suggest me? … To leave and simply protect 
my rose or to stay and forget the journeys? ...” (pp. 253-254). 
The sensual elements that made Philias’ performance more delightful, interwoven 
with her speech, were her vivid paralinguistic characteristics and lively body 
movement. The rhythm of her speech and the tone of her voice were differentiating in 
harmony with the affective mood of the narration, while the energy of her facial 
expressions, gestures and posture connoted a vigilant sense of her dual role as 
teacher/actor. An unspoken but moving snapshot of her narration was the moment that 
the Little Prince approached his rose to caress and kiss it before leaving.  
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7.4 EPILOGUE: THE CONNECTEDNESS OF THE PARTICIPANTS’ SELF 
This chapter has been positioned within the perspective of understanding the process 
of the participants’ aretaic development, focusing both on the personal and 
professional virtues they developed in the context of drama/theatre education. As 
clearly attested by the ethos and aesthetics of their pedagogy and artistry, the 
participants as teachers integrated in their teaching a nexus of intrinsic motivations, 
ethical dispositions and social/intellectual virtues that, originally, they experienced 
and developed as persons/students in the framework of the drama/theatre education 
courses. By this correlation it can be argued that, in the case of the participants, the 
development of personal virtue ethics transformed into professional virtue ethics. 
Some major examples of this cohesion and continuity of their personal self with their 
professional self are, as I have suggested, evident through their practice of the ethical 
virtues of respect, cooperation, trust and friendship/love, the virtue ethics of the 
beautiful – joy and good-heartedness – and the ethics of dialectic and rhetoric. 
Crucially, these are all observable within both ecologies: in the drama/theatre 
education courses and in their teaching practices. 
In light of this key remark upon the participants’ aretaic development, a series of 
critical conclusions might be formulated which are of relevance to the contribution of 
drama/theatre education. So, this view preludes the scope of the next chapter, which 
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PART FOUR  
 
CONCLUDING THE STUDY:  
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Chapter 8 
ACTIVATING POSSIBILITIES FOR ARETAIC PEDAGOGY 
THROUGH DRAMA/THEATRE EDUCATION 
The challenge for our education system is to leverage the learning sciences 
and modern technology to create engaging, relevant and personalized 
learning experiences for all learners that mirror students’ daily lives and the 
reality of their futures. In contrast to traditional classroom instruction, this 
requires that we put students at the center and empower them to take 
control to their own learning by providing flexibility to several dimensions 




8.1 INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
With this contemporary rhetoric in mind, this qualitative phenomenographic case 
study has attempted to offer a rejoinder to this position by educating student teachers 
to understand teaching as an ethical, virtue-driven practice through drama/theatre 
education. Situating such an outlook as its overarching purpose, the study has 
consequently sought an alternative proposal to the synchronous mainstream 
educational discourse and politics, which tend to vision good teaching/learning as an 
exclusively determinant product of a technical-rationalist approach to education. 
Certainly, the practice of aretaic pedagogy in modern schools is a complex 
undertaking, if we seriously estimate the influence of the technological conditions of 
education, largely imposed by governmental policies, economic expediencies and 
imperatives. However, the results of this study suggest that aretaic pedagogy is 
inextricably bound up with the practice of drama/theatre education. In this light, it 
turns out to be an intrinsic and essential quality for the effectiveness of the field.   
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As clearly shown in the above quote, at the heart of the essential changes in learning 
lies the idea of a person-centred pedagogy that, according to the interpretation given 
in Chapter 2, advocates the promotion of virtues, both intellectual and ethical. This 
particular pedagogical consideration has been studied in harmony with the 
fundamental Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, which urges the growth of the person 
through the synergy of a holistic virtue-based practice throughout his/her 
personal/social/professional life.  
The study has also exploited MacIntyre’s (1981) sociological theory of practice – as a 
social and cooperative human activity geared towards the achievement of excellence 
by means of the exercise of internal goods – to argue that teaching is a paradigmatic 
case of such an ethical practice. Higgins’ (2011) further elaboration of MacIntyre’s 
perception of the internal goods, as indicated within his taxonomy into those of a 
practice/practitioner, was very useful for seeing teaching as a eudaimonistic space 
both for learners and teachers. In addition, following Sockett’s (2012) pedagogical 
theses, it has been highlighted that a person-centred pedagogy can be practically 
achieved by the application of an epistemological approach to teaching, which has the 
advantage of linking methodically knowledge with virtue.   
On the other hand, as examined in Chapter 3, the idiosyncratic epistemology of 
drama/theatre education, which depends upon the activation of self in relation to the 
real and imaginative others’ selves, was a vital premise for the purpose of this study, 
since it accommodates a rich spectrum of possibilities for aretaic development. One 
additional and underlying idea that has underpinned the scope of the study is that in 
both practices – teaching and drama/theatre education – the quality of a teacher’s 
presence is a key epistemological factor, interwoven in the teaching/learning space 
(Fenstermacher, 1990; Neelands, 2004, 2009b; Sockett, 2012; Winston, 2010). 
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This theoretical fabric, as proven, had a leading role in the data analysis process of the 
study and, accordingly, in the research findings that this last chapter wishes to 
introduce. Thus, in the next sections, the presentation of findings is first followed by a 
discussion of their implications to virtue epistemology, the ontology of good teaching 
and teacher education and, second, by suggestions for new policy and further 
research. Finally, my personal reflections on teaching in the context of teacher 
education conclude this study.  
 
8.2 MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Both the analysis of the research data and its theoretical interpretation, as discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7, illustrate a sequence of findings that substantially stem from the 
primary quest of the study: How did the drama/theatre education courses aid the 
particular student teachers/participants in conceptualising teaching as a practice 
embedded in virtue ethics? The findings are elucidated along with a series of inherent 
themes, necessary for their overall description. 
However, one substantial issue intimately associated with the proper understanding of 
the findings that needs further clarification is the use of the term development. When I 
refer to the notion of aretaic development, which is often interchangeably determined 
by the terms practice or exercise of virtues, this is based on the process itself of 
learning the virtues in accord with Aristotelian ethics, which has been explicated in 
Chapter 1. Hence, Aristotle reminds us:   
We learn an art or craft by doing the things that we shall have to do when 
we learnt it … Similarly, we become just by doing just acts, temperate by 
doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts (NE, 1103a32-1103b1). 
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• The participants perceived that the specific ecology of the drama/theatre 
education courses had a noticeable impact on the practice of their virtues. 
The synergy between all of the five interlocked domains of the courses’ internal 
goods – epistemological, methodological, emotional, recreational and pedagogical – is 
demonstrated as the foremost premise of the flourishing of the participants’ virtues. 
However, according to the process of formation both of the ethical and intellectual 
virtues, the most prolific prerequisites were mainly promoted within the particular 
epistemological, emotional and methodological conditions of the courses.  
• Virtuous dispositions, as the key coefficient of the development of virtues, 
were formed by the participants through beauty, playfulness and the 
ensemble-based ecology of the courses. 
Beauty, as a personal embodiment of the affective power of experiencing the art form 
of drama/theatre education (Winston, 2013), enabled the participants to experience a 
chain of warm, energetic emotions and, by extension, to constitute virtuous 
dispositions such as togetherness, pleasure and willingness. These, in their wholeness, 
influenced the practice of all the virtues they developed. Playfulness was a virtuous 
habit that they cultivated through the energy of beauty within play, which functioned 
as a second important source of virtuous dispositions. Spontaneity, authenticity, 
freedom and flow, for example, are a nexus of such playful/virtuous dispositions. 
There is evidence to suggest that the courses’ ensemble-based ecology equipped the 
participants with a series of ensemble-driven dispositions directly associated with 
confidence/self-confidence, responsibility, unselfishness and self-critique.   
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• Ensemble-based artistic work provided the poetic space for the shaping of 
the participants’ aretaic development, personal and professional. 
The phenomenon of the participants’ aretaic practice has been demonstrated both as a 
personal endeavour and a social attainment. The conjuction of the ensemble-based 
ecology and the artistic work of drama/theatre education facilitated, through a 
diversity of performative/dialogical/dialectical approaches/plays/conventions, the 
configuration of their interpersonal and intrapersonal virtuous dispositions into 
ethical/social/civic and intellectual/poetical/artistic virtues.  
• The participants’ personal aretaic development has been defined by four 
different kinds of virtue ethics, originated by dialogue, the beautiful, the will 
and consciousness. 
Sympathy, empathy, respect and friendship/love are the social virtues practised by the 
participants. The growth of their dialogical virtues is also determined by the 
democratic virtues: parrhesia, isonomia, isegoria, isopsephia, autonomia. As regards 
the virtue ethics of the beautiful, civility is one virtue primarily elaborated by Stefanos 
and Philia, who point to my own practice as a model here. Playful laughter is a virtue 
largely demonstrated by all the participants. Persistence is one key virtue of will 
exercised mostly by Maria, Constantinos and Stefanos that they see as having 
enhanced their self-confidence, self-knowledge and pleasure for work. Courage, as a 
second virtue of will, was demonstrated again by Maria and Constantinos, helping 
them overcome their fears and initial shyness in drama class. Finally, self-knowledge, 
the central virtue of consciousness, was exercised by almost all of the participants. In 
the cases of the female participants, it had a corrective impact on their character, 
whereas it functioned as a reinforcing means of the male participants’ pedagogical 
knowledge.  
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• The participants’ ethics within their teaching was based on virtues that they 
practised in the framework of the courses. 
In their drama/theatre education teaching practices, the participants applied an 
ensemble-based pedagogy in combination with dialogue exercising their social virtues 
of cooperation, trust, respect and friendship/love. Joy, good-heartedness and comfort 
were the virtues of the ethics of the beautiful that boosted the playfulness and 
vigilance of their presence when teaching. Also, they worked with the perception that 
the teacher’s love for drama/theatre education can serve as a scaffold for the building 
of a pleasurable teaching/learning experience.  
• Their teaching was embedded in aretaic pedagogy with focus to artistry. 
The fundamental characteristic of their teaching was the incorporation of art into 
pedagogical/technical skills and virtue ethics into aesthetics (Carr, 2003; Winston, 
2013). Both in the planning and implementation of their teaching, they activated a set 
of poetical skills embedded in pedagogical/virtuous dispositions that correspond to the 
performance of a quadripartite presence: of playwright, director, actor and teacher 
(Bowell & Heap, 2005; Wagner, 1999). The aesthetics/pedagogy of their physical 
presence was a further powerful sign of the energy of their ethical/social 
dispositions/virtues.  
• The key trait of the participants’ artistry was the building of a play-guided 
learning process.  
First, the participants constructed a virtuous space-body dialogue, using the real and 
imagined spaces of the drama classroom and driven by a steady interaction, 
togetherness and playfulness between teacher and pupils. Second, they concentrated 
on awakening the pupils’ emotions/dispositions towards beauty, making use of the 
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unexpected, curiosity and surprise. Third, Philia was the principle participant to 
perform in role, executing a dialogical/rhetorical play and provoking the pupils’ active 
engagement through her rhetorical speech, using a nexus of dilemmatic questions and 
convincing arguments. Also, her rich paralinguistic characteristics and vivid bodily 
movements created an affective aesthetics throughout this episode. 
 
8.3 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY TO LITERATURE 
The significance of the above findings can be mainly contextualised in three fields: 
(1) virtue epistemology, (2) an ontology of good teaching and (3) teacher education. 
Therefore, in the discussion that follows, a set of implications related to the 
philosophy of education and the practice of teaching will be illustrated. 
8.3.1 Virtue Epistemology 
This study, I would argue, demonstrates that virtues can spring from an emotional 
immersion in the experiential process of the art form of drama/theatre education and 
its play-driven framework. Thus, as a response to the critical question of virtue 
epistemology ‘How can aretaic development be achieved in teaching?’ the study can 
suggest, in correlation with the artistic work of drama/theatre education, three 
fundamentals: beauty, playfulness and the ensemble-based pedagogy. These particular 
sources of emotion enabled each participant to form a wide personal ecology of 
virtuous dispositions that, in turn, through the influence of the artistic work, 
engendered the promotion of a diversity of ‘social and work-related virtues’ (Winston, 
2013, p. 139).  
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The fact, however, that the essential inherent qualities of beauty – togetherness, 
pleasure and willingness – are those that had the most decisive role on the 
participants’ virtuous dispositions, points towards the potentially significant impact of 
beauty on creating possibilities for aretaic development in teaching/learning spaces. 
We might accordingly propose beauty as an indispensable “aesthetic necessity” for 
the flourishing of the learners’ virtues. In this regard, this finding boosts Murdoch’s 
(1991) belief in beauty as an appropriate means for an education ‘in the love of virtue’ 
(p. 86).  
8.3.2 Ontology of Good Teaching 
Defining what is good teaching is certainly a philosophical matter that presupposes, as 
Biesta (2012) indicates, a clear vision of education as a teleological practice. In the 
context of this study, the notion of the ontology of good teaching is determined by the 
application of aretaic pedagogy, which aims at the learners’ aretaic development and, 
simultaneously, premises the practice of the teacher’s virtue ethics. Pragmatically, 
locating this theoretical frame of good teaching in drama/theatre education, as 
demonstrated by the findings of the study related both to the courses’ ecology and the 
participants’ pedagogy, can be achieved through the practice of one essential 
principle: How teacher and learners build together a virtuous-dispositions-driven 
teaching/learning space for playing together. It is an assumption that practically 
requires the merger of three key theatrical signs: body, space and good-energy-driven 
emotions.  
The greatest advantage of the learning space within this framework is that it carries 
the potential to have a multidimensional affect upon the learners’ aretaic development 
in relation to their personal identity. This is evidenced by the growth of the 
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participants’ virtues of the will and self-knowledge. Moreover, this possibility is 
affirmed within the participants’ teaching practices of drama/theatre education, in 
which the shy pupils and the pupils with special needs demonstrated, according to the 
participants’ commentaries, a more energetic involvement than in other subjects. In 
view of this therapeutic function, wherein the presence of ‘bodies, emotions, place, 
time, sound, image, self-experience, history’ are interwoven, the learning space, as 
suggested by Ellsworth (2005), can ‘take us up to and sometimes across the 
boundaries of habit, recognition and socially constructed identities within ourselves 
… [and] between selves and others’ (p. 55).   
From the side of the teacher, the first key condition for the creation of a virtuous-
dispositions-driven teaching/learning space, as proposed by the participants, is his/her 
love for drama/theatre education. The merit of this is decisive for, as evidenced, it is 
channeled in the teacher’s pedagogy and artistry, affecting the quality of his/her 
performance in relation to the roles of playwright, director and actor. The embodiment 
of social virtues and the ethics of the beautiful is another significant aspect of the 
teacher’s ethics that, as attested, can play a noticeable role in the enhancement of the 
pupils’ sense of security and the pleasures of participation. Such a context of ethics, in 
Higgins’ (2011) view, can ‘be the expression of one’s personal and deepest 
motivations’ and makes ‘the teacher struggle to be self-ful’ (p. 2, italics original). On 
the other hand, it can offer the teacher, as Higgins further claims, the possibility for 
‘self-cultivation’, which can eventually move ‘closer to a humane, sustainable ethic of 
teaching’ (ibid.).  
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8.3.3 Teacher Education 
The contribution of this study to teacher education can be argued in terms of two 
crucial aspects of the participants’/student teachers’ professional preparation. First, 
there is evidence that the participants’ aretaic development can be seen as a dialectic 
process between their personal aretaic development and professional aretaic 
development. This is an important finding, because it reveals the possible influence of 
drama/theatre education on the growth of student teachers as persons, both ethically 
and intellectually. This chimes with Biesta’s (2010, 2012, 2014) recent educational 
theory that student teachers’ personal aretaic development should be included in the 
teleology of teacher education. Speaking of the future of teacher education, Biesta 
(2012) indicates the necessity for educating teachers as ‘educationally wise person[s]’ 
(p. 18, italics original) and, therefore, problematises the notion of teaching as a 
practice of competences that, as he beholds, monopolises current educational 
discourse. The alternative thesis that he proposes emanates from an Aristotelian 
theoretical view and is built on the idea of ‘formation of the person’ (ibid., p. 18). As 
he expounds: 
[T]eacher education is not about the acquisition of knowledge, skills and 
dispositions per se (qualification) nor about just doing as other teachers do 
(socialisation) but starts from the formation and transformation of the 
person, and it is only from there that questions about knowledge, skills and 
dispositions, about values and traditions, about competence and evidence 
come in, so to speak – never the other way around. What we are after in the 
formation of a person is educational wisdom, the ability to make wise 
educational judgments. Following Aristotle we can call this a virtue-based 
approach to teacher education. … we could say that what we are after here 
is for teacher students to become virtuous professionals (ibid., pp. 18-19, 
italics original). 
 
As evidenced within this study, a “virtue-based approach to teacher education”, 
applied in the field of drama/theatre education, facilitated the participants/student 
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teachers’ understanding of the concept of virtue as an inherent, epistemological factor 
that can operate on two levels: as a good amplifier of the distinctive pedagogy of the 
field and, perhaps more importantly, as a prerequisite for virtue-based learning. 
The second underlying finding, which bares witness to the significant role of the study 
in the participants’ professional training, is the cultivation of their artistry through 
drama/theatre education. Teacher artistry is, in essence, a notion that, as interpreted in 
the previous chapter (section 7.3.2) is intrinsically associated with what the teacher is 
– as a person – and emanates from his/her ethical/pedagogical subjectivities and 
intellectual/poetical teaching capacities. As a consequence of this perception, we 
might postulate the participants’ artistry as a virtuous practice that can be considered 
integral to Biesta’s (ibid.) recommendation for “educationally wise” teachers.  
In addition, the importance of the promotion of the participants’ artistry might be 
further underlined by Bowell and Heap (2005). In their view, as argued in Chapter 3, 
it is essential for student teachers to be trained as teacher-artists, who must be 
prepared to manage both the pedagogical and artistic aspects of teaching the art of 
drama/theatre education. Thus, since the essential characteristic of the participants’ 
artistry was the device of a vivid play-driven process, this was the result of the use of 
poetical approaches embedded in the ensemble-based pedagogy. Within this 
pedagogical/artistic context, the participants employed theatre semiotics and 
theatrical elements, in an attempt to produce a challenging environment that could 
excite the pupils’ creative responses.  
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8.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR NEW POLICY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Considering the positive implications of drama/theatre education in the participants’ 
personal/professional aretaic development, it is reasonable to stress the need for a 
substantial amendment regarding the position of the courses of drama/theatre 
education in the student primary teachers’ academic programme of my school. As 
referred to in Chapter 4, in section 4.4.2.1, contrary to the programme of pre-primary 
education, in which there is at least one compulsory course of drama/theatre 
education, in the programme of primary education both courses are optional. Given 
the findings of the study we can postulate that this policy is weak, provoking a key 
lacuna in the preparation of student primary teachers, who will possibly finish their 
study without having attended any of the courses. Both the participants’ views upon 
the significance of the courses, as affirmed through the study (see also Appendix B), 
as well as the findings per se, would point towards the desirability for such attendance 
by student primary teachers and the application of a similar policy to that of the pre-
primary programme.  
This new policy would be feasible on the basis of different schemata. In particular, 
one possibility might be the transposition of one of the two courses from the 
speciliasitations of the Arts or Greek Language and its location in the two compulsory 
Arts courses: Visual Arts in Primary School (Edus 350) and Music Education in 
Primary School (Edus 361). From another perspective, the teaching of one of the 
drama/theatre education courses would be presumably more beneficial if it was 
combined with the courses of Teaching Methodology. In both instances, the second 
course of drama/theatre education would remain common to the specialisations of 
Arts and Greek Language. Proceeding to the materialisation of any of these proposals, 
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the only considerable alteration in the students’ academic programme would be the 
reduction of the courses of each specialisation from four to three courses. 
Certainly, the case for this new policy might be even more robust if this research 
project could be applied more extensively in relation to the following questions: 
• How did pupils evaluate the participants’ teaching of drama/theatre education? 
• What were the views/estimations of the mentors-teachers, in the classes of 
whom the participants taught their lessons of drama/theatre education? 
• Whether and to what extent did the participants/student teachers apply their 
aretaic development – personal and professional – promoted within the 
drama/theatre education courses, in the teaching of other subject areas of the 
curriculum during their practicum?  
However, these additional themes for research, in combination with the scope of this 
study, essentially connote the prospect of the conduct of new research studies, which 
should apparently be carried out under different research parameters, such as: 
questions, methods and contexts. Should the above questions be included in the 
current study then, due to the expected elongation of the processes of data collection 
and data analysis, two key factors of its performance would be necessarily altered. 
The large spectrum of research work would very probably demand a group of 
researchers and, also, a longer period of time.  
 
8.5 EPILOGUE: PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING IN TEACHER 
EDUCATION 
Finally, I have chosen to end with a brief argument on one crucial question: What is 
the impact of the findings of this study on the widening of my theory of teaching in the 
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context of teacher education? This question is imperative, as I believe I had multiple 
opportunities for self-evaluation as a teacher through my threefold role as teacher, 
observer and researcher throughout this study. Consequently, within the frame of this 
question, I have clarified vague ideas and ordinary habits hidden within my teaching 
practices/approaches for which, beforehand, I had been unable to see the depth of 
their pedagogical merit. The process of answering this question can bring to light 
what Taylor (1989) points out, namely an ‘essential link between identity and a kind 
of orientation’, which allows the determination of ‘what has meaning and importance 
… and what is trivial or secondary’ (p. 263).  
Hence, given the phenomena of personal and professional aretaic development of the 
participants through the courses of drama/theatre education, I have furthered my sense 
of the significance of the following three pedagogical premises. 
• Good teaching presupposes conscious and explicit theoretical/philosophical 
knowledge of what is teaching, a knowledge that is transformed into 
epistemological practices.    
• The necessary epistemological conditions that can awaken student teachers’ 
learning depend on the synergy of the use of space, body, mind and virtuous 
dispositions, given that these four factors are those that shape what is 
teaching as a social/human practice.  
• When beauty and artistry are inherently intertwined in the teaching space, 
student teachers can empirically conceive their implications in both the 
performance and process of teaching. For them, the combination of both 
these qualities is a precondition for gaining insights into emotional and 
qualitative issues of teaching. It is possible that, in this light, they themselves 
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might feel confident to employ teaching approaches, both embodied and 
embedded in sentimental energy and poetical activation.       
Conceptualising teaching in these terms signifies the wish that we desire our new 
teachers to comprehend teaching as an aretaic practice, founded in both pedagogical 
science and artistry. This notion, as strongly demonstrated by the results of this study, 
can fill the student teachers’ mind with purpose, passion and hope. Ultimately, in so 
doing, we might re-position ‘the human heart that is … the source of good teaching’ 
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APPENDIX A: Excerpts From the Participants’ Reflective Diaries 
 
Maria: 10th Reflective diary, 10.1.2013 
After all the groups performed their pieces, we sat in a circle and shared our emotions, 
as well as the positive and negative points of our performances. One idea that arises 
from our discussion is that the self can go beyond its limits! We can do a thousand 
things that we think we cannot manage! It demands drive, perseverance, love for what 
you do, and optimism! Then, you can see a different ego.  
Our team did very well. We each did our best. I think I’m happy with myself and I 
tried to offer pleasure and emotion in our performance. ... I really enjoyed it! It was 
more than magic! ... 
All this effort, work and persistence helped me learn what I can do! I discovered 
many aspects of myself and understood better my fellow students! Finishing this 
course I will have only positive memories, because I learnt new things that I can apply 
to my everyday life. It was also an experience that doesn’t end here! …  
In the context of Theatre Education and Theatrical Play, students expand their 
imaginations and learn to communicate with greater energy. … They can work 
creatively, respectfully and cheerfully. … The imagination helps you think beyond 
what is real. If student teachers take this course seriously, I think they will be able to 
help their pupils meet their potential and love what they do! 
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Philia: 6th Reflective diary, 18.11.2012 
This session managed to prove the importance and timelessness of this epic. Although 
written thousands of years ago, it is so recent. The human mind doesn’t change, no 
matter how many years pass. For instance, the dilemmas of a man after being lured by 
a woman’s charming beauty, the constant concern for our honour and dignity, the 
constant conflict between reason and feeling. All these together form the world of our 
mind. Sometimes, they are issues that lead humans to despair and often to wrong 
decisions and paranoia. … 
Finally, I am thinking that if drama can act as an exploration of an event, a story and a 
human condition, then it can also work as psychoanalysis for the self. If true, what can 
I say … we found our cure! 
 
Maria-Eva: 3rd Reflective diary, 16.10.2012 
Teaching through Theatre Education, the teacher has the potential to teach pupils the 
relation of the school with the wider social environment. Pupils can improve their 
expressiveness and discover creative ways to communicate. They can understand 
human relationships and their problems. … 
Theatre Education and Theatrical Play gives the opportunity to become both actor and 
spectator. You are free to do whatever you have in mind, and you can improvise 
because you are not obliged to follow a particular script. … 
Today, in the workshop, we had very creative activities. … We were invited as pairs 
to have an improvised conversation that was based on a question related to the script. 
Examining the case of the woman, we talked and said whatever we believed regarding 
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her decisions and their consequences. We discussed what would happen later in her 
life. In the end, when we had to explain her decisions, I personally said I would 
behave as the woman in the story, because if these people really did have someone 
injured with them, then I would feel bad if I didn’t help. Applying the technique of the 
conscience alley, within the path of consciousness each had a different point of view, 
which was great for listening to what the rest of my fellow students were saying, I 
understood that there are so many different opinions concerning one subject. 
 
Odysseas: 7th Reflective diary, 26.11.2012 
How should one learn to agree or disagree with others on various issues? 
Is this something we can learn? Does our society allow us to disagree? Does your 
level of education not allow you to disagree? Is there the potential just to agree so as 
not to offend anyone and, consequently, do you suffer for having agreed? 
Do I agree so that I won’t lose the benefits of my supposed friendship? 
Do I agree because you are older than me? 
Do I agree because you have a superior position to me? 
Do I agree to avoid confronting any consequences? 
Do I agree with you because I am afraid of the truth? 
Do I agree with you because I am too shy to disagree with you? 
Do I agree with you due to political conditions or obligations?  
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So, in many cases, we may proceed to an agreement that we essentially don’t endorse. 
This happens because there is a gap of communication between us and, even more, 
because there is a lack of honesty between us. Or perhaps, we are pressured. 
If you do have the courage to say, “No, I don’t agree”, will you, I wonder, suffer as a 
result of it?  
Will you lose your job, or your life even? 
Will you end your friendship? 
Will you go on adventures? 
Yes, there are people who will greatly appreciate your discord. You have to present 
your opinions with strong arguments. Also, when you don’t agree with something and 
you express it, logically, it should be accepted by the other side, since we live in a 
democratic environment.  
So, for democratic teachers at a democratic school, it is essential to listen to the 
“voice” of their pupils or colleagues. … However, a lot of people prefer to be quiet, 
remaining uninvolved in an event by neither agreeing nor disagreeing. But will this 
society progress with people who want to be in peace? 
 
Stefanos: 8th Reflective diary, 18.12.2012 
Drama is not easy. In drama, it is important to learn to meander, to be able to bring 
children back to the work and to control the class in a magical way, as a cheerful 
person. 
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The way the story was narrated by Eleni was extremely good. There were, 
undoubtedly, perfect features beyond the tone of her voice, her articulation and the 
intensity in the voice, which were incredible. The whole process happened in the 
following way. She made 3 groups, then took a pair of maracas and told us that once 
she rattled one of the maracas, group 1 would have to get up and do whatever she was 
narrating. When she would shake both maracas, group 1 should sit. By extending her 
hands in conjunction with the affirmative nod of her head, group 1 should repeat the 
words she would narrate. When group 1 sat, group 2 stood up and continued to 
improvise.  
 
Constantinos: 4th Reflective diary, 29.10.2012 
I start to realise that the teacher, through drama, can effortlessly grasp the attention of 
students. …  
For me, I noticed that I, too, could become like the rest of my fellow students. Ever 
since I was a primary pupil, when there would be school ceremonies, I never wanted 
to take part, as I was shy. I sometimes even cried and wanted to get off the stage. 
But now I see how wrong I was. … 
As regards my fellow students, I can see that they each demonstrate a change through 
the way they work. I believe that we all learn something, perhaps, some more than 
others, but we definitely improve. We are not all on the same level, as some students 
have taken theatre classes before, whereas others haven’t; however, I see progress in 
all! 
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APPENDIX B: The Participants’ Views on the Position of the Drama/theatre 
Education Courses Within their Academic Programme 
 
Case 1: Constantinos 
A: Constantinos, what is your opinion on drama being in the Arts specialisation? 
C: I think that drama should be a compulsory course, because as I believe it is a 
course which can help you change the opinion of yourself. There have been major 
changes in me within the course. My attitude towards the children has changed a lot. 
It helps student teachers; I can’t describe it. 
A: I see. If the course were compulsory where would you place it in the academic 
programme, Constantinos?  
C: I would certainly add it to Language, Mathematics, teaching methods, with the 
most important, as well as with School Experience (2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
… 
A: Nice! We’re towards the end, Constantinos. Would you like to add a last 
comment? 
C: I loved drama. I also liked research. … And I believe that drama is a good tool for 
teaching. If drama becomes a compulsory course, it will help student teachers a lot. 
It’s not a course that you have to study for day and night. It’s pleasant and interesting 
and you learn through what you do and not through a book (3rd Interview, 26.6.2013).  
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Case 2: Philia 
P: Drama is a course that can actually answer questions about life and our self. It is 
necessary for our field of study, I think. In a practical way, it showed us how to 
behave in a classroom, how to teach beyond books and theories. That’s why I 
consider it different and very important. 
A: As a student teacher you attended this course because you specialise in the Arts. 
What do you think about this regulation? 
P: I think it is one of the courses that should be made a requisite. I’ve seen great 
teachers with years of experience in schools who try to and want to teach drama. But 
what they ultimately do is not really drama. … I would like to suggest that this course 
should be mandatory at university. Furthermore, beyond this, I believe that educators 
at schools within seminars by the Ministry of Education should somehow be informed 
about what drama is (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
 
Case 3: Stephanos 
S: I don’t think it should be an optional course. I realised that my fellow student pre-
primary teachers, who had already been taught the other course of Theatre Education, 
had the qualities to cope with the particular way of teaching. This way is the most 
familiar to the children. You must have these qualities as a teacher. I believe that all 
teachers should go through this specific course. … Drama generally changed me as a 
student, how I view university, and also as a future educator. 
A: Where do you suggest Drama Education should be? 
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S: Do you mean in which category? 
A: Yes, we could think about it in that way, too. 
S: Yes, it could be together with the methodology courses (2nd Interview, 30.1.2013). 
 
Case 4: Maria-Eva 
A: As you know, Theatre Education and Theatrical Play is not a mandatory course, it 
is optional and only teachers specialising in Language can take it. Would you like to 
make a comment about this? 
M: I find it appropriate that it is included in the Language specialisation. I think it 
relates both to language and to the Arts. Having taken the course, I understand that it 
would be beneficial if it were mandatory, because it really helps the teachers’ 
methodology. The course helps you become open and be direct … with your students. 
So, yes, it would be great if it were mandatory. Personally, It really helped me and I 
wouldn’t change it for another course now (2nd Interview, 26.1.2013). 
 
Case 5: Maria 
A: Maria, as you know, Theatre Education and Theatrical Play is a course that 
belongs to Language specialisation. Would you like to comment on that? 
M: Now that I am reaching towards the end of the course and, also, as the cycle of my 
studies comes to an end, I would really prefer this course to be a requisite rather than 
an optional course. Personally, it gave me the chance to learn a lot of things and it 
might offer the opportunity to other students to discover what theatre education is. 
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You can definitely read the title and think, okay, it’s a theory course or that it’s simply 
a theatre course. But it’s different to actually experience it, to sense it and to confront 
yourself within it. I would prefer that it were a mandatory course. 
A: I see. 
M: Because theatre education is not only language. It’s history, religion, it can be 
taught in combination with all lessons. It can be integrated in all, even in physical 
education (2nd Interview, 26.1.2013). 
 
Case 6: Odysseas  
A: What’s your opinion concerning Theatre Education and Theatrical Play belonging 
in Language specialisation, Odysseas? 
O: I believe it should be compulsory so that all students have the opportunity to take 
the course and see how beautiful it is and how many things there are to learn. The 
most important thing is the experience you can have. I think the course should be 
mandatory. It’s a pity it is offered as a course in Language specialisation. 
… 
O: If you don’t have the experience of this course, it’s not easy to use theatre 
education in your teaching. Because I had taken the course, I was able to combine my 
lessons with theatre education during my school experience. Also, for other university 
courses, I designed lesson plans based on theatre education (2nd Interview, 29.1.2013). 
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ΑPPENDIX C: Fragments From the 3rd Interview on the Participants’    
Teaching Practices at Primary School 
 
Case 1: Philia 
A: Did you enjoy the drama lesson that you taught? How did you experience it?  
P: Um, I’m in a position to say that I liked it. I was expecting more things to go wrong 
but in the end it went fine. It flowed well, thankfully. Though it could certainly have 
run even better. But I think it was a pretty good drama lesson. Yes, besides my own 
satisfaction, I felt like I managed to teach drama and I think that of all the lessons of 
my school experience, this one won them over. I exceeded my limits that day. 
… 
A: Philia, I would like to ask something that we might have left behind earlier. When 
you were in the role of the prince, you were actually in the two roles, of the teacher 
and the prince. Was this difficult for you? 
P: My narrative wasn’t challenging for me at all, because I had cleared up in my head 
from beforehand when I would be a prince and when I would be a teacher asking 
pupils’ opinions. Later, during circular drama, I forgot my dual role. Specifically, I 
forgot my role as a prince. … 
… 
P: I think alertness is a virtue. A few things went wrong with a couple of children, 
during the introductory play, and it was the beginning of drama. At the beginning I 
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wanted some time to gain confidence in order to be able, later, to guide the flow of the 
drama. But something went wrong and I just had to think of something to correct the 
mistake.  
… 
A: Philia, do you think that the drama course helped you in School Experience? I 
mean did you apply characteristics of drama to other lessons you taught? 
P: Yes, my personality has changed. Um, I have taken some factors and virtues that 
drama requires and I apply them to my other courses. This made my pupils more 
committed.  
A: Could you mention some examples? 
P: The element of vigilance, the tone of voice, the way the body communicates, how 
to motivate children. 
A: All these are very important. Is there any other factor you would like to mention? 
P: When I designed the lesson plans for other areas of the curriculum, not for drama, I 
had put the activities of lessons in my head as episodes; this made the organisation of 
my lesson plans easier. I’m aware now that teachers work as directors and so I can 
define teaching as a performance, whereby the children are both actors and spectators. 
A: And why is this performance happening? 
P: Teaching touches something beyond the mind. It touches the mind and, also, the 
soul. It aims at educating the soul and this can occur through a theatrical performance 
too. It can give messages to the spectator and the actor, at once. … (Smiling) And 
what doesn’t teaching offer, at last? Directing is related to psychology. I believe that 
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for someone to be a sensitive, empathetic, sweet and communicative teacher, he/she 
needs to be in tune with children’s psychology and people’s psychology, in general 
(8.7.2013). 
 
Case 2: Constantinos 
C: I see the degree of difficulty involved in drama, but it’s more fun. I think that when 
you learn to prepare drama lessons, it’s easier to succeed as a teacher. It’s one of the 
most delightful ways to teach.  
A: What are the reasons for the difficulties? 
C: Well, you don’t have a book in front of you. You have children and you don’t 
know what can happen. You have an outline for a lesson but what follows can change 
your plan. 
A: So, drama is unforeseeable.  
C: The other reason is what we referred to earlier, you need to be expressive. If you 
aren’t expressive, I think you aren’t doing anything important. Pupils will react 
differently if they see you in a role, trying to be a good actor. (Smiling) You need 
ample time to prepare. Um, what else? You have to be alert at all times so that the 
children don’t get out of hand.  
… 
A: (Watching the video) That’s a beautiful moment when these two girls go from one 
“cage” into the other “cage”… 
C: Yes, they’re in a collective role. 
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A: What do the children do at the end of their show? 
C: They are shy. Although they worked hard, in the end they were shy. Maybe 
because they were being recorded, they didn’t come closer to the audience?  
A:  Eleni isn’t shy. 
C: Yes. 
A: And this girl? 
C: That’s Antigone. She usually just sits in class without participating. But during 
drama, she participated well. 
A: Did she work hard? 
C: Yes. 
A: How would you, Constantinos, assist the children, at this stage, so that they could 
wrap up their performance better?  
C: Yes, the issue about instructions that I mentioned earlier. In some cases, my 
instructions were incomplete. I guess, on my part, there could have been more 
preparation and attentiveness. Some children stand in front and others behind. I didn’t 
accurately describe how they ought to end their performance (26.6.2013).   
 
Case 3: Stephanos 
S: After the 1st activity, the game with the balls, the children began to open up more 
and to express their opinions more freely. I think this is the central feature in drama, 
that the pupil should feel comfortable, as well as the teacher. Children started to 
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express themselves and were not trying to conceal anything or to impress anyone. 
They were real and helped me more than I could help myself. Em, in terms of 
motivating them, since I wasn’t at school every day with them like Odysseas, I can 
say that these children inspired me. 
A: I see. Stephanos, which factors helped the children respond better after the 1st 
activity, as you said? 
S: I think that drama by its very nature is a little more unusual, in the good sense of 
that word. … You help children escape a little from restrictions, to be carefree, and 
yet, drama is friendlier. They understand that drama is very fitting to their 
environment of play and joy. Maybe I just didn’t give clear instructions at first. 
… 
S: The drama teacher must certainly be able to bring the children back to the structure 
of the lesson without telling them off, in a way that the children won’t notice that the 
teacher has done so. … Let’s say I’m teaching mathematics and the lesson is coming 
to an end and they must at that moment pay attention to me, so I announce, “Children, 
pay attention, we have something very important to say now!” In drama, there 
shouldn’t be, “Children, pay attention!” (13.6.2013). 
 
Case 4: Odysseas 
A: Is, in your opinion, Odysseas, the attitude of the drama education teacher a very 
important factor? 
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O: When teaching theatre education, if you bring your problems into the classroom, 
nothing positive will come out of it, because whatever you feel you pass on to the 
children. I believe that however you perform in the classroom, children will respond 
accordingly. If you’re excited, the children will be. If you are not very spirited in the 
classroom, I think you won’t have the best results. The children will be easily bored. 
A: Does that apply to all lessons, do you think? 
O: Yes, but I think for other lessons, when you teach Greek, Mathematics, etc. it 
doesn’t really matter how you are. For theatre education it is more evident, because 
you have experiential things to do with the children, you have to be with them, there, 
entirely. You have things to experience with them. You are certainly with them in 
other lessons, too, but for theatre education, how you are has more of an impact. 
… 
A: What would you change in your lesson, if you were to do it again? 
O: I would definitely change the beginning of the course, if I was to teach it again, 
and things related to my expression. 
… 
O: Basically, when I was taking the course on Theatre Education, we learnt so many 
lovely things, as if we were children. I always remember our experiential workshops. 
We were part of a group, talking, saying, “I’ll do this”, “I want to stand there”, “I’ll 
say this or that”, “I’ll play this or that role”. I was, personally, anxious afterwards, as 
to how and what my group would prepare, how it would seem to others, whether they 
would like it, if I were good, etc. You learn all these. Based on everything I had 
learnt, I wanted my pupils to feel the same way I felt during the course (7.6.2013). 
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Case 5: Maria 
A: (Watching the video) What would you say about yourself in this moment, why you 
are lifting the ears of the elephant? 
M: I was showing that we were playing… Theatre education is very playful. 
A: Do you think your playful spirit influenced the children? 
M: I show them that I am there with them in the classroom, and I think the children 
also expressed their wish to play after. I tried to create an environment of curiosity 
and suspense. I tried to make the children wonder what this letter could say? What 
might Elmer be hiding? 
A: How were your movements here? What were you doing? 
M: They were slow and gentle. I was going to open the letter and see, “what could be 
happening”? This whole process creates an atmosphere of mystery and suspense. 
… 
A: What input could improve in this particular episode? 
M: I think I lose my pupils a little bit here. 
A: Why do you think that happened? 
M: I should have given the instructions differently. To explain them better before 
giving out the picture cards. I could also sit rather than stand on top of their heads. 
A: How about the material that was used? 
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M: Yes, there should have been more boxes of markers so as to avoid all the children 
gathering at the same spot. As we can see from the picture cards, the words aren’t 
legible because the markers were bad quality. 
A: Did you explain to them what to do before they started to call out words? 
M: No. This was one of the lesson’s episodes when I felt that the setting of the 
classroom wasn’t at its best. 
… 
M: Hmm, teaching for me is, essentially, something that should be live.  
A: Do you remember your drawing from the previous stage regarding what is 
teaching? 
M: Yes, yes. Basically (laughing) it was a cauldron of assorted smells. From what I 
understand, in teaching you need to have the right attitude and mood since together 
they aim at offering an outcome. That is the practice of teaching, itself. That’s how I 
now define teaching. At least, that’s how I experienced this from Theatre Education. 
That is teaching. I offered my pupils the opportunity to develop attitudes. 
A: Maria, could you explain further the idea you just mentioned? 
M: Yes. Opportunities should be made so that students can foster their attitudes and 
voices that otherwise remain masked. This is the most important aspect of theatre 
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Case 6: Maria-Eva 
A: Maria-Eva, can you mention some activities you believe assisted pupils in their 
language development?      
M: Yes, the activity during the meeting with the mayor and officials. They got 
involved in the process of thinking and discussing their opinion with other children, as 
well as listening to other children’s opinions. In this activity, there was 
communication between the students and myself. In the following activity, the 
communication was between the children. They discussed what they would say to the 
giant when they visited him. For the next activity, where the children would visit the 
giant, they developed their oral skills. All children had the chance to speak. Beside 
language development, in the 5th activity, children expanded their imagination and 
teamwork, since they would cooperate in performing a scene for the giant’s birthday. 
… 
A: Could you define teaching, now, through Theatre Education, Maria-Eva? 
M: Bearing in mind that teaching demands imagination, creativity and activity, I 
understand that all these aim to advance the ethics of pupils. There is freedom in 
teaching so that pupils are able to openly express their opinions. Through teaching, 
children discover themselves and this gives them joy (25.6.2013).  
 
 
 
 
